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Introduction
Computer systems are the basis for daily human activities, and, even more importantly, they
play a key role in many critical domains. For example, ground and air transportation, power
supply, nuclear plants, and medical applications strongly rely on computer systems: failures
affecting these systems can lead to catastrophic consequences. For this reason, depend-
ability, i.e., “the ability of the system to avoid service failures that are more frequent and
more severe than is acceptable” [2], has been among the most relevant industry and research
concerns since early computer systems. Understanding dependability characteristics
of computer systems is crucial to engineers. For example, analyzing failures, identi-
fying architectural bottlenecks, measuring dependability attributes allow designing effective
failure recovery and mitigation means, reducing maintenance costs, and improving the ser-
vices provided by the system. Direct measurement and analysis of natural failures occurring
under real workload conditions is among the most accurate ways to assess dependability
characteristics [3].
Event logs represent a valuable source of data to conduct a failure analysis.
Event logs are files where computing entities (such as, operating system modules and dae-
mons, middleware supports, application components) register events related to regular and
anomalous activities occurred during the system operational phase. For this reason, logs
have been recognized among the few mechanisms for gaining visibility into the behavior of a
system [4]. Events logs have been extensively used in the context of a variety of application
1
2domains. A non-exhaustive list includes, for example, operating systems [5, 6, 7], con-
trol systems and mobile devices [8, 9], supercomputers [4, 10], and large-scale applications
[11, 12]. It is worth noting that measurement studies based on event logs span over the past
three decades; however, computer systems have deeply changed over this timeframe [13].
For this reason, investigating the suitability of traditional assumptions and techniques un-
derlying log-based failure analysis, in spite of the changes occurred in the computer systems
industry, is of paramount importance.
Relevant industry trends that have been impacting dependability characteristics and
related research are shifting failure causes, and growing system complexity [13]. With respect
to the former trend, it has been recognized that software faults have become the major
responsible for system failures [13, 2, 14], because the hardware failure rate has been
decreasing over the years [15]. Furthermore, current software systems are often developed by
integrating home-made code with a variety of Off-The-Shelf and, more and more frequently,
open-source products [16]. Due to time constraints and technical limitations, it is not
possible to fully validate the correctness of the software solely by means of testing [17, 18]:
software might be released with residual faults that activate during operations. Recent
works have started recognizing that it might be difficult to analyze software failures solely
by looking at logs [6, 19, 20, 21]; however, the ability of current logging mechanisms
to detect the occurrence of software failures is still somewhat unknown.
Growing system complexity is the other industry trend impacting log-based failure anal-
ysis. Early studies adopting logs have been conducted in the context of centralized and
small-scale systems, e.g., [22, 23]. Nowadays, distributed computing is on a strong
growth path [13]. Many notable systems (e.g., web-based applications, networked infras-
tructures, cloud architectures, supercomputers) consist of a large number of entities that
interact to provide a variety of services. As a result, collected logs are often heterogeneous
and distributed across different locations: efficient infrastructures to collect logs play
3a key role to support log-based failure analysis. Furthermore, errors affecting the
entities of a distributed system might propagate because of the natural interactions with
the other components, and cause redundant notifications in the event log. Recognizing
error propagation phenomena is crucial to the objective of obtaining accurate
dependability characterization [24, 25], because it allows identifying entries in the log
related to the manifestation of the same failure. Traditional analysis techniques, e.g., [4, 10],
are not aware of the correlation among entries in the log, thus they might underestimate
the number of failures and distort measurements.
Thesis Contributions
The level of trust on log-based dependability characterization of complex distributed sys-
tems, is biased by the ability at identifying failure data from event logs collected across
different locations, which is a challenging issue [26]. Several factors compromise the ability
at identifying failure data, such as the accuracy of the logging mechanism to detect occur-
ring errors, the effectiveness of the infrastructure that is adopted to manage failure data,
correlation phenomena among the entries in the log. The focus of the thesis is to eval-
uate the accuracy of current logging mechanisms at reporting failures, and to
develop novel techniques to make event logs effective to infer failure data. Tech-
niques involve production, collection, and correlation of the failure data in the log to support
accurate system dependability characterization. Despite the existence of a large number of
studies proposing dependability measurements and models starting from collected logs, e.g.,
[5, 9, 11, 12, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31], this is the first contribution that investigates and improves
the accuracy of data sources and procedures, which are commonly adopted to determine the
failure-related information used to conduct a dependability study. The thesis provides an
answer to each of the following fundamental research questions:
4• Can analysts and practitioners trust event logs? Logs have been successfully
used to analyze hardware-induced failures; however, as mentioned, failures caused by
software faults have become predominant over the past decades. In this work it is
assessed the accuracy of current logging mechanisms at reporting software failures:
surprisingly, the analysis reveals that around 67% of failures caused by the activation
of software faults go completely unreported in the event log. Furthermore, around
40% of notifications provided by event logs represent false failure indications. These
limitations make current logs hard to be used to perform meaningful failure analysis.
Unreported failures lead to erroneous insights into the behavior of the system and re-
duce the effectiveness of corrective actions performed by system administrators. False
failure indications must be filtered out; however, filtering can heavily distort analy-
sis results if not supplemented by a very detailed knowledge of the system and its
components.
• Why current logging mechanisms have limitations? The analysis of the source
code of eight successful open-source and industrial projects, accounting for total around
3.5 million lines of code, demonstrates that, the scarce reporting ability observed for
the logs, is caused by a poorly implemented logging mechanism (i.e., the set of in-
structions in the program that allow the detection of errors occurring at runtime).
The implementation of current logging mechanisms lacks a systematic approach, it
is biased by the programming skills of individual developers and programmers, and
crucial decisions about logging are left at coding time: the analysis shows that cur-
rent logging techniques assume a too simplistic error model, with many errors going
undetected during the system operational phase.
• Is it possible to improve the logging mechanism? The implementation of current
logging mechanisms has at least two severe deficiencies (i) the lack of a comprehensive
5error model for the log (ii) no awareness about the system architecture. A novel logging
mechanism, conceived at design time, is proposed to increase the accuracy of logs at
detecting failures: experiments show that the proposed approach is able to detect and
log around 92% of failures at almost no false indications. Furthermore, the event log
obtained with the proposed approach is around 160 times smaller than the traditional
one. Failures are notified with very few lines: the proposed approach makes it easy
to navigate and to interpret the content of the log, and provides a better support to
tasks, such as diagnosis and maintenance.
• Which are the capabilities an effective logging infrastructure should pro-
vide? The improvement of the failure detection ability is the key to make logs ef-
fective to infer failure data. However, current systems consist of many distributed
components, each equipped with its own logging technologies. An effective logging
infrastructure has to support interoperability among different platforms and masquer-
ade heterogeneity. Furthermore, it must be able to supplement the content of existing
event logs when failures occur. Such capabilities are partially, if not, addressed by
currently available infrastructures, which mainly provide log-centralization capabili-
ties: the thesis proposes a novel logging framework that integrates on-line monitoring
features and processing/analysis tools to manage event logs.
• How to identify correlated entries in the event log? Once logs have been col-
lected across multiple locations, it is crucial to identify correlated error notifications,
i.e., entries in the log that are the manifestation of the same problem: multiple notifi-
cations are caused by error propagation phenomena among the entities composing the
system. The analysis of the log produced by a large-scale supercomputing system (i.e.,
the Mercury cluster at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA),
6University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) revealed that neglecting propagation phe-
nomena distorts dependability measurements by more than 11%. An improved filtering
technique, which adopts statistical indicators to identify correlated error notifications
in the log, is proposed to improve the identification of the failure data.
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides basic notions of dependability,
and clarifies the key role of event logs to analyze dependability characteristics of computer
systems. The nature of the logging mechanism, and the analysis of the challenges to log-
based failure analysis are also discussed.
Chapter 2 describes methodology and applications of log-based failure analysis, and ana-
lyzes related research, which makes it possible to highlight novelty aspects and contributions
of the thesis.
Chapter 3 evaluates the accuracy of current logging mechanisms. It is described the
framework that has been implemented to conduct experiments, and results observed for
three popular real-world systems: Apache Web Server, TAO Open Data Distribution Service,
MySQL DBMS.
Implementation pitfalls of current logging mechanisms are discussed in Chapter 4, which
describes the techniques that have been developed in the thesis to make logs effective to
infer failure data.
Chapter 5 provides the experimental evaluation of the proposed techniques, and discusses
the benefits that can be obtained by means of their adoption in the context of several case
studies. Concluding remarks are proposed at the end of the dissertation.
Ricordati che dietro ogni problema c’é
un’opportunitá.
Remember that behind any problem
there is chance.
Galileo Galilei
Chapter 1
Characterizing System Failures with
Event Logs
Characterizing dependability of operational systems is crucial to engineers. Characterization encom-
passes, for example, failure modes classification, identification of failure-prone components (often in-
dicated as dependability bottlenecks), measurement (e.g., Time-Between-Failures, Time-To-Repair).
Analysis is valuable in a variety of industrial sectors, because it provides strong insights into the
failure behavior of the target system, and allows determining the causes of failures, preventing their
occurrence, and improving the dependability of future system releases. Direct measurement and anal-
ysis of natural failures occurring under real workload conditions is among the most accurate ways
to characterize dependability [3]: for this reason, event logs, which contain information generated by
the system during the operational phase, represent a valuable source of failure data. This chapter
provides basic notions of dependability that will be used in the rest of the dissertation, and clari-
fies the role of event logs to analyze the system failure behavior. Then, it is described the logging
mechanism, which aims to detect and notify, i.e., in terms of entries in the event log, anomalous
events occurring during operations. The nature of the logging mechanism, along with the trends that
have been impacting computer industry over the past decades, allow achieving insights into issues
and threats affecting log-based failure analysis that motivate the study.
1.1 The Role of Event Logs
Computer systems are the basis of daily human activities, and, even more importantly, they
play a key role in a variety of business and safety critical domains, such as telecommunica-
tion systems, transportation, power supply, nuclear plants, and medical applications. For
example, the crash of several AT&T switches occurred on January 15, 1990, caused the loss
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of phone service for 60 thousands users in the United States. The failure of the software of
a medical device, which made therapeutic radiations to overcome the recommended dosage,
caused the death of eight patients. For this reason, dependability, i.e., “the ability of the
system to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable”
[2], has been among the most relevant industry concerns and research topics since early
computer systems.
Analyzing the nature of the failures occurred in the filed is crucial to engineers. Failure
analysis techniques are widely used in the context of several industrial sectors because they
allow determining the causes of failures, preventing their future occurrence, and improving
the dependability of the system in hands. Direct measurement and analysis of natural
failures occurring under real workload conditions is among the most accurate ways to assess
dependability characteristics [3]. For this reason, failure analysis is often conducted by
means of event logs, i.e., the set of files where computing entities (e.g., operating system
modules and daemons, middleware supports, application components) register events related
to regular and anomalous activities occurred during operations.
Event logs represent attractive sources of failure data. As a matter of fact,
logs have been recognized among the few mechanisms for gaining visibility into
the behavior of a system [4]. The importance of log-based failure analysis is well recog-
nized in the context of a variety of application domains. A non-exhaustive list includes, for
example, operating systems [5, 6, 7], control systems and mobile devices [8, 9], supercom-
puters [4, 10], and large-scale applications [11, 12]. These studies allowed achieving valuable
insights into the failure behavior of real production systems and improving their subsequent
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releases. In the following, are discussed basic notions of dependability and event logs. The
nature of the logging mechanism, along with the trends that have been impacting computer
industry over the past decades, allow achieving insights into the threats affecting log-based
failure analysis and motivate the study.
1.2 Basic Notions of Dependability
Dependability has been considered a fundamental attribute since early computer systems.
First efforts in the area of dependable computing date back to the 1960s, e.g., [32, 33].
Later on in 1971, the establishment of a technical conference on fault-tolerant computing,
i.e., the First International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing (FTCS), represented
a milestone in the area of dependability [13]: this conference established a discussion forum
about novel practical and theoretical research contributions in the area of dependable com-
puting. The efforts of the joint committee on “Fundamental Concepts and Terminology”
founded in 1980, and composed by the TC on Fault-Tolerant Computing of the IEEE CS
and the IFIP WG 10.4 “Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance”, have been crucial for
the formalization of dependability-related concepts.
Laprie reviewed the outcomes of such efforts in [34], and defined dependability as
the system “ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted”. A later work from
the same research community [2] defines dependability as the “the ability of the system
to avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable”. The
latter is an alternative definition of dependability, which provides an operational criterion
for deciding if a system is dependable. Dependability threats, attributes, and means [2] are
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Figure 1.1: Dependability threats: fault, error, failure (adapted from [2]).
briefly described in the following1. The focus is on the concepts that are closely related to
the contents of the dissertation.
1.2.1 Fault, Error, Failure
The definition of dependability focuses on the concept of service, i.e., the behavior of the
system as perceived by its users. The portion of the boundary of the system where the
service is delivered is called service interface, i.e., Figure 1.1(A). Dependability threats
encompass causes and manifestations of incorrect services delivered at the interface.
A service failure, or simply, failure, occurs when the delivered service deviates from
the correct service. For example, a service might fail because it does not comply with the
functional specification. A failure is thus a transition from correct to incorrect service,
as shown in Figure 1.1(B). The period of delivery of incorrect service is called outage;
the transition from incorrect to correct service is the service restoration. The deviation
1The thesis follows the dependability-related notions proposed by the IFIP WG 10.4 “Dependable Com-
puting and Fault Tolerance”.
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from correct service assumes different forms, which are called failure modes. For example,
commonly observed failure modes are content and timing failures. The former encompasses
those scenarios where the content of the information delivered at the interface deviates from
implementing the system function; in the latter case the arrival time or the duration of the
information delivered at the interface deviates from implementing the system function. An
error is the part of the system state that might lead to its subsequent failure. A fault is
the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error. Faults belong to three major categories:
• development faults including all internal faults originated during development;
• physical faults, i.e., all fault classes that affect hardware;
• interaction faults, which represent all external faults.
Faults, errors, and failures are related in the form of a chain that is partially shown in
Figure 1.1(A). A fault is active when it produces an error; dormant, otherwise. An error
is thus caused either by an internal fault that is activated or an external fault. A failure
occurs if the error propagates to the service interface. It is worth noting that many errors
do not reach the service interface: such errors are called latent. Let consider the so called
programming bugs, i.e., faulty instructions in a program (e.g., common mistakes, such as
missing variable initializations, or poorly-written logical clauses). A programming bug is a
dormant fault in the software. The fault is activated when an appropriate input pattern is
fed to the component where the faulty instruction resides, and an error is generated. The
error might propagate within the system and affect the delivered service: in this case a
failure has occurred.
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Figure 1.2: Dependability measures: TTF, TTR, TBF.
1.2.2 Attributes and Measures
As developed over the years, dependability has been an integrating concept encompassing
several attributes [2]. Attributes and measures that are closer to the content of the disser-
tation are briefly introduced in the following.
Reliability. Reliability measures the probability of correct service over a specific time
interval. According to [35], reliability is the conditional probability of delivering a correct
service in the interval [0, t], given that the service was in a correct status at the reference
time 0.
R(0, t) = P (no failures in [0, t] | the service is correct at 0) (1.1)
If F (t) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the Time To Failure (TTF) (each
TTF sample is the time interval between a service restoration and the subsequent failure,
as shown in Figure 1.2), reliability can be also written as
R(t) = 1− F (t) (1.2)
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Reliability has been among the only attributes of interest in case of early computer systems.
The failure rate, i.e., the frequency a system fails, and the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)
are commonly used indicators of the system reliability [36, 37, 38].
Maintainability. Maintainability is the ability of the system to be easily repaired after the
occurrence of a failure. For this reason, a commonly adopted way to assess maintainability
is observing the Time To Recover (TTR), i.e., the time between the occurrence of a failure
and the subsequent service restoration, as reported in Figure 1.2. In this case, the Mean
Time To Recover (MTTR) is adopted as a single maintainability indicator.
Availability. Availability is the readiness for correct service, and it became relevant when
the popularity of time-sharing systems increased. A system is available at the time t, if it
provides a correct service at t. Let A(t) be a function defined as follows:
A(t) =
{
1 if the service is correct at t
0 otherwise (1.3)
Availability is the fraction of time where the system provides a correct service. As shown
in Figure 1.2, the time the system is able to provide a correct service depends on both the
number of failures and the TTR. In other words, availability can be computed as:
A =
MTTF
MTTR+MTTF
=
MTTF
MTBF
(1.4)
where the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF, with MTBF=MTTR+MTTF) is the mean
time between two subsequent failures. For example, the shorter the time to repair the
system, the higher the service availability.
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1.2.3 Means
The need to ensure dependability properties during system operations has lead to the design
of a variety of dependability means over the last decades. Authors in [2] group such means
into four general categories:
• Fault prevention aims to prevent the occurrence or the introduction of faults in the
system. Prevention is enforced at development time and applies both to software, e.g.,
by forcing developers to make use of modularization, information-hiding techniques,
patterns, strongly-typed programming languages, and hardware, e.g., by means of
precise design rules.
• Fault tolerance embraces those means aiming to avoid service failures in case of faults
activated during operations. Fault tolerance is commonly achieved by introducing
temporal and/or spatial redundancy in the system. Temporal redundancy attempts
to re-execute the operation that caused the failure after the system has been restored
into an error-free state; spatial redundancy adopts multiple replicas of the same system
function. Spatial redundancy relies on the assumption that replicas are not affected by
the same faults: this is achieved via design diversity [39]. Furthermore, both temporal
and spatial redundancy adopt error detection and recovery approaches: once the error
is detected, a recovery action is initiated.
• Fault removal aims to reduce the number and severity (i.e., the measure of the
impact of the fault activation on the overall system) of faults. Fault removal is usually
conducted at verification and validation time via testing and fault-injection techniques
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1 [ May−12−2011 0 9 : 3 0 : 1 1 ] Get manager reference from local daemon
2 [ May−12−2011 0 9 : 3 0 : 1 1 ] Setup datastores
3 [ May−12−2011 0 9 : 3 0 : 1 1 ] Supervision property change event notifier
4 [ May−12−2011 0 9 : 3 0 : 1 2 ] Event notifier is running
5 ... omissis ...
6 [ May−12−2011 0 9 : 3 0 : 2 2 ] Exception raised when creating managed process ’ P1 ’
7 [ May−12−2011 0 9 : 3 0 : 2 2 ] Error : managed process ’ P1 ’ aborted
8 ... omissis ...
9 [ May−12−2011 0 9 : 3 0 : 3 2 ] Created DS Sys_Converter
10 [ May−12−2011 0 9 : 3 0 : 3 2 ] Created SystemAccessor
Figure 1.3: Example of entries in the event log.
[40]. During the operational phase, fault removal encompasses corrective and perfective
maintenance.
• Fault Forecasting allows estimating the current number, the future incidence, and
consequences of faults: this is done by evaluating the system behavior in face of
activated faults. Evaluation can be either qualitative, e.g., classification and analysis
of the failure modes, or quantitative, e.g., assessing the extent system attributes are
satisfied in terms of probabilities. Evaluation can be performed at different phases of
the life cycle of the system, such as design, prototype, operational [3].
1.3 Event Logs
Event logs, or simply logs, are system-generated files that report sequences of
events occurred during operations, in the form of text-entries. Figure 1.3 reports
example entries in an event log: entries usually provide a timestamp, i.e., the time the event
has been logged, and a text message providing contextual information about the event, such
as nature and type. An entry might encompass further information, e.g., the pid of the
process and the IP address of the node generating the entry, or the severity of the event.
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Figure 1.4: General reference scenario.
Entries are logged via a programming interface, according to developers’ needs. Well-known
examples of event logging subsystems are UNIX syslog [41] and Microsoft’s event logger
[42]. Entries range from regular to error events occurred during the system operational
phase [22]. Regular events report non-error conditions, e.g., disk mounts, network-status
reports, incoming user connections, ordinary system elaborations; error events report about
hardware or software problems, and unsuccessful operations (e.g., Figure 1.3, lines 6-7).
Log entries are produced by a variety of computing entities, e.g., operating
system modules and daemons, middleware supports, application components. In a more
general scenario, depicted in Figure 1.4, different instances of these entities are distributed
across the nodes composing a system and represent the layers of the software stack run by
the nodes. Logs collected across multiple locations, i.e., in terms of nodes and architectural
layers, are extremely valuable to engineers: as mentioned, they have been recognized among
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Table 1.1: Breakup of the logs generated by a Flight Data Plan Processor application during
the startup phase, by node and software layer.
node node 1 node 2 node 3 total
# logs # entris # logs # entries # logs # entries # logs # entries
SW layer
application 8 1,359 6 669 7 1,078 21 3,106
middleware 4 945 4 304 2 67 10 1,316
OS 1 35 1 15 1 22 3 72
total 13 2,339 11 988 10 1,167 34 4,494
the few mechanisms for gaining visibility into the behavior of the system [4] and allow ini-
tiating proper recovery actions in case of failures occurred during operations. Nevertheless,
logs are a quite under-utilized resource, because navigating the large amount of collected
data to infer the knowledge about the system behavior is a challenging task [30, 26].
For the sake of clarity, it is discussed a real example concerning the logs produced
by a prototype Air Traffic Control application, i.e., a Flight Data PLan (FPL) Processor,
developed in the context of an academic-industrial collaboration2. Application components
of the FPL processor run atop a middleware layer consisting of CARDAMOM3 (a CORBA-
based platform designed to support the development of software architectures for safety
and mission critical systems) and an OMG-compliant Data Distribution Service4 (DDS)
implementation. Table 1.1 provides the breakup of all the logs produced by an instance of
the FPL processor (running on three nodes) by node and software layer: it is worth noting
that the logs referenced by Table 1.1 are produced during the sole startup phase of the FPL
processor. Total around 4,500 entries (reported in the last row of Table 1.1) are produced by
2A world leading company, SELEX-SI, FINMECCANICA Group, and academic partners have been
involved in the COSMIC Project, a three-year industrial research project aiming to create a public-private
laboratory for the development of a open source middleware platform for mission critical systems.
3http://forge.objectweb.org/projects/cardamom
4OMG specification for the Data Distribution Service.
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the FPL processor during the startup. The entries are stored into 34 distinct files produced
at different layers and distributed across several machines. Furthermore, the system adopts
a variety of logging technologies: (i) entries produced by the OS are generated via the UNIX
syslog interface and are stored in the /var/logs/messages system file, (ii) middleware logs
are collected by means of a specific CARDAMOM service called Trace Logging, finally,
(iii) application logs are collected both via the Trace service and regular text files. If the
startup of the FPL processor failed, understanding the causes of the failure would require
administrators to perform hard and time-consuming tasks to retrieve the information from
the node locations and to investigate the content of these heterogeneous data sources.
Only a fraction of the entries in the log is useful to conduct the failure analysis. As
discussed, entries might report about regular system operations indicating non error events:
these entries, which represent most of the content of the log, can be filtered out and excluded
from the failure analysis [22]. For example, the failure analysis of a supercomputing system,
which will be discussed later in the dissertation, focused on 377,197 out of around 200 million
entries contained in the initial event log, i.e., only 0.18% of the entire dataset. Filtering
non-error events is essentially a laborious task, but it does not represent an actual threat
to log-based failure analysis. Several techniques can be used to discriminate not useful
from useful entries in the log, accurately. For example, a preliminary manual inspection
of the log is valuable to identify the severity of the entries and error-specific keywords; de-
parameterization procedures [30, 43], which aim to remove variable fields from the entries
in the log, e.g., usernames, IP and memory addresses, folders, reduce the number of distinct
messages to scrutinize and allow a better interpretation of the messages in the log.
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The level of trust on log-based failure analysis is affected by the ability at inferring
meaningful failure data from the log. For example, as discussed in Section 1.2.2, widely-
used dependability indicators, such as availability and reliability, are inherently related to
the notion of failure. The accurate identification of the subset of entries in the log
representing the failure data is extremely challenging. To this objective, the logging
mechanism, which aims to detect anomalous events occurring during operations, plays a key
role: if a failure goes undetected by the logging mechanism (thus, unreported in the event
log), analysis results can be completely distorted in spite of the accuracy of the filtering
techniques that have been adopted to process the data before the analysis.
1.4 Logging Mechanism
The logging mechanism is the set of detectors, either hardware or software, that allows to
reveal the occurrence of error events during the system operational phase. Figure 1.5 shows
the causal relationship between faults and failures and clarifies the role of the detectors com-
posing the logging mechanism. Once a fault is activated by a trigger (i.e., a specific sequence
of inputs or condition of the execution environment that activates a fault) it generates one
or more errors. Errors propagate through the various layers and/or nodes of the system,
and might possibly fire the detectors. As a result, detectors will report the occurrence of the
event in the form of entries in the log (Figure 1.5, event log). As discussed in Section 1.2.1,
an error that reaches the service interface, causing a deviation from the correct service, is
called failure. In order to be suitable to perform a failure analysis, the logging mech-
anism should encompass only the errors that cause failures, i.e., Figure 1.5 (d).
Chapter 1. Characterizing System Failures with Event Logs 20
Figure 1.5: Error logging mechanism: overview.
However, many situations can prevent the accurate reporting of the failures, thus making
hard, if not impossible, to infer the information about their occurrence from the event log.
For example, failures can go unreported in the log either because (i) no detector is able to
catch the failure, i.e., Figure 1.5 (b), or (ii) even if the failure is detected, i.e., Figure 1.5
(a), there is no enough time to write an entry in the event log (e.g., in C/C++ programs,
bad pointer manipulations can originate a crash of the OS process before any useful infor-
mation is logged). Furthermore, event logs might report errors that did not cause a failure,
i.e., Figure 1.5 (c): some error notifications that can be commonly observed in the log
(e.g., unreleased files, pending sockets, null pointers) do not necessarily represent a failure
indication, and have to be discarded before the failure analysis is performed: this task, if
not supplemented by a detailed knowledge of the system, can distort analysis results.
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Figure 1.6: Coverage of the event log.
Figure 1.6 provides a pictorial representation of the described scenarios, by highlight-
ing the role of the event log at reporting failures. The ellipses represent the set of faults,
the subset of activated faults, i.e., errors, and the subset of errors causing failures, respec-
tively; the event log, represented by the ellipse with the dotted border, partially overlaps
failures. Through the rest of the dissertation, unreported failures will denote failures that
go undetected and/or unlogged by the logging mechanism, and thus escape the event log
(as indicated in Figure 1.6). These failures are false negatives, i.e., a problem has occurred
in the system but no trace can be found in the log; the failure is reported (or logged), oth-
erwise. Similarly, reported errors (as indicated in Figure 1.6) will denote improper states
of the system that do not cause a failure, but fire the logging mechanism by causing one
or more entries to be written in the log; errors are named unreported, otherwise. Reported
errors represent false positives to the failure analysis: even if they notify anomalous events
in the log, no actual failure has occurred in the system.
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1.4.1 Limitations
The implementation of the logging mechanism is currently a low-priority task that is left to
the late stages of the system life cycle (e.g., coding). Key decisions about log production
and management are taken by developers and programmers, each of them with his/her own
programming skills, and deciding what and where to log with no systematic approach: as
a result, entries in the log are often subjective [7] and unstructured [30]. In general, the
logging mechanism is not envisioned at system design time.
The nature of the logging mechanism has serious limitations that compromise the ef-
fective use of event logs for the failure analysis. Several works, such as [4, 7, 6], recognize
that logs might lack any useful information to perform the analysis: as discussed,
failures can go undetected by the logging mechanism. Unreported failures decrease the level
of trust on log-based failure analysis, because they cause the overestimation of dependabil-
ity attributes, e.g., availability, reduce the effectiveness of corrective actions performed by
administrators, and lead to wrong insights into the behavior of the system.
As mentioned, the logging mechanism might detect errors that do not cause
failures. Event logs are often conceived for debugging purposes rather than for failure
analysis. For this reason, they contain many error indications on unreleased files or sockets,
null pointers, and so on: these errors do not necessarily indicate that a failure has occurred.
Figure 1.7 shows some example entries representing false failure indications. Examples have
been extracted from the event log of Apache Web Server and TAO Open DDS, which will
be discussed later in the dissertation. In all the cases the entries seem to report critical
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1 - Example #1: Apache Web Server (ver 1.3.41) -
2
3 [ Tue May 26 00 : 05 : 53 2009 ] [ error ] ( 9 ) Bad file descriptor : fcntl (420 , F_SETFD ,
4 FD_CLOEXEC ) failed
5 [ Tue May 26 00 : 05 : 53 2009 ] [ warn ] ( 9 ) Bad file descriptor : exec ( ) may not be safe
6
7 - Example #2: Apache Web Server (ver 1.3.41) -
8
9 [ Tue May 26 01 : 13 : 47 2009 ] [ error ] [ client IP−ADDR ] request failed : erroneous
10 characters after protocol string : ∗
11 [ Tue May 26 01 : 13 : 49 2009 ] [ error ] [ client IP−ADDR ] request failed : erroneous
12 characters after protocol string : ∗
13 [ Tue May 26 01 : 13 : 51 2009 ] [ error ] [ client IP−ADDR ] request failed : erroneous
14 characters after protocol string : ∗
15
16 - Example #3: TAO Open DDS (ver 0.9) -
17
18 (28570 |3077016496) ERROR Cached_Allocator_With_Overflow : : free b5d13f1c more deletes
19 1 than allocs 0 to the heap
20 (28570 |3077016496) ERROR Cached_Allocator_With_Overflow : : free 8166224 more deletes
21 1 than allocs 0 to the heap
22 (28570 |3077016496) ERROR Cached_Allocator_With_Overflow : : free b5d0beb4 more deletes
23 1 than allocs 0 to the heap
Figure 1.7: Examples of false positives entries in the log.
conditions preventing the correct execution of the program. Errors involve OS and applica-
tion data structures, e.g., files and buffers (Example #1 and #3, respectively), and client
requests (Example #2). In particular, in the second example taken from Apache, the mes-
sage in the log explicitly states that the HTTP request forwarded by the client has failed.
Nevertheless, it has been observed that, in all the cases, the systems were able to provide
correct service despite the notification in the log: in this cases, the information provided by
the event log leads to erroneous conclusions.
The detection ability of the logging mechanism is of paramount importance to analysts,
because, in most of cases, the event log is the only available source of data to achieve insights
into the failure behavior of the system: misleading information in the log, i.e., in terms of
missing or false failure notifications, can heavily distort the analysis and related results.
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False failure notifications must be filtered out before the analysis; however, this task is hard
when no further information, such as the ground truth (i.e., the knowledge of the actual
failure behavior of the system), is available to supplement the content of existing logs.
The logging mechanism might report a single failure with multiple notifica-
tions in the log. The nature of the workload and error propagation phenomena, due to
natural interactions among system components, cause one or more error detectors to be
fired many times and, in most of cases, over short time intervals during the operational
phase [4, 22]. For example, the analysis of a supercomputing system revealed that, an in-
put/output failure caused by a damaged disk sector affecting a storage node, lead to 142
“unknown partition table” entries in the event log: these entries spanned a timeframe of
28s. Similarly, it was observed a case where a single failure affecting MySQL DBMS caused
5,421,413 entries in the log.
1.5 Challenges to Log-Based Failure Analysis
Measurement studies based on event logs span over the past three decades; however, com-
puter systems have deeply changed over this timeframe [13]. The 1970s were characterized by
mainframe systems that could be operated only by highly trained personnel; today, a variety
of technologies, such as personal computers, laptops, mobile devices, PDAs, are available to
the mass market. Two relevant industry trends have been impacting dependabil-
ity characteristics and related research over the past decades [13]: shifting failure
causes, and growing system complexity. These trends threaten the validity of assumptions
on the data and processing technique used to conduct log-based failure analysis.
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Works, such as [13, 2, 14], recognize that software faults are currently among the
main responsible for system failures. System outages caused by hardware failures have
dropped by two order of magnitude in two decades, as shown by a study from IBM data
[15]. As opposite, software is becoming more and more complex, and it is often developed by
integrating a variety of home-made and third-party components. Testing activities might not
be able to fully validate the correctness of the software against every potential trigger [17, 18],
and a software component is likely to be released with residual faults that activate only
during operations. While event logs have been successfully used to characterized hardware
problems, it has been recognized that, analyzing software failures solely by looking at logs,
is a hard task [6, 19, 20, 21]. The activation of software faults may escape any low-level
check and go completely unreported in the log. As discussed, in C/C++ programs, bad
pointer manipulations can originate a process crash before any useful information is logged.
Similarly, infinite loops caused by bad variable management may lead to hangs, without
leaving any trace in the logs. Software faults are challenging and represent a serious threat
to the accuracy of event logs. In fact, the suitability of current logging mechanisms in face
of software failures is still somewhat unknown.
Inaccuracy is not the only threat to log-based analysis. Early studies adopting logs have
been conducted in the context of centralized and small-scale systems, e.g., [22, 23]. Nowa-
days, distributed computing is on a growth path [13]: many notable systems (e.g.,
web-based networked infrastructures, cloud architectures, supercomputers) consist of entities
that interact to provide a variety of services. The example ATC application, which has been
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discussed in Section 1.3, indicates that logs are heterogeneous and distributed across differ-
ent software layers and/or nodes. The growing system complexity, i.e., in terms of number
of components and interactions among them, highlights the need for novel infrastructures
to collect and to manage the logged information.
Furthermore, in case of distributed systems, errors might propagate because of the nat-
ural interactions among the components. Propagation results in multiple and apparently
uncorrelated entries in the log collected across different locations [44, 22], and represents
a further threat to log-based failure analysis. Recognizing error propagation phenomena
in the event logs allows understanding when to group events related to the same failure
manifestation, and to establish the actual number of unique failure data points: this is cru-
cial to the objective of obtaining accurate dependability characterization [24, 25]. A widely
adopted strategy to group entries, is using an one-fits-all timing window. However, this
approach is not aware of the actual correlation among log messages [4, 10]. The risk is to
classify correlated failures as uncorrelated, and vice versa, thus leading to unrealistic results.
The focus of the thesis is to evaluate the accuracy of current logging mecha-
nisms at reporting failures, and to develop novel techniques to make event logs
effective to infer failure data. Techniques involve production, collection, and correlation
of the failure data in the log to support accurate dependability characterization. Towards
this objective, the thesis moves from the evaluation of current logging mechanisms. Analysis
results show that current logs are inaccurate at reporting software failures, thus, an effective
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logging mechanism, which is based on the lessons learnt from the analysis of the implementa-
tion pitfalls of current ones, is proposed. A novel framework to manage event logs collected
in distributed environments is then presented. The framework provides a log-centralization
support and, more importantly, integrates monitoring features that allow supplementing the
content of existing logs when failures occur. Finally, it is discussed an approach to correlate
failure data in the collected log. The identification of correlated entries allows determining
the actual number of failures and obtaining more realistic measurements.
Il vero sapere é conoscere le cause.
The actual knowledge is knowing the
causes.
Aristotele
Chapter 2
Log-based Failure Analysis:
Methodology and Applications
Analysis of naturally occurring system failures allows assessing dependability characteristics. To-
wards this objective, event logs, which report events occurred during system operations under real
workload conditions, are a valuable source of failure data. So far, event logs have been successfully
used in a variety of application domains, ranging from operating systems to supercomputers and
large-scale applications: studies based on event logs pursue rather different analysis objectives. In
this chapter, it is discussed related work in the area of log-based failure analysis. Overall methodol-
ogy, tools and techniques supporting collection and filtering of event logs are presented beforehand. A
substantial body of literature analyzing failure data of operational systems is subsequently introduced.
Works are classified and discussed based on the major analysis objectives they pursue. Finally, re-
search efforts that are closer to the content of the thesis are presented, in order to highlight challenges
faced by the thesis. More in details, analysis of closely related literature makes it possible to under-
stand the novelty aspects of the techniques developed in the thesis. The techniques, supported by a
concept schema investigating their applicability, are summarized at the end of the chapter.
2.1 Methodology Overview
Failure analysis is valuable in a variety of industrial domains, because it allows evaluating
and improving dependability characteristics of computer systems. As already discussed,
analysis is usually based on the observation of natural failures occurred during the oper-
ational phase of the system under real workload conditions (i.e., failures are not induced
by means of fault/error injection techniques): analysis of naturally-occurring failures is
28
Chapter 2. Log-based Failure Analysis: Methodology and Applications 29
Figure 2.1: Log-based failure analysis: methodology overview.
among the most accurate ways to achieve insights into the failure behavior of the system
[3, 4]. Event logs have been a widely adopted source of failure data over the past three
decades. Analysis of failure data in the log provides valuable information on error/failure
classes, allows pinpointing dependability bottlenecks, quantifying dependability attributes,
and supporting the verification of assumptions made in system models. In the following, it is
described the methodology underlying log-based failure analysis. Methodology involves
three main steps, i.e., (i) collection, (ii) filtering, and (iii) analysis of entries
in the log, which are reported in Figure 2.1. The concept overview shown in the Figure
highlights the sequential relationship among them. In particular, once event logs have been
collected from a target system, filtering procedures make it possible to infer failure data
from the event log. Finally, failure data are analyzed to characterize properties of interest
of the system. Major state-of-the-art tools and techniques adopted to manipulate the data
at each step of the methodology are surveyed in the following.
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2.1.1 Collection
The logging mechanism allows detecting the occurrence of events of interest at runtime:
once an event is detected, one or more text entries are produced in the log. Entries might
be stored in a file available at the location hosting the component that detected the event.
However, this approach has a main drawback: event logs are distributed across many dif-
ferent locations, especially in the context of large-scale systems. It might take significant
effort to retrieve the data to analyze.
Logging protocols and supports have been developed to centralize entries
produced by distributed computing entities at a single location. A well-known
example is UNIX syslog [41, 45]. The syslog protocol defines a log format that has become
a de facto standard over the years. For example, a syslog entry is characterized by severity
and facility, that can be combined to define the priority of the message. Severity is related
to the criticality of the notification, i.e., in terms of importance of the logged event. It varies
in the interval {0, ..., 7}, with 0, i.e., the maximum severity, representing an emergency-level
entry, down to 7, reporting a debug entry. Facility provides an indication of the source of
the event, such as kernel, or the security subsystem. Other information might encompass
timestamp, hostname of the component generating the entry, application name, message
id. A configuration file, namely, /etc/syslog.conf, allows specifying how to manage the
events, e.g., based on the severity. Syslog is not just a reference format to log entries, but
it also defines a protocol, encompassing originator, relay and collector entities to centralize
the log. The originator is the source of the entries; the relay is used to forward entries
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to monitoring/analysis clients, which are collectors. Typical syslog architectures are based
on the use of a relay process for each node of the system. Each relay forwards the events
collected from all local processes to a remote location.
Microsoft Event Log protocol is another example of log-collection system [42]. Each
Windows machine runs an Event Log provider that is accessible by means of specific system
calls. Once an entry is logged, it can be stored in a log file and/or forwarded to a remote
machine. Another popular framework is Apache Software Foundation’s log4xx [46] . The
framework is available for C++, PHP, Java and .NET applications, and it can be config-
ured in terms of syntax of log messages, e.g., to support automatic parsing of the entries,
and destination. Furthermore it adopts pluggable components to allow the storage and/or
transmission of the events in the local file system, databases, network, and email.
It is worth noting that a variety of logging and monitoring subsystems have been de-
veloped to supplement existing frameworks. In the following, are discussed some examples
coming both from academia and industry. Analyze NOW [47] consists of a set of tools to
support log-based failure analysis. In particular, it automates data collection in networks
of workstations, whose monitoring is challenging because of the frequent addition and re-
moval of components. Authors in [48] discuss the design of a logger application to collect
failure-related data of mobile phones. The logging support helped at gaining more detailed
knowledge of mobile phones failures. Another proposal is IBM Common Event Infrastructure
[49], introduced to save the time needed for root cause analysis. It offers a consistent, unified
set of APIs and infrastructure for the creation, transmission, persistence and distribution of
log entries, according to a well-defined format.
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2.1.2 Filtering
Given a large volume of data collected in real systems, a crucial step of each log-based
measurement study is inferring the failure data that will be used to perform the analysis.
Filtering encompasses two types of activity, i.e., (i) removing non-useful data, and, more
importantly, (ii) coalescing redundant failure data by grouping entries in the log that are
related to the manifestation of the same problem.
Only a fraction of the entries in the log is useful to conduct the failure
analysis: as discussed, many entries report non-error events and can be excluded from the
failure analysis [22]. Filtering non-error events is essentially a laborious and time-consuming
task; however, it does not represent a real threat to log-based failure analysis. A manual
inspection of the log is valuable to identify the severity of the entries and error-specific
keywords. Furthermore, manual inspection can be supported by de-parameterization proce-
dures. De-parameterization replaces variable fields within the text entries of the log (e.g.,
usernames, IP and memory addresses, folders) with a generic token. For example, the hypo-
thetical entries “incoming connection from 192.168.0.184” and “incoming connection
from 221.145.31.27” appear the same once IP addresses are replaced with the “IPAddr”
token. De-parameterization reduces the number of distinct messages templates to scruti-
nize. As shown by [43] around 200 million entries in the log of a supercomputing system
were generated by only 1,124 distinct messages. Where needed, de-parameterization can be
combined with statistical approaches to faster the identification of the content of interest.
For example, authors in [30] apply the Leveinshtein distance to cluster distinct messages.
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Figure 2.2: Tuple heuristic: grouping algorithm (A); sensitivity analysis (B).
Once non-error data has been filtered out, it still remains the problem of grouping the error
entries in the log representing the manifestation of the same problem. As discussed in Section
1.4.1, a fault can generate multiple errors that propagate within the system, causing a prob-
lem to be detected multiple times by the logging mechanism, and, consequently, reported
with multiple notifications in the event log. In order to obtain accurate dependability mea-
surements log entries related to same failure manifestation have to be clustered
into the same failure data point [24, 25]: this procedure also called coalescence.
The most adopted coalescence strategy is the tuple heuristic (or, simply, tupling) [22].
The intuition underlying this strategy is that two entries in the log, if related to the same
fault activation, are likely to occur near in time. Consequently, if the time distance of the
entries is smaller than a predetermined threshold, i.e., the coalescence window, they are
placed in the same group (called tuple). Figure 2.2(A) clarifies the concept. Let ei and
ei+1 be two subsequent entries in the log occurring at t(ei) and t(ei+1), respectively. If
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the condition t(ei+1) − t(ei) < W is satisfied (with W denoting the mentioned coalescence
window), ei+1 is placed in the same tuple of ei. The coalescence window, determined via a
sensitivity analysis, is selected to group log entries into tuples. Sensitivity analysis assesses
how the tuple count varies when W varies. As a result of the grouping condition reported in
Figure 2.2(A), the longer the duration of the coalescence window, the smaller the number
of tuples. For this reason, the result of the analysis is a “L-shaped” curve representing the
tuple count, such as the one shown in Figure 2.2(B): the tuple count decreases when the
coalescence window increases.
A good choice for the coalescence window is the value right after the “knee” of the
curve, where the tuple count sharply flattens [22]. The choice of the coalescence window
is critical, because the tuples provide an approximation of the actual number of failures
that occurred during the time the log has been collected. When W is too small, the risk is
to put entries related to same problem into different tuples (truncation); viceversa, if W is
too large, entries related to different problem might be placed in the same tuple (collision).
The methodological improvement of the heuristic is represented by the concept of spatial
coalescence [10, 4]: errors can propagate among the nodes of the system, and notifications
related to the same fault manifestation might be spatially distributed as a result.
A rather different approach is content-based coalescence: in this case, events in the log
are grouped based on the content of the text entries. For example, the authors in [6] use
a complex perl algorithm, based on the sequential parsing of the messages in the log, to
identify OS reboots. The work [25] shows how to use the content of the entries to group the
events notified by the same entity.
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2.1.3 Analysis
Collection and filtering make it possible to infer the failure data from the event log; analysis
allows system engineers to achieve meaningful insights from the data. Early studies in the
area of log-based failure analysis, such as [50, 51, 52], demonstrated that logs are a valuable
mean to perform quantitative system assessment and to evaluate fault tolerance and recovery
mechanisms. So far, log-based failure analysis has been conducted in a variety of
application domains, ranging from operating systems to supercomputers and large-scale
applications, pursuing rather different objectives. Relevant application areas, that will be
extensively discussed in Section 2.2 along with some representative works, are:
• Error and Failure Classification. This type of analysis often represents the starting
point of a log-based measurement study. Entries in the log are classified according
to different criteria, e.g., severity and originating component. Classification allows
pinpoint the most errors/failures-prone components and, in general, the failure modes
of the system. Classification results can be used to drive finer-grain analysis.
• Evaluation and Modeling of Dependability Attributes. A substantial body of
literature on log-based failure analysis performs measurement studies to characterize
dependability attributes. For example, they measure figures, such as availability, re-
liability, Mean Time To Failure, or derive parameters that can be adopted to build
system models, such as finite state machines, Markov chains, Petri nets [53].
• Diagnosis and Correlation of Failures. Data analysis, supported by statistical
approaches, allows highlighting characteristics of operational failures that cannot be
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observed solely by means of measurements. For example, it has been shown that there
exists a relationship between failures and workload, or that failures affecting system
components might be correlated. These works represented important achievements in
the area, and contributed to improve modeling and analysis of real systems.
• Failure Prediction. Failure data in the event log have been used to develop and
to validate failure prediction models. Failure prediction is a relevant application of
log-based analysis, because it allows triggering proactive corrective actions, and im-
proving dependability attributes, such as Time To Repair and availability. Prediction
is commonly achieved by observing the occurrence of event patterns in the log.
• Security Analysis. A quite recent application of event logs is the evaluation of
security-related characteristics, such as attacks classification, analysis of the progres-
sion of attacks, development of models and monitoring tools. Analysis is based on
traditional event logs, e.g., syslog, and information provided by the security infras-
tructures. Data collection is often conducted by means of honeypots; however, recent
works started using real attack data.
• Other applications. Event logs are usually available for any notable computer sys-
tem; other relevant works and recent contributions have been using logs to analyze
dependability features of embedded systems, industrial products, or special purpose
applications.
It is worth noting that log-based failure analysis is mainly a manual process that relies on
the adoption of ad-hoc algorithms and techniques to process the data. It thus emerged the
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need for software packages, which integrate a wide range of the state-of-the-art techniques:
the tools ease, if not automate, the data analysis. MEADEP [54] consists of four software
modules, i.e., a data preprocessor for converting data in various formats to the MEADEP
format, a data analyzer for graphical data-presentation and parameter estimation, a graph-
ical modeling interface for building block diagrams, e.g., Weibull and k-out-of-n block, and
Markov reward chains, and a model-solution module for availability/reliability estimation
with graphical parametric analysis.
Analyze NOW [47] that, as mentioned, provides a support tool to collect log data in
networks of workstations, is a framework encompassing a wider set of features. Among the
others, it provides filtering and coalescence modules, a monitor of the state of the machines
belonging to the network, and dependency-table generator to pinpoint correlation among
machines, whenever a failure occurs. In [55, 56] a tool for on-line log analysis, i.e., Simple
Event Correlator (SEC), is presented. It defines a set of rules to model and to correlate log
events at runtime, leading to a faster recognition of problems based on the identification of
even patterns. Rules are encoded by analysts: for this reason, the definition of the rules
depends on the format and content of the log, and it might biased by the analyst’s skills.
2.2 Relevant Applications
Event logs have been used for decades to characterize dependability of operational systems.
In the following are discussed relevant efforts and reference works in the area of log-based
dependability characterization: works have been grouped based on the main analysis objec-
tives they pursue.
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2.2.1 Error and Failure Classification
A primary task to achieve insights into the meaning of collected failure data is classifica-
tion. Error and failure classification usually represent the starting point of a
log-based study and have several advantages. For examples, they allow determin-
ing the most-predominant failure classes, pinpointing system components that are prone to
generate error/failure data, and support the evaluation of the improvement between subse-
quent releases of the same product. This information is valuable to conduct quantitative
evaluations of the system, and allows a better interpretation of the measurement.
Authors in [27] present a measurement study of a UNIX machine, serving around 1,200
users and involved in a variety of applications, such as internet services and scientific pro-
gramming. Analysis is based on an event log spanning around 11 months. Data in the
log is classified and categorized to identify error trends leading to failures, and to support
MTBF and availability measurements. For examples, authors show that the input-output
subsystem is the most error-prone subsystem, and that many network problems observed
in the log were not caused by the system under study. It is worth noting that the cause of
some failures, i.e., around 9%, remained unknown.
The study proposed by [57] provides a characterization of operating system reboots of
Windows NT and 2K machines. The data source adopted in the study was collected over a
period of 36 months. The study focuses on unplanned reboots, representing the occurrence
of a failure, identified via a content-based coalescence approach. A classification study
performed on both the types of operating system demonstrates that the number of failures
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caused by the operating system itself is smaller in Windows 2K when compared to NT
machines; however, the number of failures caused by application code is larger in Windows
2K. Furthermore, authors observe that more than a reboot was needed to restore proper
operations after a failure.
A similar classification study is conducted in [58], which analyzes crash and usage data
fromWindows XP SP1 machines. The study confirms that many failures observed during the
system operational phase are not caused by the operating system itself, but by applications
and third-party components: web browsers seemed to be the most failure-prone application
in the study. Authors conduct a detailed classification study to pinpoint the .dll and
executable files causing crashes.
Authors in [59] face a rather different application domain. In particular, they study
failure data collected from three large-scale Internet services, i.e., Online, Content, and
ReadMostly. They classify the major causes leading to user-perceivable failures and inves-
tigate the effectiveness of potential techniques to mitigate the failures. Results of the study
indicate that operator errors and network-related problems are the major failure contrib-
utors. Furthermore, authors show that the percentage of failures caused by the software
running in the front-end nodes is significant.
Understanding the distribution of the failure data among different classes can provide
a feedback about the quality of analysis results. A study conducted in the context of
supercomputing systems [43] demonstrates that the classes of failures that bias the content
of the log, i.e., the most entries-prone classes, can distort measurements.
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2.2.2 Evaluation and Modeling of Dependability Attributes
Several studies characterize the failure data in terms of well-known statistical
distributions. Authors in [60] use a hyper-exponential distribution, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 λie
−λitpi,
to fit the duration of failures. This type of distribution has been adopted in the mentioned
study because the authors observed the existence of multiple predominant failure dynamics
in the data: as a result, a two-stage hyper-exponential model was chosen. It is worth noting
that this type of scenarios cannot be modeled accurately by means of a unique exponential
distribution, because of the simplistic memoryless property. For example, the exponential
distribution has been adopted to model the Time To Failure of electronic components;
however, it cannot fit the failure data produced by a complex computer system.
Another relevant distribution is the lognormal. In [61] the author hypothesizes that the
failure rate of a complex system can be tough as a multiplicative process of independent
factors, e.g., activations of faults. The lognormal distribution arises when the value of a
variable can be determined by the multiplication of many random factors: for this reason, it
is adopted to model software failure rates. The work shows that the lognormal distribution
is a good model to fit empirical data. The lognormal distribution has been also used in the
context of high-performance computing systems [12].
Finally, the Weibull, i.e., e−(λt)α [62], is probably the most adopted function to model
the failure data. The specific value of the shape parameter α allows modeling decreasing
(α < 1), increasing (α > 1), and constant (α = 1), failure distribution rates. For this reason,
Weibull distributions have been used in many application domains, e.g., [7, 62, 60]. The
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modeling of the failure data by means of statistical distribution, is usually supported by
goodness-of-fit test procedures, e.g., the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, to establish whether the
chosen distribution is a good model to fit the data.
Dependability evaluation is also performed by means of modeling approaches
based on the failure data. Authors in [5] address the analysis of the MVS operating
system and, among the first contributions proposing this approach, they develop a semi-
markov model based on both the normal and error behavior. The data adopted in the study
is collected form the operating system’s event log and both temporal and content-based
coalescence have been adopted to filter the data. The analysis of the failure distribution
highlighted a significant incidence of software-induced failures, i.e., 36%. Other relevant
causes of failures were CPU, memory and I/O errors. The adoption of the model allowed
figuring out that exponential distributions were not able to properly fit the failure data.
Authors in [7] propose a finite state machine to model the error behavior of a LAN of
Windows NT machines. Results of the paper are (i) a classification of the causes of system
reboots starting from the analysis of the events in the log preceding the reboot, (ii) sugges-
tions to improve the usability of logs, e.g., the introduction of an explicit shutdown event to
support the identification of the causes of reboots, (iii) availability analysis. In particular,
the adoption of the finite state machine model showed that, even if the measured system
availability was around 99%, the user-perceived availability was significantly smaller, i.e.,
92%: in some cases, even if a machine of the LAN was up, it was not able to provide correct
service to the user.
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Analysis of the data in the event logs is a valuable support to validate assumptions
made in system models. Authors in [63] analyze the data collected from five VAXcluster
systems to validate availability Markov models previously derived for those machines. Sur-
prisingly, the analysis revealed that some modeling assumptions were not supported by the
real experimental data. For example, the model did not take into account depending failure
behaviors across the devices of the system; furthermore, the data showed that failures were
non-exponentially distributed, as opposite to the model assumption.
2.2.3 Diagnosis and Correlation of Failures
Log-based analysis allows achieving in-depth understanding of causes and correlation among
failures. This type of evidence cannot be achieved solely by means of measurements-based
approach, but it relies on the use of models, and statistic artifacts applied to the data.
Works in the area, dating back to the 1980s, demonstrated the existence of a relationship
between the failure behavior and the workload run by a system. A performance
study of a DEC system conducted in [64, 65], showed that the failure rate is not constant;
nevertheless, many system models at that date, relied on this simplistic assumption. The
same authors subsequently developed a doubly stochastic Poisson model highlighting the
relationship between the instantaneous failure rate of a resource and its usage.
A similar finding has been confirmed by authors in [66, 38]. More in details, they
evaluate the relationship between system load and failure behavior by means of empirical
data. Analysis of the failure data and performance counters from three IBM 370 mainframes
revealed the existence of strong correlation between workload and failures. An in-depth
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research focusing on CPU failures demonstrated that around 17% of CPU failures were
permanent, and that such failures were correlated to the level and type of workload run by
the machine hosting the CPU. Furthermore, authors observed that the failure probability
was sensitive to changes in the interactive workload.
Several works suggest that failures observed in different components of a
computer system are correlated. The paper [67] proposes an approach to analyze event
logs from fault tolerant systems. The approach is illustrated using the data collected from
Tandem systems. Authors process the data log to identify errors, and adopt multivariate
techniques, i.e., factor analysis and cluster analysis, to pinpoint halts dependencies among
components and to figure out the actual halt patterns. Although the number of errors
observed during the system operations was relatively small, authors observed that multiple
processes were affected by the same problem, because of the presence of shared resources.
Authors in [68] perform a measurement study to assess the dependability of seven DEC
VAX machines. The analysis aimed to estimate the distributions of the Time Between
Errors and Time Between Failures, to analyze dependencies between errors and failures.
Again, shared resources turned out to be a relevant dependability bottleneck. Furthermore,
the analysis showed that errors and failures occur in bursts, and that, neglecting failure
correlation phenomena can significantly impact the quality of the measures.
Evaluation proposed by [69] uses statistical techniques to quantify the strength of the
relationship among entries in the log. In particular, authors analyzed the data from two
Cyber systems and an IBM 3081 multiprocessor system to develop and to validate on-line
diagnosis approaches. These techniques aim to recognize the occurrence of intermittent
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failures, and to discriminate transient, permanent and intermittent failure manifestations
by means of the correlation between failure events. The analysis of real data demonstrated
that the proposed approach was able to diagnose some problems previously gone undetected.
2.2.4 Failure Prediction
Analysis of failure data in the log is the basis of interesting applications. Among the oth-
ers, several works have been developing techniques to predict failures, based on the
occurrence of specific event patterns in the log. Predicting failures is challenging;
however, it allows applying failure avoidance strategies, triggering corrective and recovery
actions, reducing the Time To Repair, enhancing system dependability.
Authors in [62] present the Dispersion Frame Technique (DFT), implemented as part
of a distributed on-line monitoring system. They analyzed the data collected from 13 file
servers running the VICE file system over a 22-month period. The principle underlying
the technique is recognizing recurring error trends leading to failures. DFT achieved 93.7%
success rate in failure prediction, by using a smaller number of data point, i.e., one fifth,
when compared to other statistical techniques.
The approach proposed by [70] focuses on the use of event-driven data sources, such as
error notifications in the log, to develop prediction models. In particular, authors develop a
Hidden Semi-Markov Models (HSMMs) and validate the effectiveness of such models by an-
alyzing the field data produced by a telecommunication system. For example, the proposed
model achieves precision of 0.85 and recall of 0.66 that, according to the data available in
the study, was a better result when compared to other prediction techniques.
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Failure prediction has gained increasing popularity in the area of large-scale systems.
Authors in [71] analyze event logs from a 350-node cluster system. Logs encompass reliabil-
ity, availability and serviceability (RAS) events, and system activity reports collected over
one year. Authors observed that data in the log were highly redundant: for this reason, they
apply filtering techniques to model the data into a set of primary and derived variables. The
prediction approach, based on a rule-based classification algorithm, was able to identify the
occurrence of critical events with up to 70% accuracy.
Prediction methods have been proposed for IBM BlueGene/L [10]. The approach pro-
posed in the paper was able to predict around 80% of memory and network failures and 47%
of I/O failures. Authors in [72] investigate the use of spatio-temporal event correlation to
develop a failure prediction framework for HPC systems.
2.2.5 Security Analysis
Event logs have been recently used to perform security analysis, starting from the data
collected during the progression of malicious activities and security attacks. A first cat-
egory of works characterize security properties by means of data collected via
honeypots, i.e., monitored computer environments placed on the Internet with the explicit
purpose of being attacked. Data produced by honeypot systems are analyzed to derive
measurements.
Authors in [73] use honeypots to validate vulnerability assumptions adopted in the design
of intrusion-tolerant systems. The honeypot was composed by three machines running three
different operating systems, i.e., Windows NT and 2K, and RedHat Linux; security data
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have been collected over a period of 4 months. The analysis focuses on the sources of the
attacks and attacked ports. Authors observed that the types of attacks were similar across
the different machines. Furthermore, attackers were likely to target precise ports without
performing any preliminary scan activity.
A similar setup has been used by [74]. In this case the testbed was composed by two
Windows 2K machines and security data have been collected over a time period of 109 days
by means of the Ethereal tool. The objective of the study was to establish the characteristics
of the data that allowed separating different classes of attacks. This work, which shows how
to use field data to recognize attacks, established that features, such as, number of bytes
constituting the attack or mean distribution of the bytes across the packets, are valuable
metrics to separate attacks.
Recent works adopt real attack data to analyze security. The data consist of
the event logs produced by security tools available at the target infrastructures, and contain
alerts generated during the progression of security incidents.
For example, authors in [75] conduct an in-depth study of the forensic data (e.g., syslog,
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) logs) produced by the machine of a large-scale computing
organization. Attack data adopted in the study are collected over a timeframe of 5 years.
The analysis aims to achieve insights into the progression of attacks, to pinpoint the type
of alerts that are more likely to catch different types of attacks, and to investigate causes
of undetected incidents. Analysis results are valuable to model security attributes and to
develop monitoring tools.
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Similarly to the previous work, [76] uses real incident data to design an automated ap-
proach aiming to detect the progression of credential compromise attacks. In particular, the
work proposes a Bayesian network to correlate (i) data provided by different security tools
(e.g., IDS and netflows) and (ii) information related to the users’ profiles to identify compro-
mised users. Results demonstrate that the approach was effective in detecting compromised
users, while eliminating around 80% of false positives
2.2.6 Further Applications
Nowadays, failure data are available for any notable software system. Some other relevant
applications are discussed in the following. Authors in [77] characterize the dependability
of 13 mobile robots coming from 3 manufacturers based on the analysis of the failure data
collected during 673 hours of operations. Authors observed that, in the average, robot
reliability is quite low, with a MTBF of around 8 hours. Field robots have a smaller reliability
than indoor ones; problems affecting effectors and wireless communications links turned out
to be the most-likely causes of failures.
Another interesting application is the one proposed [8], where authors analyze the data
of around 11 years experience on safety critical software for nuclear reactors. Several lessons
could be derive from the study: the analysis of the data is relevant to improve development
processes; however, due to complexity of hardware/software interactions, and real time issues
it might be hard to develop realistic models that take into account real failure scenarios.
The Java Virtual Machine has been recently analyzed by means of failure data [19]. The
data source is represented by Bug Database, which is the only publicly available source of
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failure data for the JVM. As it will be discussed later in the dissertation, authors observed
that many failures, i.e., 45.03%, are likely to go undetected by the exception-handling mech-
anism of the JVM; furthermore, a significant number of failures of the JVM were caused
by software-aging bugs [78, 79], which lead to the progressive degradation of the execution
environment. For this reasons, the JVM is not expected to achieve the same dependability
level across different physical platforms.
Finally, authors in [9] analyze the failure data of Bluetooth Personal Area networks
(PAN), and provide valuable insights into the failure behavior and recovery mechanisms.
They also suggest how to improve overall system dependability.
2.3 Related Research and Thesis Contributions
Literature proposing techniques and measurements based on the analysis of failure data in
the event logs, spans over the past three decades. However, as discussed in Section 1.5,
computer systems have deeply changed over this timeframe: new industry trends, such as
shifting failure causes and growing system complexity, are strongly impacting dependability
characteristics and related research, including log-based failure analysis [2]. For this reason,
it is important to investigate the suitability of assumptions and techniques underlying log-
based failure analysis, in spite of the changes occurred in the computer systems industry.
A crucial point is represented by the accuracy of event logs, which have been used to con-
duct studies in a variety of domains. Besides the limitations related to the nature of the
logging mechanism, several works have experienced inaccuracy of logs in-the-field. Relevant
examples are discussed in the following.
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A study on Unix workstations and servers [6] recognizes that logs may be incomplete
and ambiguous. For this reason, authors investigate the use of multiple sources to conduct
the analysis: the combination of the data provided by wtmpx and syslog log files helped
at achieving a more comprehensive understanding of the target system, and to obtain more
realistic measurements. In [80] authors provide evidence that logs can be affected by several
issues, e.g., missing events, inconsistent information, and bogus timestamps. They discuss
some recommendations to create better event logs, and to discriminate the presence of
different users that can in the system at the same time. More importantly, authors recognize
the importance of considering the handling of events as a core requirement of the system,
that should be part of its conception and design.
In [7], a study on a networked Windows NT system demonstrates that many OS reboots,
i.e., about 30%, do not show a specific reason. The authors were not able to establish whether
the events preceding the reboot were enough severe to be considered the cause of the reboot
itself. A positional study about the log produced by five supercomputing systems [4] shows
that logs may lack useful information for enabling effective failure detection and diagnosis.
It also suggests that it would be useful to include operational context information (i.e., the
time at which the log was produced, such as scheduled downtime, production time, and so
on) along with log entries, to better contextualize collected data, and drive more realistic
conclusions. As already mentioned, authors in [19] demonstrate that, even if the Java
Virtual Machine is equipped with a sophisticated exception handling mechanism, built-in
error detection mechanisms are not able to provide evidence of a considerable percentage of
failures (45.03%).
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More importantly, current logs seem to be ineffective in case of software faults, which are
among the main responsible of system failures [2, 13, 14]. The work [21] uses a fault injection
approach to compare logging mechanisms with other failure detection techniques in the
context of web applications. Experiments show that although logs are able to detect failures
caused by resource exhaustion and environment conditions, they provide little coverage
with respect to emulated software failures (e.g., a deadlock). In the study preceding the
experimentation proposed in the thesis [81] it is shown that around 60% of failures caused by
the activation of software faults go undetected by current logging mechanisms. Experiments
demonstrate that the logging mechanism is able to log errors that affect operating system
resources; however the detection ability of errors affecting algorithms, e.g., the ones leading
to infinite loops or concurrency issues, is significantly smaller.
All these works recognize that logs might be often inaccurate; however, inaccuracy has
not been assessed yet in terms of a quantitative study. The first contributions of the
thesis are (i) the quantitative evaluation of the accuracy of current logging mech-
anisms, and (ii) the analysis of the suitability of the logging mechanism in face of
software faults. Quantitative analysis is crucial to understand the extent software faults
compromise the quality of collected logs. Furthermore, the analysis motivates the design of
novel techniques to make logs effective to infer failure data.
Recent works have been addressing inefficiency issues of logs. Authors in [82] introduce
a set of recommendations to improve the expressiveness of logs. Among the others, authors
suggest to incorporate numbering schemes and classes to categorize the information in the
log. Text entries should be organized as key/value pairs and make explicit the type of the
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values in the entries. Furthermore, authors provide a metric to assess the information entropy
in the log. Similarly, [83] proposes to enhance the logging code by adding information, e.g.,
data values, to ease the diagnosis task in case of failures. Authors design a log-enhancer tool
to introduce such information at the logging points; the aim is to reduce the set of potential
root failure causes to support trouble-shooting of complex systems. An approach to visualize
console logs is proposed in [84]: the authors describe how to obtain a graph that can be used
to improve the logging mechanisms, e.g., by adding missing statements. This approach is
based on the assumption that the logs make extensive use of identifiers; however, this might
be not the case of many notable software systems. Finally, authors in [85] propose to extend
the syslog architecture by integrating a set of tools performing near real time analysis based
on the messages produced by the system. The tools can help monitoring and support the
task of system administrators.
These proposals are valuable to engineers, because they improve the expressiveness of
logs, and provide tools to support the analysis. Nevertheless, they have a limitation: the
improvement is based on the logging functions that already exist in the software platform.
The incompleteness of the logs cannot be solved acting solely on the existing functions:
developers might forget to log significant events, and, in many cases, errors escape the
existing logging points, because of the nature of current logging mechanisms. Differently
from these works that mainly focus on semantic and format issues of event logs, the thesis
aims to fill the gap in the knowledge about the use of current logging mechanisms
to report software failures, and to propose an approach, i.e., rule-based logging,
to improve their detection capabilities.
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The improvement of the detection capability of the logging mechanism is the key to
make logs effective to infer failure data. However, systems might be composed by a variety
of legacy supports, each equipped with its own logging technology. For this reason, the
thesis investigates further techniques that can be progressively adopted by engineers when
they cannot intervene on the original logging mechanisms, e.g., in the case only partial, if
not any, changes can be made into the system.
Firstly, the thesis proposes a failure data management infrastructure aiming
to increase the usability and effectiveness of logs. The infrastructure, called Logbus,
provides a log-centralization support. Centralizing multiple, heterogeneous, data sources
increases the chance to detect failures and provide detailed insights into the behavior of the
system [6, 81]. As discussed, there are several tools (presented in Section 2.1.1) supporting
the collection of log entries produced by different computer entities. Such tools are valuable
to engineers and analysts, because they allow saving the time needed to collect, parse, and
filter logs; however, they mainly address log format issues. Logbus proposes several novelty
aspects that are not, or only partially, addressed by current log-management infrastructures.
Among the others, Logbus provides an application programming interface (API) supporting
the interoperability of different logging platforms and masquerading the heterogeneity of the
information produced with different protocols and techniques. More importantly, Logbus
integrates on-line monitoring features supplement the content of existing event logs when
failures occur. Monitoring consists of a set of services that are embedded into the Logbus
infrastructure, such as operating system daemons, profiling tools, event-specific monitors,
which enhance failure detection.
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Centralization of the event log is the first step to infer failure data produce by a dis-
tributed system. However, once log entries have been collected, e.g., by means of an existing
or the Logbus infrastructure, grouping entries representing the manifestation of the same
failure, is even a more challenging task. Authors in [22] discuss the validity of the tuple
heuristic, that coalesces the entries in the log occurring close in time. Authors investigate
the collision phenomena and discuss the process of selecting a proper timing window to
group the entries. It is worth noting that, early studies adopting the tuple heuristic have
been conducted in the context of centralized and small-scale systems. For example, [22]
encompasses the log of a Tandem system consisting of four processors; authors in [23] point
out that the failure distributions of different machines are correlated by analyzing the log
of a VAXcluster system composed by 7 machines. Subsequently, the tuple heuristic has
been adopted to analyze the log of large-scale, networked systems. The methodological
improvement of the heuristic is represented by the concept of spatial coalescence. Authors
in [10] analyze the log collected from a BlueGene/L system by combining temporal and
spatial filtering. As discussed, they also develop failure predictions methods and show that
the methods are effective for predicting, for example, around 80% of memory and network
failures. The logs collected from five supercomputing systems are analyzed in [4]. Authors
provide an optimization of the filtering algorithm proposed in [10]; however, they recognize
that the proposed algorithm might remove independent alerts that, by coincidence, hap-
pen near the same time on different nodes. The thesis investigate the limitations of
time-based coalescence and proposes a novel grouping technique, based on the
adoption of statistical indicators.
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Several works, e.g., [69, 71, 72, 86, 87], use statistical approaches to identify temporal
and/or spatial relationships among the entries in the log. More closely related to the tech-
nique proposed in the thesis, [69] uses statistical techniques to quantify the strength of the
relationship among entries in the log, with the aim of recognizing intermittent failures. Au-
thors in [87] use the lift indicator in the context of a log-preprocessing technique aiming at
preserving error patterns to achieve a more accurate prediction of failures. In the thesis the
adoption of statistical indicators allows developing an improved version of the tuple heuris-
tic, which increases the accuracy of the grouping. The results obtained with the proposed
heuristic are compared with the results achievable with the tuple heuristic, as used in [10, 4].
These works adopt the heuristic to characterize the failure behavior of supercomputing sys-
tems. The comparison allows quantifying the distortion caused by incorrect grouping on
dependability measurements.
By concluding, the contributions of the thesis are the evaluation of the accuracy of the
logging mechanisms, and the development of novel techniques making logs effective to infer
failure data. Techniques target production, collection and filtering of the entries in the log of
complex distributed systems. Despite the existence of a large number of studies proposing
dependability measurements and modeling, this is the first contribution that investigates and
improves the accuracy of data sources and procedures, which are adopted to infer failure
data used in such studies. Engineers can adopt a subset if not, all, the proposed techniques
depending on different parameters, such as the type of analysis they aim to perform, the
accuracy of the results they want to achieve, the degree of intervention they can operate on
the system.
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Figure 2.3: Applicability of the techniques proposed in the thesis.
Figure 2.3 clarifies the concept by providing a graphical representation of the contri-
butions: the representation highlights the applicability of each technique proposed in the
thesis. The x-axis indicates the degree of intervention it can be operated on the system,
i.e., the extent of the changes engineers have to make to the system in order to use the
techniques proposed in the thesis. The worst case is the black box : the system exists and no
change is possible at all. The best case is the white box : it is possible to apply any change to
the system, such as modifying the source code. Other types of intervention, e.g., changes to
the configuration files of the system or reboot of components, are classifiable in the middle
of the scale, i.e., grey box. The y-axis indicates the availability of the failure data in the
event log produced by the system. Each technique is represented by a box labelled with a
letter (meaning is reported in Figure 2.3).
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There are several interpretations of Figure 2.3. As discussed, it indicates the applicability
of the techniques proposed in the thesis. For example, the Logbus infrastructure, that can be
integrated in the system by acting on the configuration files or by installing wrapper compo-
nents, can be used whenever the intervention degree is ≥ grey box.; correlation of failure data,
i.e., “C” box, might be adopted whenever some information is available. Alternatively, given
a system where the allowed degree of intervention is X, with black box ≤ X ≤ white box,
Figure 2.3 shows the tools analysts might expect to use (or to integrate in the system) to
conduct a log-based failure analysis. For example, if the system is able to generate failure
data, but it does not allow any change, it could be possible to improve the failure analysis by
correlating existing failure data with the approach proposed in the thesis. Again, the best
case is represented by the white box system: traditional event logs can be supplemented with
any of the tools proposed in the thesis. Figure 2.3 helps the reader to identify the portions
of the thesis he/she is interested in. For example, once the intervention degree on the system
and the target logging capability (i.e., production, collection, or filtering) are known, Figure
2.3 suggests the contributions of the thesis that are more suitable to the reader.
La conoscenza degli effetti e l’ignoranza
delle cause produsse l’astrologia.
The knowledge of effects and ignorance
of causes generated the astrology.
Giacomo Leopardi
Chapter 3
Accuracy Evaluation of the Logging
Mechanism
Event logs have been widely adopted to analyze the failure behavior of computer systems over the past
decades. However, systems have deeply changed over this timeframe: new industry trends threaten
the accuracy of current logging mechanisms at reporting failures. Accuracy is crucial to the validity of
log-based measurement studies. In this chapter it is assessed the accuracy of current logging mecha-
nisms in face of software faults, which are among the main responsible for system failures [2, 13, 14].
An automated framework, based on software fault injection experiments, has been designed to eval-
uate the logging mechanism. Evaluation encompasses metrics, such as number of reported failures
and reported errors (i.e., false negative and false positive rates, as discussed in Section 1.4), and
number of lines in the log notifying the occurrence of failures. The approach is applied to three
popular systems: Apache Web Server, TAO Open Data Distribution System, and MySQL Database
Management System. Analysis results show that logs are inaccurate at reporting software failures,
and suggest how to design better logging supports.
3.1 Evaluation framework
Software faults have become among the main responsible for system failures over the past
decades [2, 13, 14]; however, the suitability of current logging mechanisms in face of
software faults is somewhat unknown. Software faults are challenging, because they
might escape any low-level check and go completely undetected. For example, in C/C++
programs, bad pointer manipulations can originate a process crash before any useful infor-
mation is logged. An infinite loop caused by bad variable management may lead to a hang,
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without leaving any trace in the logs. The logging mechanism of a software plat-
form is exercised by injecting software faults in the source code of the platform;
faults are subsequently triggered by exercising the platform with a workload. This approach
makes it possible to shorten the experimentation time, and to design a controlled analysis
framework. The framework that has been designed to assess the accuracy of the logging
mechanism is described in the following. The injection of a software fault consists of a
change in the source code of the target software: each change implements a programming
mistake, also known as bug. Software faults have been injected according to the real fault
distribution experienced in the field, which is discussed by a widely accepted reference work
in the area of software fault injection [88, 1]. Examples of programming mistakes are miss-
ing function call (MFC) or missing variable initialization using a value (MVIV). A support
tool, which will be presented in Section 3.1.1 along with the faults adopted in the study,
drives the injection process. The tool produces a list of locations within the source code
of the target software where the fault types will be introduced. The number of locations is
generally large: for example, the fault injection campaign conducted to analyze the accuracy
of the logging mechanism of MySQL DBMS encompasses 43,139 experiments.
Each experiment exercises a faulty-version of the software platform, i.e., containing one
software fault, against a workload. Due to the large number of experiments, a Test Man-
ager program has been designed to automate the execution of the campaign. Figure 3.1
shows the framework to assess the accuracy of the logging mechanism, and highlights the
key role of the Test Manager. For each experiment, one fault (among the ones identified
via the support tool) is injected into the source code of the software platform: the code
Chapter 3. Accuracy Evaluation of the Logging Mechanism 59
Figure 3.1: Assessing the accuracy of the logging mechanism: the framework.
is compiled and the obtained faulty-version of the software platform is initialized by the
Test Manager (step (1) experiment setup). The platform is then executed against a
workload with the aim of triggering the injected fault and generating a software
failure (step (2) workload startup). Once the workload is completed, the Test Manager (i)
collects, if any, the anomalous entries in the event log produced by the logging mechanism,
(ii) resumes the original fault-free code of the software before a new experiment is performed
(iii) restart the machines involved in the campaign (step (3) logs collection & exp. comple-
tion). Anomalous entries are the ones caused by the activation of the fault. They are
isolated by removing the entries that are normally produced during fault-free runs of the
target software, from the event log collected after the fault injection experiment.
The Test Manager is the oracle of the campaign: it detects and classifies, if any, the
failures that occur in the system because of the injected faults. Failures have been monitored
instead of errors, because an error might not necessarily cause a failure (Figure 1.5). The
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detection ability of the logging mechanism is evaluated by checking the content of the log
against the failure indication, i.e., oracle view, provided the Test Manager. The Test
Manager has been tested by executing several fault-free and faulty runs of the system before
the campaign in order to achieve evidence of its deterministic behavior at determining the
occurrence of failures. Failure indications provided by the Test Manager (also denoted as
outcomes) assume the values described in the following. Failure types are based on [2], and
are detected by using information collected both at OS- and workload-level, as described:
• halt: unexpected termination of the system under-analysis. The system no longer
runs and no output is delivered; the OS generates at least one memory dump;
• silent: the system is still up, but no output is produced within a reasonable response
time, e.g., the system is hung or an expected message is not delivered. The response
time has been tuned before the execution of the campaign by means of several fault-free
runs of the platform under test;
• content: failure conditions that are not halt or silent, such as value failures, i.e., the
output delivered to the user is not the expected one;
• no_failure: the system keeps correctly running; the injected software fault is not
activated or it does not cause a failure.
The framework provides a testing environment to run the target system under a stressful
workload and to detect the occurrence of failures. The outcome and the log collected for
each fault injection experiment are used to assess the accuracy of the logging mechanism.
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Experiments have been conducted by running the target software under the Linux OS. The
machines of the testbed are Intel Pentium 4 3.2 GHz, 4GB RAM, 1,000 Mb/s Network
Interface equipped. An Ethernet LAN connects the nodes of the testbed.
3.1.1 Software fault injection approach
The technique that has been adopted to assess the accuracy of the logging mechanism is
derived from a past work in the field of Software Fault Injection: G-SWFIT, presented
in [1]. G-SWFIT defines a set of fault operators that are representative of residual faults
found in real-world operational systems (i.e., fixed after their release). Operators are based
on a large field data study encompassing 668 faults over 12 systems, and they account for
more than 50% of fault types occurring in the field. In the G-SWFIT technique, faults are
injected in the software by means of changes in the binary code: the change corresponds
to programming mistakes in the high-level source code. Although this approach is suitable
for off-the-shelf software, or if the source code of the program is not available, there can
be discrepancies between high-level software faults and binary changes. In [1], it has been
observed that, in the average, there are 9% more binary changes not corresponding to high-
level software faults, due to the usage of C macros in the target source code. Furthermore,
G-SWFIT requires additional efforts to be adapted to the system of interest, because of the
heterogeneity of hardware, OS and compiler technologies.
In this study, even if the fault types are the ones defined in [1], the injection approach is
different. Faults are introduced by means of modifications of the source code. This
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Figure 3.2: Software fault injection via the support tool.
approach avoids the inaccuracies of injection performed at the binary level. Moreover, injec-
tion in the source code is portable among all platforms supported by the original program,
without any additional efforts. This approach leads to highly accurate results; however, as
discussed in Section 3.1, the source file has to be compiled after the fault is injected.
Injection is driven by a support tool1. A source code file is fed to the tool, which
produces a set of faulty source code files, each containing a different software fault. Each
faulty source code file is subsequently compiled. Figure 3.2 summarizes the steps followed
by the fault injection tool, with reference to C/C++ programs. First, a C preprocessor
translates the C macros contained in the source code (e.g., inclusion of header files, macros
for conditional compilation, constants), in order to produce a complete compilation unit. A
C/C++ front-end, i.e., the part of the compiler that builds the internal representation of a
program, processes the compilation unit, and it produces an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST),
which is a more suitable structure to be processed by the Fault Injector program. The
Fault Injector searches for all possible fault locations in the AST, and applies the operators
summarized in Table 3.1, when specific criteria are met. For example, the MIFS operator is
applied only if the IF construct contains at least 5 statements.
1The tool is currently available at http://www.mobilab.unina.it/SFI.htm
Chapter 3. Accuracy Evaluation of the Logging Mechanism 63
Table 3.1: Fault operators ([1]).
Acronym Explanation
MFC Missing function call
MVIV Missing variable initialization using a value
MVAV Missing variable assignment using a value
MVAE Missing variable assignment with an expression
MIA Missing IF construct around statements
MIFS Missing IF construct plus statements
MIEB Missing IF construct plus statements plus ELSE before statem.
MLAC Missing AND clause in expression used as branch condition
MLOC Missing OR clause in expression used as branch condition
MLPA Missing small and localized part of the algorithm
WVAV Wrong value assigned to variable
WPFV Wrong variable used in parameter of function call
WAEP Wrong arithmetic expression in parameter of a function call
3.2 Accuracy Metrics
The accuracy of the logging mechanism to detect the occurrence of software failures is
estimated by examining the presence of anomalous entries in the event log against the
outcome of each fault injection experiment. The reference metrics that have been adopted
in the study are described in the following.
Coverage. Given an experiment where a failure occurred i.e., the outcome of the ex-
periment provided by the Test Manager is not “no_failure”, it is assumed that the failure
has been logged by the logging mechanism if at least one anomalous entry is observed in
the log; the failure is unlogged, otherwise. The coverage of the logging mechanism is the
ratio between the number of logged failures and the total number of failures observed dur-
ing the campaign. Coverage is also broken down by failure type to obtain a more detailed
insight into the ability of the logging mechanism at reporting failures. Coverage provides
a big-picture of the detection capability of the logging mechanism; however, it does not
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provide insights into false positives, which represent a key aspect concerning the accuracy
of the logging mechanism. For this reason, the analysis has been refined with the recall and
precision parameters, that will be clarified shortly.
Verbosity. Verbosity is the average number of anomalous entries observed in the log,
estimated across the experiments where (i) a failure occurred, and (ii) the failure has been
reported by the logging mechanism. This measure provides an indication of the effort that is
needed to preprocess the log before the analysis: the smaller the number of lines in the log,
the easier the interpretation and preprocessing of the log. As discussed, the entries in the
log representing the manifestation of the same failure, must be grouped before the analysis
to obtain accurate measurements. Similarly to the coverage parameter, verbosity is broken
down by failure type.
Recall and Precision. Recall (R) measures the false negative rate, e.g., unreported
failures, while, differently from the coverage, precision (P) provides insights into the number
of false failure indications, i.e., those experiments where no failure has occurred, but anoma-
lous entries are observed in the log. R and P are assessed as described in the following.
Each log produced during the campaign by the logging mechanism, is classified into one out
of four disjoint sets, i.e, true negative (TN), true positive (TP), false negative (FN), false
positive (FP); then, recall (R) and precision (P) are computed with Equations 3.1:
R =
|TP |
|TP |+ |FN | P =
|TP |
|TP |+ |FP | (3.1)
Log classification is performed by comparing the log view of the experiment, i.e., if, by look-
ing into the log, it can be concluded that an anomalous event occurred during the experiment,
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Figure 3.3: Log classification
against the oracle view provided by the Test Manager (Figure 3.3 3)-classification). For ex-
ample, a FN occurs when no failure has been observed according to the log, but the outcome
provided by the Test Manager is not “no_failure”. Three distinct indexes, related to the
amount of information contained in a log li, have been used to establish the log view:
• bytes: returns the size in byte of the log file li. This index has been adopted because
a high rate of events in the log can be the symptom of some fault activations [89];
• lines: gives the number of lines in the log file. The intuition underlying this index
is the same as the bytes one. However, both the indexes have been considered in the
study because a single line can be many bytes long: the two indexes provide different
perspectives on the log mechanism;
• words: this index, used in the area of information retrieval [90], is related to the
presence of error keywords in the event log. A dictionary of error keywords, i.e., D, is
preliminary built by analyzing the logging statements in the source code of the system
under analysis. D contains words, such as unable, not found, unrecoverable, cannot,
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and so on. Given a log file li, it is estimated the number of occurrences, i.e., nki , of
each keyword ki ∈ D in the log file. The words index is estimated as
√∑|D|
i=1(nki)2.
For each log li, the index functions return a value I(li) ≥ 0: the greater the index,
the higher the chance that the event log contain anomalous entries; if I(li) ≥ K (with K
representing a threshold parameter) it is concluded that an anomalous event occurred during
the experiment according to the log (Figure3.3 2)-check against the threshold K ). After all
the logs have been classified, R and P are computed with Equations 3.1. For example,
the point (0.30; 0.65) in Figure 3.6, discussed later in the dissertation, indicates that the
traditional logging mechanism achieves 0.30 recall and 0.65 precision whenK = 1 (according
to the words index).
It can be noted that R and P vary when the classification parameter K varies. For
this reason, given an index function, (R,P) pairs obtained with different values of K in the
interval ]0;Kmax] are assessed. Kmax has been set to 5,000, 100, and 50, for the bytes,
lines and and words index. The result of this sensitivity analysis is a plot reporting (R,P)
pairs. Again, Figure 3.6 shows an example of such a plot.
3.3 Case Study 1: Apache Web Server
Apache Web Server is a popular open-source project, which accounts for more than 50% of
installations in the world2. The wide adoption of Apache and its growing complexity are
increasing the importance of dependability and security issues caused by software faults.
Therefore, this is a relevant case study to assess the accuracy of the logging mechanism.
2http://www.netcraft.com/survey/
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Figure 3.4: Apache Web Server: experimental testbed.
Figure 3.4 shows the testbed that has been designed to perform the campaign: Apache Web
Server version 1.3.41 is evaluated in this work. Node 1 hosts the httperf3 tool version
0.9.0, that generates HTTP requests for the Web Server. The workload makes use of the
main features offered by the Web Server (e.g., multiple methods and file extensions, cookies).
Node 2 hosts the faulty version of the Web Server and the Test Manager program.
For each fault injection experiment the Test Manager (1) initializes a faulty Web Server
version (2) starts the workload generator (3) stops the testbed components and collects
experiments data, once the workload terminates. Experiment data encompass the event log
and the outcome from the Test Manager for each experiment. The campaign consists of
8,200 software fault injection experiments. Table 3.2 reports the breakup of the experiments
by fault operator.
3.3.1 Coverage and verbosity
During the campaign 1,101 out of 8,200 fault injection experiments lead to a failure, i.e.,
616 halt, 104 silent, and 381 content. The logging mechanism implemented by Apache
3http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/linux/httperf/
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Table 3.2: Apache Web Server: breakup of the experiments by fault operator and coverage
of the logging mechanism.
Fault # locations Fault # locations
MFC 831 MLAC 182
MVIV 68 MLOC 144
MVAV 223 MLPA 1,935
MVAE 1,166 WVAV 279
MIA 793 WPFV 1,179
MIFS 768 WAEP 361
MIEB 271
Total experiments 8,200
Number of failures 1,101
Logged failures (coverage) 377 (34.2%)
Figure 3.5: Apache Web Server: coverage by failure type.
detects 377 out of 1,101 failures: coverage is 34.2%. Figure 3.5 shows how the coverage varies
with respect to the failure types. Halt failures are mainly due to bad pointer manipulations.
In most cases (65%) no entry is observed in the log in case of halt failures. Logged halts
(35%) are due to the termination of one or more Web Server child processes, thus enabling
the parent process to notify their failure. Nevertheless, no significant information is provided
about failure locations or failure causes in the logs. Collected entries just suggest to inspect
memory dumps from the operating system, which might not be always available.
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Table 3.3: Apache Web Server: verbosity of the logging mechanism.
failure logged number of entries in the log
type failures average ±std-dev; (min-MAX)
halt (218) 18 ±16; (1-248)
silent (11) 814 ±475; (24-1,251)
content (148) 117 ±408; (1-1,732)
average 316
Unlogged silent failures (89%) are mainly due to algorithmic errors leading to infinite
loops. Logged silent failures (11%) involve OS resources (e.g., sockets, IPCs). The higher
coverage is observed in case of content failures, when 148 out of 381 failures are logged, i.e.,
39%. Logged content failures mainly correspond to errors with the HTTP protocol handling
(e.g., header corruption) or filesystem accesses (e.g., wrong resource path). However, a
significant number of content failures is unlogged (61%). Many unlogged content failures,
i.e, around 55.7%, occur during the system start-up phase, when the Web Server halts and
no logs are provided. This percentage is due to the presence of a significant amount of code
devoted to configuration management (encompassing 10.3% of source code and 10.4% of
faults). These faults are not excluded from the analysis because (i) the configuration code
appears to be complex and error-prone, (ii) faults in configuration management are not
necessarily discovered before release, and they could be triggered by a specific configuration
file in the field [91], (iii) logs in such a situation can help to fix configuration issues.
In the average (last row of Table 3.3), each detected failure leads to 316 entries in the
log. Halt failures results in the smaller number of entries, i.e., 18. On the other end of the
spectrum, the occurrence of a silent failure causes a significant number of entries in the
log: in the average, the logging mechanisms notifies such failure with 814 entries.
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Figure 3.6: Apache Web Server: recall and precision.
3.3.2 Recall and precision
The function indexes exhibit a similar trend when applied to the logging mechanism of
Apache. This can be observed in Figure 3.6. The maximum achievable recall is 0.26, 0.27,
and 0.30 with the lines, bytes, and words index, respectively. Such values have been
obtained for the minimum values of the index classification thresholds (reported in Figure
3.6). The low values assumed by the recall parameter (which encompasses false negative
experiments) can be explained by reminding that 65.8% of failures are unlogged by the
traditional mechanism. Furthermore, when the recall is maximum, precision is around the
lowest values. For example, the words index achieves 0.30 recall with 0.65 precision when
K=1. In other words, in order to not miss any failure, it has to be assumed that a failure has
occurred even if a single error keyword is observed in the event log; however, this cause a large
number of false positives, i.e., low precision. On the other end of the spectrum, a high value
of the precision parameter can be achieved only when K increases. For example, precision
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Figure 3.7: TAO Open DDS: experimental testbed.
is 0.90 (among the greatest observed values) if K=98 with the lines index. Accordingly, to
achieve high precision when analyzing the event log, it should be concluded that a failure
occurred only when strong error evidence is observed.
3.4 Case study 2: TAO Open DDS
TAO OpenDDS4 is an open-source C++ implementation of the OMG’s v1.0 Data Distribu-
tion Service (DDS) specification. DDS, as part of the Event Driven Architectures (EDAs),
is emerging as new technology to design flexible applications by means of message-driven
processing [92, 93]. Its recent use in mission-critical scenarios, e.g., the Air Traffic Con-
trol domain (Coflight5 project), makes it useful to perform an in-depth evaluation of DDS
logging capabilities. The testbed shown in Figure 3.7 has been deployed to perform the
campaign. A test application, coming with the DDS software distribution, provides the
workload to exercise the middleware. The application consists of two processes. The pub-
lisher (PUB) process, deployed on node 1, sends DDS messages bounded to a topic. The
4http://download.ociweb.com/OpenDDS/
5http://www.coflight-efdp.com
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Table 3.4: TAO Open DDS: breakup of the experiments by fault operator and coverage of
the logging mechanism.
Fault # locations Fault # locations
MFC 762 MLAC 144
MVIV 140 MLOC 87
MVAV 139 MLPA 1,105
MVAE 317 WVAV 125
MIA 345 WPFV 505
MIFS 304 WAEP 40
MIEB 110
Total experiments 4,123
Number of failures 1,023
Logged failures (coverage), PUB 346 (33.8%)
Logged failures (coverage), SUB 297 (29.0%)
Logged failures (coverage), joint 492 (48.1%)
subscriber (SUB) process (node 2) subscribes the topic of the publisher and then receives
the messages transmitted via the DDS middleware. Furthermore, node 2 hosts the Test
Manager program: for each experiment it (1) initializes the test application (2) starts the
publisher process, i.e., the workload generator, and (3) once the workload terminates, stops
the testbed components and collects experiments data. Table 3.4 reports the 4,123 experi-
ments composing the campaign broken down by fault operator: faults have been injected in
the library encapsulating the code of the DDS middleware.
3.4.1 Coverage and verbosity
Injected faults caused 1,023 failures out of total 4,123 experiments (356 halt, 597 silent,
and 70 content). The coverage of Open DDS is preliminary assessed at the publisher and
subscriber side, separately, because the DDS infrastructure does not provide a native support
to centralize the event log. Publisher and subscriber are usually deployed on different nodes
and it might not be possible to access the logs of both the components of the application.
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(a) Publisher. (b) Subscriber.
(c) Joint (i.e., Publisher or Subscriber).
Figure 3.8: TAO Open DDS: coverage by failure type.
The logging mechanisms reports 346 out of 1,023 failures at the publisher side: coverage
is around 33.8%. Figure 3.8a shows how the coverage varies with respect to the failure
types. Similarly to Apache, many halt failures, i.e., 73% do not leave any trace in the
log. Most of them are caused by (i) the DataWriterImpl and PublisherImpl DDS modules
(16.4%), due to the bad manipulation of DDS messages during the sending phase, and (ii)
Service_Participant DDS module (8.8%). Silent failures are logged in a relevant number
of cases (37%). The DDS library is able to log silent failures occurring (i) in the DDS lower
transport layer (12.5%), and (ii) in the DataWriterImpl (10%), which are mainly due to the
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bad manipulation of the topic of the DDS message. Unlogged silent failures (63%) mainly
occur within (i) the lower DDS transport layer (18%), because of the bad manipulation of
the send buffer, and (ii) the Service_Participant DDS module (13%). Content failures
are mostly unlogged (61%). Corrupted messages are delivered to the subscriber side without
any notification in the log of the DDS-based application.
Coverage is around 29% at the subscriber side. Although the percentage is similar
to the publisher, the overall logging behavior is different, as described in the following.
In this case (as shown in Figure 3.8b), the coverage of halt failures, i.e., 40%, is higher
than the publisher: subscriber is able to log failures caused by a bad QoS setup within the
Service_Participant DDS module (7%), and a significant percentage of halt failures (18%)
that occurred at the publisher side, thus acting as an external failure detector. Unlogged
halt failures (60%) are mainly due to problems occurring in the Service_Participant
module (12%), which still remains a significant source of unlogged halt failures. A significant
percentage (77%) of silent failures is unlogged. Unlogged silent failures mainly occur (i) in
the DataReaderImpl module (13.5%) due to problems affecting the topic-subscription phase,
and (ii) algorithmic errors during the message delivery occurring in the DDS lower transport
layer (11%). Again, content failures are mostly unlogged (80%). A corrupted messaged is
delivered to the subscriber due to problems occurring in the DDS transport layer.
Furthermore, the coverage of the overall DDS (i.e., those failures logged by either the
publisher or the subscriber), is around 48.1% (Figure 3.8c), thus higher than the publisher
and subscriber: the logging mechanism might benefit of a log centralization support, in case
of distributed applications.
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Table 3.5: TAO Open DDS: verbosity of the logging mechanism.
failure logged number of entries in the log
type failures average ±std-dev; (min-MAX)
publisher
halt (96) 5 ±3; (1-17)
silent (223) 7 ±24; (1-139)
content (27) 7 ±3; (6-16)
subscriber
halt (145) 2,949 ±34,732; (1-409,492)
silent (138) 2 ±1; (1-4)
content (14) 7 ±2.5; (6-12)
average 496
Table 3.5 reports the average number of entries in the log notifying the occurrence of
a failure in case of TAO Open DDS. In the average (last row of Table 3.5), the logging
mechanism reports each failure with 496 entries in the log. The PUB process is less verbose
than the subscriber. The worst case is represented by halt failures logged at the subscriber
side: in the average, this type of failure cause 2,949 entries in the traditional log.
3.4.2 Recall and precision
Recall and precision analysis has been conducted for TAO Open DDS at the publisher and
subscriber sides: results, reported in Figure 3.9a and 3.9b, highlight a similar trend at both
the sides of the DDS application, thus the only publisher is discussed in the following. It can
be observed that the maximum achievable recall is 0.34, obtained for the bytes and lines
indexes when the classification parameter K is set at the minimum value (Figure 3.9a);
however, precision is only around 0.58. The highest precision, i.e., 0.96, is observed for the
words index when K = 6, but the recall parameter is just 0.07. As observed for the Apache
Web Server, achieving high recall conflicts with a good precision rate (and viceversa).
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(a) Publisher. (b) Subscriber
Figure 3.9: TAO Open DDS: recall and precision.
3.5 Case study 3: MySQL DBMS
MySQL is a widely used open-source DBMS. It has a market share of about 30% according
to several market studies6. The experimental testbed is shown in Figure 3.10. It is composed
by a MySQL server and a client program that exercises the server. MySQL7 version 5.1.34
is evaluated in this study.
The client is a SQL testing tool, namely MySQL Test Run (MTR), shipped with the
MySQL source code. The workload is represented by a subset of test cases from the en-
tire MySQL test suite, which includes functional and regression tests actually used by the
MySQL developers. Total 73 test cases have been selected in such a way to cover most of
the MySQL features within a limited amount of time; all the selected test cases are sequen-
tially executed during an experiment. MySQL server is represented by the mysqld program,
which, in turn, is made up of several sub-components, such as the MySQL core and the
6http://www.mysql.com/why-mysql/marketshare/
7http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/mysql/5.1.html
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Figure 3.10: MySQL DBMS: experimental testbed.
Table 3.6: MySQL DBMS: breakup of the experiments by fault operator and coverage of
the logging mechanism.
Fault # locations Fault # locations
MFC 3,932 MLAC 1,496
MVIV 682 MLOC 1,238
MVAV 1,823 MLPA 13,436
MVAE 5,880 WVAV 1,615
MIA 4,333 WPFV 3,328
MIFS 3,897 WAEP 723
MIEB 756
Total experiments 43,139
Number of failures 15,102
Logged failures (coverage) 5,376 (35.6%)
storage engines. The standard MySQL configuration also includes a further process, namely
mysqld_safe, which instantiates the mysqld process, and collects all error messages from
mysqld to store them in a log file.
MySQL core is the target of the fault injection experiments, because it is the largest
and most fundamental component of the DBMS; it is responsible for managing threads
and connections, and for SQL query parsing, optimization, and execution. The campaign
encompasses 43,139 fault locations that are broken down by fault operator in Table 3.6.
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Figure 3.11: MySQL DBMS: coverage by failure type
3.5.1 Coverage and verbosity
During the campaign have been observed 15,102 failures (i.e., 3,663 halt, 761 silent,
and 10,678 content) out of 43,139 total software fault injection experiments. The logging
mechanism reports 5,376 out of 15,102 failures: the coverage is 35.6%. Figure 3.11 shows
the coverage of MySQL logging mechanisms by failure type.
Figure 3.11 shows that almost all halt failures (97.9%) are detected by the mysqld_safe
process; it is the parent of the mysqld process and receives a notification of the child process
termination from the OS. It should be noted that, even if Apache has a similar architecture,
its coverage with respect to halts is lower (46.2%). It is reasonable that Apache parent
process performs active work, other than a pure monitoring task, thus failures in this pro-
cess might go undetected. Unlike mysqld_safe, the Apache parent process is not specifically
designed to collect error messages from child processes; hence logged data may not be as
effective as in the case of MySQL.
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A significant percentage of silent and content failures occurs without leaving any
message in the log. Logged silent failures (6.0%) include invalid operations on sockets, locks
or files (3.5%) as well as errors during thread creation or termination (1.5%). Unlogged
silent failures were due to omission faults related to concurrency (e.g., omitted call to lock
primitives (57.4%)), resource allocation or initialization (e.g., missing thread deallocation
(10.5%)), and operations on network connections (e.g., connection not opened (9.2%)). It
has been observed that even if the OS or external resources are involved, there can be a lack
of log messages due to the omission of an operation. In the remaining cases, silent failures
were related to infinite loops and corrupted data structures, e.g., linked lists (16.8%): it
would be useful enforcing the logging mechanism during the access to logical resources.
Logged content failures (19.4%) were due, among the others, to table corruption (1.6%),
wrong interactions with storage engines (1.4%), and incorrect management of files and sock-
ets (1.2%). Unlogged content failures were due to faults that affected system behavior in
a complex way, leading to a bad state (e.g., incorrectly initialized strings or flags), wrong
control flow (e.g., a missing if with a goto instruction), or wrong output (e.g., missing data
manipulation).
Verbosity of the logging mechanism is reported in Table 3.7. In the average, a failure
affecting the DBMS causes the production of 81,774 entries in the log: this result indicates
that the logging mechanism implemented by MySQL is significantly verbose. The worst
case is represented by silent failures. Such failures cause, in the average, 245,252 entries in
the log. During the campaign, it is been observed a silent failure reported with more than
5 million entries.
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Table 3.7: MySQL DBMS: verbosity of the logging mechanism.
failure logged number of entries in the log
type failures average ±std-dev; (min-MAX)
halt (3,573) 44 ±6; (1-100)
silent (46) 245,252 ±1,003,960; (1-5,421,413)
content (1,757) 36 ±41; (1-1,093)
average 81,774
Figure 3.12: MySQL DBMS: recall and precision.
3.5.2 Recall and precision
The analysis of recall and precision confirms the findings which have been observed for the
other case studies. Results are shown in Figure 3.12. It can be observed that the maximum
achievable recall is 0.37, obtained for the bytes index when the classification parameter K is
set at the minimum value (Figure 3.12); however, precision is only around 0.58. Precision is
higher for the other function indexes, e.g., 0.81 for the words index. Nevertheless, MySQL
achieves better precision without impacting recall. For example, when the classification
parameter K is 1,000, the bytes index achieves 0.34 recall and 0.97 precision, which is a
more reasonable tradeoff when compared to Apache and Open DDS.
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3.6 Discussion
Experiments revealed that current logging mechanism are inaccurate at reporting failures
caused by software faults. This is a severe threat to the validity of log-based measurement
studies, because, as discussed, software faults have become among the main responsible for
system failures. The key findings of the analysis are summarized in the following:
• The coverage of current logging mechanisms, in the proposed case studies,
is around 33%. The percentage of logged failures ranges between a minimum of
29%, i.e., TAO OpenDDS (Subscriber side), and a maximum of 35.6%, i.e., Apache
Web Server. This result suggests that around 7 out of every 10 actual failures due to
software faults do not leave any trace in the log during the system operational phase:
unreported failures heavily distort analysis results.
• Failure-related information in the log is highly redundant, as indicated by
the verbosity parameter. For example, failures affecting MySQL DBMS, when
detected, are logged with 81,774 average lines in the log. This result highlights the
need for efficient algorithms to group the entries in the log that are related to the same
failure manifestation. This problem is exacerbated in case of distributed systems.
• Current logging mechanisms are likely to raise many false positives, i.e.,
40%, estimated across the proposed case studies. It has been observed that,
in order to maximize the recall, it should be concluded that a failure has actually
occurred even if a minor error evidence is observed in the log; however, this causes
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many false positives. On the other hand, increasing the precision parameter leads to
many undetected failures. The analysis of the event logs calls for a trade-off between
the strength of the failure evidence in the log and recall/precision rates
• Software systems are most prone to log errors that occur with operating
system resources rather than algorithmic ones. Both Apache Web Server and
MySQL DBMS are able to log software faults resulting in bad sockets, files, memory
or IPCs management. Algorithmic errors leading, for example, to infinite loops, wrong
buffer management or concurrency issues are mainly unlogged.
• Architectural features influence the effectiveness of the logging mechanism.
The distributed architecture of the DDS increases the probability to log failures. The
use of the mysqld_safe process is an effective solution to log almost all halt failures.
• Designing specific logging support increases coverage. Experimental results
show that a distributed infrastructure for collecting/correlating logs at the publisher
and subscriber sides may increase the number of logged failures. The introduction
of a process, responsible for event collection, can also increase log coverage. These
approaches could provide further failure data to developers at the cost of the overhead
of log event transfer to a dedicated node or process.
Analysis exacerbates the inadequacy of current logging mechanisms at detecting software
failures, and provides useful hints to design better logging infrastructure. Results discussed
in this Chapter motivate the need to design novel techniques to make logs effective to infer
failure data.
Se hai un sistema migliore insegnalo,
altrimenti usa il mio.
If you have a better way teach it,
otherwise use mine.
Quinto Orazio Flacco
Chapter 4
Improving Logs for the Analysis of
System Failures
The analysis of the logging mechanism implemented by real-world systems revealed that event logs
are often inaccurate. Among the other findings, analysis demonstrates that around 67% of failures
caused by software faults go unreported in the log, and 40% of failure indications represent false pos-
itives. The inadequacy of the logging mechanism to cope with software faults is challenging, because
software faults are among the main responsible of system failures. However, this is not the only
threat to log-based failure analysis: distributed computing, that is currently on growth path, poses
new challenges in terms of heterogeneity of the data sources and redundancy of the information in
the log. In this Chapter are described novel techniques to make event logs effective to infer the failure
data. A rule-based logging mechanism is designed based on the lessons learnt from the analysis of
the implementation pitfalls of current ones. Then, it is discussed a management framework named
Logbus, which provides a log-centralization support and integrates monitoring features that allow
supplementing the content of existing logs when failures occur. Finally, it is discussed an algorithm
to correlate failure-related data in the event log produced by distributed systems.
4.1 Implementation Pitfalls of the Logging Mechanism
The logging mechanism, introduced in Section 1.4, is the set of detectors intended to re-
veal the occurrence of error events during the system operational phase. Nevertheless,
experiments conducted in the context of real-world systems, demonstrate that the logging
mechanism is inadequate to cope with software fault, that are among the most common
causes of system outages: around 67% of failures caused by software faults go undetected
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Table 4.1: Software platforms and related statistics
software # files # lines # log
platform ver. invoc. (ratio %)
apache 1.3.41 130 97,263 688 0.71
apache 2.0.64 378 211,247 1,297 0.61
opendds 0.9 146 33,076 524 1.58
mysql 5.1.34 963 734,977 1,141 0.16
ace 5.5.1 4,239 1,593,705 6,773 0.42
jacorb 2.2 5,219 597,824 340 0.06
minix 3.1.1 174 76,957 544 0.71
cardamom 3.1 958 300,454 879 0.29
average 1,526 455,688 1,523 0.57
in the log and 40% of notifications in the log represent false positives. The inaccuracy of
logs is a threat to validity of log-based studies, thus, the scarce ability of the
detectors composing the logging mechanism is worth to be investigated. The
implementation of several logging mechanisms, which are currently adopted in the field, is
analyzed in order to (i) pinpoint implementation pitfalls that make detectors ineffective,
and (ii) understand how to design a better logging strategy. The analysis encompasses
open-source and industrial software projects, which are reported in Table 4.1 (column 1)
and briefly surveyed in the following. Apache Web Server, TAO Open DDS, and MySQL
DBMS have been extensively described in the previous Chapter of the thesis. Ace is an
object-oriented C++ framework implementing core patterns for concurrent communication
software. Jacorb is a standard-compliant ORB (Object Request Broker) implementation
for Java applications. MINIX is a microkernel operating system targeting high-reliability
and security features. Finally, CARDAMOM is an industrial platform providing services
to support the development of safety critical systems. Selected software platforms cover a
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1 if ( ! reported && ( active_threads==ap_threads_per_child ) ){
2 reported = 1 ;
3 ap_log_error( APLOG_MARK , APLOG_NOERRNO | APLOG_ERR ,
4 server_conf , "Server ran out of threads [ omissis ] "
5 "raising the ThreadsPerChild setting " ) ;
6 }
7 (a) - Apache 1.3.41 (http_main.c, 6106-6111)
8
9 try{
10 knownReferences=
11 ( Map ) ObjectUtil . classForName (
12 hashTableClassName ) . newInstance ( ) ;
13 }
14 catch ( Exception e ){
15 logger.fatalError(" unable to create known ref . map " , e ) ;
16 throw new INTERNAL ( e . toString ( ) ) ;
17 }
18 (b) - Jacorb 2.2 (ORB.java, 2078-2087)
Figure 4.1: Instances of logging patterns.
variety of features, such as, the criticality (business/safety critical systems), language (C,
C++, Java), paradigm (procedural and object oriented), and mission (standalone server,
middleware supports, operating system). The source code of the software accounts for total
around 3.5 million lines of code. Table 4.1 provides some statistics concerning the analyzed
platforms, such as the number of invocations of logging functions and the percentage ratio
of such invocations to the total lines of code of the software (column 4).
A code parser has been developed to support the analysis. The parser (i) identifies
the lines of code representing the invocation of a logging function, and (ii) extracts the
lines preceding each invocation to determine the control structure that activates the logging
function1. Figure 4.1a shows an example of logging function (line 3) activated by means of
the if construct; similarly, Figure 4.1b reports a logging function (line 15) triggered via a
1The code parser runs under the Linux OS and consists of a set bash scripts, which classify the control
structure that are used to implement the logging mechanism.
Chapter 4. Improving Logs for the Analysis of System Failures 86
Figure 4.2: Logging mechanisms: control structures
catch instruction. The code parser is run against the source files coming with the distribu-
tion of the selected software. Figure 4.2 summarizes analysis results. For each software, the
bar indicates the percentage use of the control structures that are used to implement the
logging mechanism. The most adopted pattern (73% of invocations of logging functions) is
“if(condition) then log_error();", as shown by the rightmost bar of Figure 4.2. The
condition consists of a single clause, i.e., if category, or a complex clause (multiple clauses
combined with and/or operators), i.e., if+ category, in 62% and 11% of cases, respectively.
Other control structures, e.g., else, catch, etc., account for total around 27% of cases.
The control flow of the if pattern, which is the predominant control structure, is ex-
emplified in Figure 4.3. Given a block of instructions, the detection of an occurring error
is performed in two steps. First, the values of one or more variables, which encapsulate the
state of the results of the instructions executed in the block, are gathered within the block
(Figure 4.3 A). Second, such values are checked against error flags (Figure 4.3 B): the logging
function is invoked if the check returns true. It is worth noting that other logging patterns,
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Figure 4.3: Control flow of the “if" pattern
such as else or catch, can be represented in a similar way. An occurring error (Figure
4.3) is logged if the two following conditions hold: (i) the control flow reaches the checking
instruction, and (ii) the check returns true. Let R and I denote the two conditions, respec-
tively. By following this notion, it is possible to formalize the logical equation representing a
false negative (FN), i.e., the error occurs but no log is produced, as FN = ¬R+R · ¬I: the
errors that meet such condition escape the logging mechanism and might lead to unreported
failures, which have been defined in Section 1.4.
Example errors escaping the observed pattern are timing errors, which can alter the
control flow of the program and prevent to reach the checking instruction (¬R is met). For
example, an infinite loop (e.g., caused by the bad management of the variable(s) controlling
a cycle) hangs the program and no information can be logged at all. The analysis of the
accuracy of the logging mechanism, revealed that halt and silent failures, which are the
result of timing errors that propagate to the system interface, represent the most challenging
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failure types to detect. Again, these failures distort the control flow of the program in a way
that no information can be logged at all by means of the if pattern. Even the errors that
do not alter the control flow of the program, e.g., content errors, might go unlogged if the
checking instruction returns false (R·¬I is met). This might happen when improper variables
are collected within the block of instructions or it is checked the wrong condition. A poorly-
written checking code might also cause a false failure indication, or false positive (FP), when
the logging function is invoked even if no failure occurs (causing a reported error, as discussed
in Section 1.4). FPs might also occur because of the nature of current logging mechanisms,
which are often conceived for debugging purposes rather than for failure analysis. As a
matter of fact, many errors do not necessarily cause a failure: examples have been proposed
in Figure 1.7. False failure indications are challenging: the analysis of the accuracy of
current logging mechanisms revealed that around 40% of anomalous notifications in the log
do no represent failures. As discussed, such entries have to be filtered in order to perform a
log-based failure analysis. Filtering requires a detailed knowledge of the application domain,
especially if the log is the only available source of information: inaccurate filtering misleads
the failure analysis.
For these reasons, it is crucial to develop a novel approach to logging, which addresses
both false negatives and false positives. Regarding false negatives, the analysis revealed
that the logging mechanism aims to detect errors affecting a block of instructions
by means of a single logging point. However, this is clearly ineffective against the errors
that distort the control flow, and thus escape such logging point. For this reason, it is defined
a precise error model that takes into more comprehensive scenarios that affect systems during
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the operational phase. Errors are detected by monitoring the changes in the control flow of
the program by means of the strategic placement of the logging instructions. As for false
positives, the logging mechanism should focus on the errors that propagate outside a block
of instructions and are able to reach the boundary of the system causing a failure: this is
achieved by making the logging mechanisms system-architecture aware.
4.2 Accurate Failure Detection: Rule-Based Logging
The effective placement of logging instructions, in terms of ability to detect control flow
changes and error propagation among blocks, requires knowledge about the structure of the
system. For this reason, a novel logging approach is proposed to face the inefficiency of
current mechanisms. The key aspect of the proposal is to conceive the placement
of logging instructions at design time, because it is possible to leverage the variety of
artifacts that are already available at this stage. This approach is different from the current
practice in the implementation of the logging mechanism. As a matter of fact, programmers
usually postpone the implementation of the logging mechanism to the last stages of the
development cycle (according to inefficient patterns and with no systematic strategy). Rule-
based logging drives the implementation of the logging mechanism with the knowledge of
the system structure by means of precise rules. The rules avoid the inaccuracy in the coding
of the logging instructions caused by the programming skills of individual developers.
High- and low- level design artifacts produced at design time (e.g., system conceptual
model, architectural model, and UML diagrams), are used to define a system representa-
tion model which identifies the main entities of the system and interactions among them.
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Figure 4.4: Rule-based logging approach: overview
Then, a set of logging rules drives the unambiguous placement of the logging instructions
within the entities. The rules are defined so to ensure that all the data needed to perform
the failure analysis (e.g., error notifications coming from system entities and propagation
traces) is provided by the event log.
The approach at-a-glance, denoted as rule-based logging, is shown in Figure 4.4,
where it is emphasized the use of design artifacts to obtain the system representation.
The representation is used to drive the placement of logging instructions in the source
code of the system, according to the logging rules. The idea of leveraging design artifacts
adds a novel flavor to logs, which become system structure-aware. Logs have been often
used to determine dependability bottlenecks, and error propagation traces: includinging the
system structure in the log increases the level of trust on this type of analysis. The use
of design artifacts provides generality to the approach, because such representations are
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Figure 4.5: Representation model based on the high-level architecture of Open DDS.
produced for any notable software system, at different levels of abstraction, and irrespective
of implementation choices, such as programming language and technologies. The adoption of
rules allows placing the logging instructions by means of code-parsing tools, or model-driven
approaches based on the system representation and with almost no human intervention.
In the following, the representation model, and the assumptions on the entity error modes
inspiring the logging rules are presented.
4.2.1 System Representation
The representation model identifies a set of entities, i.e., the portions of the system in
hands that designers wish to analyze via logging. The identification of the entities is based
on the variety of high- and low-level artifacts produced during the design phase of the
system [94]. For example, entities can encompass an entire software layer or smaller modules
within the same layer of a high-level architectural view of the system. Figure 4.5 reports
such an example with reference to the Open DDS middleware taken from the available
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Figure 4.6: Representation based on modules and interactions of the Apache Web Server.
documentation2. Even by adopting a basic architectural schema it has been possible to
select a set of entities. Similarly, the identification of the entities can be determined by
finer-grain views of the system, in terms of components, packages, or even single classes,
e.g., UML class diagrams [95]. Figure 4.6 shows the entities selected via a diagram of the
modules3 of the Apache Web Server.
It is worth nothing that the representation model can be supplemented by other types
of data. For example, in case of safety-critical domains, the results of a Failure Modes
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) might suggest the selection of the entities based on consider-
ations related to their criticality. Finally, if the design artifacts are not available, or the
logging mechanism has to be applied to the code of an existing system, a reverse engineering
technique can be used to isolate the entities of interest starting from the source code.
2Open DDS, TAO Developer’s Guide Excerpt, http://www.theaceorb.com/product/index.html
3http://www.voneicken.com/courses/ucsb-cs290i-wi02/papers/Concrete_Apache_Arch.htm
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1 out service ( in ){
2 entry; (entry point of the service)
3
4 //block of instructions (local elaborations, interactions)
5
6 dirty_exit;
7
8 //block of instructions (local elaborations, interactions)
9
10 clean_exit;
11 }
Figure 4.7: General service view.
The analysis of the entities in the representation allows determining the points in the
source code of the system where the logging rules have to be applied. Thus, the grain of
the representation (e.g., in terms of number of entities and coverage of the representation
with respect to the components of whole software system) influences the number of logging
instructions in the software: the finer the grain of the representation, the higher the number
of logging statements. Rule-based logging allows to detect the errors occurring in the entities
at runtime, as detailed in the following.
4.2.2 Entity Error Modes
Each entity provides a set of services invoked by external software items, such as other
entities or Off-The-Shelf components. Once invoked, the service initiates a variety of actions
(e.g., local elaborations or concurrent tasks within the entity) and, in many cases, it causes
the control flow to be transferred outside the entity when an external component in invoked,
i.e., interaction. For the sake of clarity, Figure 4.7 provides a general service view (e.g.,
function call or method invocation). The service accepts zero or more input parameters
and encapsulates a sequence of instructions to process the input. The computation can exit
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1 timestamp message entity
2
3 07/14/11 14 : 41 : 05 SUP [ E8 ] //startup
4 07/14/11 14 : 41 : 15 SUP [ E7 ]
5 . . .
6 07/14/11 16 : 32 : 40 SER : serA [ E2 ] //service error
7 07/14/11 16 : 32 : 51 IER : intX [ E7 ] //interaction error
8 07/14/11 16 : 32 : 51 IER : intY [ E8 ]
9 . . .
10 07/14/11 18 : 12 : 10 CMP : serB [ E4 ] //service complaint
11 . . .
12 07/14/11 19 : 24 : 31 CER [ E2 ] //crash error
13 07/14/11 19 : 28 : 46 IER : intZ [ E1 ]
14 . . .
15 07/14/11 22 : 15 : 35 SDW [ E3 ] //shutdown
Figure 4.8: Instance of rule-based event log.
either in a clean or in a dirty way. In the former case, the output is returned to the caller; in
the latter, the service might return an error flag. It is worth noting that when a service exit
dirtily it can be reasonably stated that something went wrong during the service execution;
however, a service might return a bad output via a clean exit point.
The rule-based log, differently from current logging approaches, reports error
notifications according to a precise error model. Figure 4.8 shows an instance of such
log, where each entry in the log contains a timestamp, a message, and the entity originating
the error. In the context of this work, error modes are defined at the entity-interface level,
because the aim is to log only the errors that reach the border of the entity and, thus, able
to propagate to the system interface until they cause a failure (e.g., reported failures). The
error modes, described in the following, have been established based on a widely accepted
and reference taxonomy in the dependability area, proposed in [2]:
• Service Error (SER). Service errors are the ones preventing an invoked service to
reach any exit point, either clean or dirty. For example, timing errors belong to this
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category: experimental results described in Chapter 3 demonstrated that information
about their occurrence is often missed by traditional logs. A SER entry, in the form
“<timestamp> SER:serA [Ei]", is written in the event log when a service error is
detected for the service named serA provided by Ei. Figure 4.8 (line 6) reports an
instance of this entry.
• Service Complaint (CMP). A complaint error notifies that a service has terminated
via a dirty exit point. A CMP entry, in the form “<timestamp> CMP:serB [Ei]", is
written in the log when a complaint error is observed for the service serB provided
by Ei . Figure 4.8 (line 10) reports an instance of this entry. CMPs enable the
backward compatibility with the traditional logging mechanism, because log events
are commonly collected when the execution reaches a dirty exit point. Furthermore,
CMPs help at detecting if a bad value is the delivered to the caller of the service: bad
output values are usually returned via dirty exit points.
• Interaction Error (IER). The error notifies that an interaction started by an entity
does not terminate, e.g., the invoked software item (entity or OTS component, such as
a library or OS support) does not return the control to the entity. A IER entry, in the
form “<timestamp> IER:intX [Ei]", is written in the log when a failed interaction
started by Ei, i.e., intX, is detected. Figure 4.8 (lines 7, 8, 13) reports instances of
this entry type. Interaction errors allow figuring out whether a problem is local or
external to the entity, thus provide more contextual information about the originating
location of the error. Furthermore, this error type allows monitoring the status of
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interactions with system components that do not belong to the representation model,
thus increasing the probability to detect failures.
• Crash Error (CER). Services are not the only mechanism to trigger the computation
within an entity. As discussed, an entity might execute concurrent tasks, such as
internal threads or the main() loop of the program, independently from the invocation
of any service. A crash error (Figure 4.8, line 12) denotes the unexpected stop of the
entity (e.g., the OS process encapsulating the entity crashes) and, given an entity Ei,
it is notified via a “<timestamp> CER [Ei]" entry in the event log.
Again, it must be noted that errors are defined at the entity-interface level to make
the event log suitable to conduct a failure analysis; however, whenever other objectives
are pursued, e.g., debugging, further error modes can be added to the model. In order
to allow the precise estimation of some dependability figures, such as availability, start-up,
and shutdown entries are introduced in the event log. Let Ei be an entity of the system.
The start-up entry, in the form “<timestamp> SUP [Ei]", e.g., Figure 4.8 (lines 1,2), is
produced when Ei starts to run. Similarly, the shutdown entry, in the form “<timestamp>
SDW [Ei]", e.g., Figure 4.8 (lines 15), is logged when the execution of Ei ends. SUP and
SDW allow computing up- and down-time intervals at entity-grain level, and discriminating
clean from dirty reboots, as proposed by studies on operating systems [7, 96] (e.g., two
consecutive SUP can be assumed as evidence of a dirty reboot). This approach allow estimate
dependability attributes both at component and system level.
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The described entries allow establishing the occurrence of anomalous events and discrim-
inating services from interaction errors: this makes it possible to achieve strong insights into
the error propagation traces in case of failures. Propagation traces augment the semantic
of the logging mechanism with determination capabilities (i.e., the ability to detect prob-
lems and isolating their root causes [97, 98]) and allows monitoring the interactions towards
the software that do not belong to representation. Overall this information significantly
enhances log-based failure analysis.
4.2.3 Logging Rules and Event Processing
A mechanism consisting of precise rules that regulate the implementation of the logging
instructions, has been designed to detect the described errors. Each rule defines what to
log, i.e., in terms of log events, and where to log, i.e., points in the source code of the
entity where the events have to be introduced. Log events allow monitoring the control
flow of the program. For this reason, differently from the traditional approaches, events
are not immediately written in a log file, but are processed at a higher level. Processing
is performed on-the-fly by a framework named Logbus, which is in charge to produce rule-
based logs, such as the one shown in Figure 4.8. Logbus has been developed in the context of
an academic-industrial collaboration, in the framework of the mentioned COSMIC project
(Section 1.3). The Logbus infrastructure will be presented in Section 4.3. Let rb_log(),
e.g., Figure 4.9b - line 4, be the support function delivering a log event to the Logbus: the
placement of log events with reference to C++ code, and how the events are processed to
detect the described entity errors is discussed in the following.
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1 (a) General view (b) Reference example
2
3 out service ( in ){ int serA ( int∗ ptr ){
4 entry; <- - - - - - - - - - - -> rb_log(SST, serA) ; //LR-1
5
6 //block of instructions if ( ∗ptr<0 ){
7 rb_log(CMP, serA) ; //LR-3
8 dirty_exit; <- - - - - - - - - - - -> return -1;
9 }
10 //block of instructions
11 rb_log(IST, intX) ; //LR-4
12 //interaction <- - - - - - - - - - - -> int x=b . intX (∗ ptr ) ;
13 rb_log(IEN,intX) ; //LR-5
14 //block of instructions
15 rb_log(SEN, serA) ; //LR-2
16 clean_exit; <- - - - - - - - - - - -> return x;
17 } }
Figure 4.9: Rule-based placement of log invocations.
Service Events
These events detect service-related errors, i.e., service errors and service complaints. The
following pair of logging rules (LR), and associated events, are defined to allow the generation
of a SER entry in the event log:
• LR-1. "Service STart” (SST): the SST event has to be logged as first instruction of
the service (Figure 4.9b - line 4). The event, if logged, provides the evidence that the
entity initiated the execution of the service, i.e., the control flow has been transferred
to the entity.
• LR-2. "Service ENd” (SEN): the SEN event notifying the termination of the service
has to be logged immediately before each clean exit point of the service (Figure 4.9b -
line 15). The event, once logged, provides the evidence that the entity completed the
execution of the service.
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The use of the (SST,SEN) pair overcomes the implementation pitfall of the logging
mechanism discussed in Section 4.1, which aims to log an error by means of a single
logging point. The described pair of events detect errors as follows. The SST event is logged
once the service has been invoked; however, if an error, e.g., timing, occurs during the
execution of the service (e.g., the triggering of an infinite loop), the control flow is altered
in a way that the SEN event cannot be reached. Differently from the traditional logging
mechanism, the change in the control flow of the program is detected by means of the lack
of the SEN event, which is the symptom that the service error, i.e., SER, has occurred.
Service errors are detected via a timeout-based approach described in the following.
This technique is implemented by the on-agent tool coming with the Logbus infrastructure.
The timestamps of the SST and SEN event, logged at each error-free invocation of the service,
allow to profiling the expected duration, i.e., ∆, of the service. The ∆ parameter is computed
with the following equation
∆ = (1− α)∆ + α∆l (4.1)
where ∆l is the last duration estimate (obtained by subtracting the timestamp of the SST
from the one of the SEN event at the last service invocation), and the α parameter is small
to take into account the history in the changing tendency of ∆. It is worth nothing that
such technique is used by several scheduling algorithms to estimate the execution time of OS
processes [99]. Figure 4.10b shows how the Equation 4.1 is used to estimate the expected
duration, i.e., ∆serA, of an example service named serA. A service error is detected, and
notified with a SER entry in the event log, if the SEN event is not observed within nS · ∆
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(a) Log event flow
of an entity.
(b) Log event processing via the
Logbus infrastructure.
Figure 4.10: Rule-based logging and error detection
(with nS > 1) time units since the related SST. As for service complaint, the following
rule has been defined:
• LR-3. "service CoMPlaint” (CMP): the CMP event has to be logged immediately before
each dirty exit point of the service (Figure 4.9b - line 7).
CMP events are introduced in the points of the source code, such as “return -1" or “catch"
blocks, representing dirty exit points. The Logbus infrastructure appends the CMP entry to
the event log if such event is observed in the flow of the entity, without further processing.
The CMP event notifies the termination of the service (even if erroneous) thus no SER entry
is written in the event log.
Interaction Events
Interaction events has been designed to detect interaction errors, i.e., IER (discussed in
Section 4.2.2), and encompass the following pair of rules:
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• LR-4. “Interaction STart” (IST): the IST event has to be logged immediately before
an interaction (Figure 4.9b - line 11). The event, if logged, provides the evidence that
the interaction has been invoked by the entity, i.e., the control flow of the entity has
reached the invocation point of the interaction.
• LR-5. “Interaction ENd” (IEN): the IEN event has to be logged immediately after an
interaction (Figure 4.9b - line 13). The event, if logged, provides evidence that the
control is returned to the entity.
No other instruction, if not the interaction, is allowed within the triple (IST,interaction,IEN).
These rules allow detecting errors affecting interactions as follows. The IST event is logged
once the interaction is invoked. If the interaction halts during the execution, e.g., an error
occurs within the invoked piece of code, the IEN event might not be observed. For example,
let intX be an interaction started during the execution of the service serA (Figure 4.9b, line
12). If intX is a blocking call that never returns the control, serA halts; furthermore, the
expected EIE event is not logged, thus helping the diagnosis of the problem.
Interaction errors are detected via the timeout-based approach described above; in
this case, ∆ (Equation 4.1) is the expected duration of an interaction, and it is profiled
by observing the timestamp of the IST and IEN events at each error-free execution of the
interaction (e.g., ∆intX - Figure 4.10b). An interaction error entry, again, IER, is written in
the event log by the Logbus infrastructure when the interaction exceeds nI ·∆ (with nI > 1)
time units the expected duration.
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Life-cycle Events
An entity can execute concurrent tasks, independently from the invocation of services and
interactions. Such tasks might cause errors, which are addressed by the following life-cycle
rule category:
• LR-6. “Start UP” (SUP): the SUP event has to be logged as first instruction executed
by an entity, i.e., at startup-time. The event allows establishing the time the entity
started its execution.
• LR-7. “HearTBeat” (HTB): the logging rule forces the entity to periodically log a
heartbeat event, independently from the services execution.
• LR-8. “Shut DoWn” (SDW): the SDW event has to be logged as last instruction exe-
cuted by an entity, i.e., at shutdown-time. The event allows establishing the time the
entity halted.
Similarly to the CMP event, the Logbus infrastructure appends a SUP or SDW entry to the
event log with no further processing, when such events are observed in the flow of the entity.
The heartbeat rule makes it possible to detect crash errors, i.e., CER. The expected duration
of the heartbeat period is profiled by the Logbus via the timestamps of two subsequent HTB
events (e.g., Figure 4.10b). A CER entry is written in the log if no HTB message is received
within nH ·∆ (with nH > 1) time units since the last HTB.
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4.3 Failure Data Production and Management: the Logbus
Infrastructure
Accurate failure detection is crucial to log-based analysis. Nevertheless, the detection abil-
ity, even if important, is not the only aspect concerning the effective use of event logs. Once
the logging mechanism detects an event, entries notifying the event must be made available
to engineers. The common practice is to store the entries in a file available at the location
hosting the component that detected the event. Since distributed computing is on a growing
path, files might be at different locations. For example, the startup of the ATC applica-
tion discussed in Section 1.3, encompasses 34 log files produced by application components,
middleware support, operating system. Centralizing the entries collected by multiple com-
ponents at a single location is important, because, as shown by the analysis of the coverage
of TAO Open DDS (discussed in Section 3.4.1), it increases the chance to detect the
occurrence of a failure. Furthermore, it avoids the manual retrieving of the data sources,
thus making the analysis of the log easier. For this reason, there exist a variety of protocols
supporting the collection of the log at different locations and providing permanent storage
capabilities. It is worth noting that, due to the large scale of current systems, heterogeneous
logging technologies might be adopted at the same time.
Logbus has been designed to manage log entries produced by the components of complex
distributed systems. They encompass (i) legacy entries, i.e., the variety of entries produced
by the traditional logging mechanisms adopted by the system at different layers and across
different nodes, and (ii) rule-based entries, i.e., the ones produced by the logging mechanism
described in Section 4.2. Logbus provides a log-centralization support, which masquerades
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Figure 4.11: Logbus infrastructure: conceptual view.
the heterogeneity of the information produced with different protocols and techniques, and,
differently from current infrastructures discussed in Section 2.1.1, integrates on-line mon-
itoring features that allow supplementing the content of existing event logs when
failures occur. As shown in Section 3.5.1 the introduction of a monitoring process can in-
crease the coverage of the log produced by MySQL DBMS. Figure 4.11 provides a concept
view of the proposed infrastructure. The Logbus transport layer accepts entries produced
by different logging mechanisms via an API.
In the following are presented the key elements of the framework, i.e., the collection API,
the Logbus daemon, and processing tools coming with the infrastructure. Description does
not focus on implementation details, but aims to highlight the novelty aspects which have
been introduced with the framework, such as monitoring capabilities, facilities provided by
the transport layer and event filtering. As discussed, these characteristics are not, or just
Chapter 4. Improving Logs for the Analysis of System Failures 105
partially, addressed by current log-management infrastructures. Logbus has been conceived
as a natural support allowing the runtime processing of rule-based event flows. As discussed
in Section 4.2.3, rule-based events allow monitoring the control flow of the program and are
processed on-the-fly by the Logbus infrastructure. Nevertheless, a subset of the features
provided by the proposed infrastructure, can be used to enhance the failure analysis of sys-
tems allowing some changes (e.g., access to the configuration files, reboot of the components,
deploy of additional processes) that make it possible to integrate the framework. The Log-
bus core infrastructure has been made publicly available4, and it is based on the prototype
implementations described in [100, 101].
4.3.1 Collection of the Log Entries
Entries are collected by means of a Logbus API that exposes the functions to access the
infrastructure. Rule-based entities, which natively include Logbus-compliant code, adopt
the mentioned rb_log() function to send an event over the transport layer. This is shown
in Figure 4.12. However, as above mentioned, Logbus collects entries produced by a variety
of traditional logging mechanisms and protocols. Different solutions might be adopted to
allow legacy components to use the Logbus infrastructure, without applying any change to
the code of the component. For example, it can be designed a component-specific wrapper,
as reported in Figure 4.12 (component C1 ), that translates the legacy logging code into
a Logbus-compliant version based on the API: this is the solution that has been adopted
to manage the entries produced by the Trace Logging service of the CARDAMOM plat-
form (introduced in Section 1.3). Alternatively, if the legacy logging mechanism already
4http://sourceforge.net/projects/logbus-ng/
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Figure 4.12: High-level view of the API (sender-side) and Logbus daemon.
supports the syslog protocol, such as log4net, it is sufficient to modify the configuration
files to redirect events over the Logbus transport layer, without the need to develop further
components. This scenario is indicated by Figure 4.12 (component C2 ). All the entries
collected by means of the Logbus API are made syslog-compliant. Each entry is
marked with further information (e.g., the pid of the OS process that encapsulates the code
of the component, the IP address of the node hosting the component, the name of the ap-
plication) that differentiates the event flows within the transport layer, and allows analysis
component to filter only the events of interest. The Logbus API is in charge of starting
monitoring threads and processes. For example, it attaches a heartbeat thread to each
rule-based entity, once the SUP event has been logged: this thread generates the HTB event
defined by LR-7 (Section 4.2.3); a monitoring thread/process is attached by the API to the
legacy components that do not support the Logbus natively. A further daemon, allowing to
detect network-related problems, is started for each node of the system by the Logbus API.
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4.3.2 Logbus Daemon
The LogBus library underlying the API transmits the events to a centralized Logbus daemon
that abstracts a transport layer between the components producing the events
and the analysis tools presented in the next Section. The daemon is shown in Figure 4.12.
It is not a mere repository/forwarder. As a matter of fact, the daemon encapsulates a variety
of support services, each implemented as a plugin component, such as permanent event
storage, ping mechanisms, load profile information, that allow supplementing the content of
existing logs and improving the overall analysis. The Logbus daemon generates new events
starting from the one received by the system components. In other words, it generates
additional knowledge about the behavior of the system. For example, the Logbus produces
a crash message if no more HTBs are received for the monitored component, but the
node where the component is located replies to ping messages sent by the Logbus daemon;
similarly, the unreachable message is produced if no HTBs are received, and the hosting
node does not reply to ping messages.
4.3.3 Processing Tools
A variety of components can be implemented to receive events from the Logbus daemon and
to perform different types of log-based analysis. Components can subscribe only the classes
of entries they are interested in, by means of a filtering mechanism that is provided by the
Logbus API (at the receiver-side). Filtering supports boolean and regular expressions. This
approach makes it possible to design specific tools, just doing a part of the whole FFDA
analysis but doing it in an effective way; output coming from different components can be
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Figure 4.13: Examples of currently available pluggable components.
combined to produce value-added information. Furthermore, the adoption of a common
syslog-based message format makes it possible to reuse analysis tools. Some of the currently
available analysis tools, that are reported in Figure 4.13, are described in the following. It
is worth noting that they represent a subset of potential tools, because Logbus is an open
platform, which makes it possible to connect components provided by third-party.
On-agent (ONline Alerts GENeraTor) generates the rule-based error entries. It consists
of a set of monitors and a logger component. Each monitor subscribes rule-based events
coming from a unique entity of the system and implements the timeout-based detection
approach (described in Section 4.2.3) to pinpoint errors affecting entities. In order to tolerate
events loss caused by network issues, e.g., congestion, each monitor queries the Logbus
permanent storage service (i.e., to figure out whether the event has been actually logged or
dropped by the network) prior a timeout-based error is produced.
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The logger component is the one in charge of maintaining a log file, i.e., the Rule-
Based (RB) log, conceived to perform dependability analyses. Error entries (i.e., service,
interaction and crash errors), startup, shutdown and complaint events are written in this
centralized event log of the system. An example log produced by the logger component
has been shown in Figure 4.8.
Statistics manages a set of variables, that are updated when some events are observed,
e.g., life-cycle and errors events. This information allows estimating (i) uptime, downtime
(i.e., the time between a SDW and a SUP), and failtime (i.e., the time between a SER
(or CMP) and a SUP when no SDW event has been experienced between them) (ii) SUP,
SDW and error counts and, (iii) availability for each entity. Statistics provides a snapshot
for the overall system, which evolves at runtime when new events occur. The recovery
component uses Logbus-generated events to initiate recovery actions at process/node level.
For example, it can restart a failed process when the crash event is notified by the Logbus.
4.4 Correlating Failure Data in the Event Log
Collection infrastructures (e.g., the syslog protocol or the proposed Logbus framework)
allow centralizing log entries at a unique location. As discussed, this approach increases the
chance to detect failures and reduces, if not eliminate, the time it takes to retrieve the data
from individual locations. As a result of the centralization, entries produced by a variety
of computing entities (e.g., processes, application components, nodes) interleave
in the collected system log. This characteristic is exacerbated in the context of current
systems, because distributed computing has been on a growing path over the past decades
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1 timestamp node message
2
3 1177454190 tg−c407 + Mem Error Detail : Physical Address : ∗ Mask : ∗
4 Node : ∗ Card : ∗ Module : ∗ Bank : ∗ Device : ∗
5 Row : ∗ Column : ∗
6
7 1177454208 tg−c401 +BEGIN HARDWARE ERROR STATE AT CPE
Figure 4.14: Examples of entries in the log close in time.
[13]. Internet applications, large-scale computer infrastructures, supercomputers, which
are commonly targeted by log-based failure analysis studies, are composed by hundreds or
thousands of entities that interact to provide complex services: an error affecting an entity
might propagate within the system and generate multiple notifications in the log [22, 4]
and, in many cases, over short time intervals. For the sake of clarity, Figure 4.14 reports
example entries taken from the log of a supercomputing system that is discussed later in
dissertation. The entries are generated by two distinct computing entities of the system,
i.e., the nodes called tg-c407 and tg-c401, and the temporal distance between the entries
is just 18s. This configuration of the entries might be the result of an error propagation
phenomenon. However, there is no discernible relationship between the two entries: they
might be close just by coincidence and report about two independent problems.
The correct identification of correlated notifications in the log is of paramount
importance, because it allows establishing the failure data points and inferring a
more realistic knowledge about the failures. As a result, it makes it possible to achieve
better insights into the behavior of the system, and leads to more accurate dependability
characterization. A technique to support the discrimination of correlated from independent
error notifications in the log, is discussed in the following.
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Figure 4.15: Example of misgrouping of events in the log.
4.4.1 Problem Statement
The tuple heuristic, that has been extensively discussed in Section 2.1.2, is the most
adopted strategy to group the entries in the log that are likely to represent the manifestation
of the same failure. As discussed, the intuition underlying the heuristic is that two entries in
the log, if related to the same fault activation, are likely to occur near in time. Consequently,
if their time distance is below a predetermined threshold, i.e., the coalescence window, they
are placed in the same group (called tuple). This approach has been originally developed
and validated in the context of centralized and small-sized systems, such as Tandem [102].
In these studies, the coalescence window, determined via a sensitivity analysis, is selected to
group log entries into tuples. The tuples provide a reasonable approximation of the number
of failures that occur during the time the log has been collected.
However, an incorrectly selected coalescence window (either too narrow or too wide) for
generating tuples can lead to inaccurate failure analysis. The identification of a proper coa-
lescence window becomes particularly difficult when analyzing the log of systems composed
by hundreds or thousands of computing entities. For example, let N1 and N3 be two distinct
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entities logging the events e1, e2, e3, and e4, e5, respectively, as depicted in Figure 4.15. It
can be noted that the entries interleave in the system log and, for the coalescence window W,
they would be grouped in the same tuple T1. There might be two cases that lead to the same
configuration of the entries, i.e., the entries are triggered by (i) one fault, whose effects prop-
agate between the entities, (ii) two independent faults, which just occur coincidentally, i.e.,
they are triggered near the same time. The latter case is referred as collision5 and represents
an example of incorrect grouping. Collisions are challenging in case of systems composed
by many distributed entities, as the chance of independent faults occurring coincidentally is
not negligible. Furthermore, it is difficult in practice to differentiate between collisions and
propagated errors solely by means of the temporal information of the entries in the event
log. Even by resorting to finer-grain failure analysis, collisions might still impact results [4].
Furthermore, this strategy provides a more detailed view of the system and makes it hard
to characterize the dependencies among the entities.
4.4.2 Identification of Correlated Entries
The intuition underlying the grouping strategy proposed in the thesis is that two subsequent
entries in the log (generated by different entities of the system) should be placed in the same
tuple if both following conditions hold: (i) the two entries are close in time, and (ii) they
exhibit a certain degree of correlation. This approach improves the traditional grouping
heuristic, which is based on a purely-temporal criteria, by introducing a statistical indicator
aiming to pinpoint correlated entries in the log.
5The technique focuses on the collisions among the entities. As shown by [22], the tuple heuristic is a
good strategy to group the entries produced by a single entity.
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The former condition, i.e., “entries are close in time” is based on the tuple heuristic.
More in details, it is performed a sensitivity analysis of the log to identify the coalescence
window W. The entries are assumed to be close enough in time if their distance is shorter
than W. The latter condition, i.e., “entries exhibit a certain degree of correlation” represents
the novelty aspect of the proposed grouping technique. In the following, it is discussed how
to evaluate the degree of correlation between two entries and how this information can be
combined with the basic tuple heuristic to improve event grouping.
Evaluating the Degree of Correlation
The grouping achieved with the tuple heuristic for a reasonable value of the coalescence
window is used as a basis to evaluate the degree of correlation between two entries. For the
sake of brevity, given an entry ei in the log, t(ei), h(ei), and m(ei), denote the timestamp,
the originating entity and the message of the entry, respectively.
The lift indicator [103], used in the context of data mining analysis, provides a
suitable metric to assess the degree of correlation. More specifically, given a database
of transactions, each of them consisting of a sequence of items, the lift measures how many
times two item-sets occur together more often than expected as if they were statistically
independent. The same concept can be easily mapped in the context of this problem: each
tuple is assumed to be a transaction and the entries they contain to be items. Let ei and ej
be two entries in the log, with h(ei) 6= h(ej). It is hypothesized that if a correlation degree
exists between the entries ei and ej , i.e., the entries share a common fault origin, it is likely
that a significant (in statistical terms) number of tuples will contain both the entries. For
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Figure 4.16: Sensitivity analysis of the lift parameter.
this reason the algorithm is based on the estimation of the quantities Ni, Nj , Ni,j , i.e., the
number of tuples containing (i) m(ei) generated by h(ei), (ii) m(ej) generated by h(ej), (iii)
both the entries. GivenN the total number of tuples, the following probabilities are assessed,
i.e., P (ei) = NiN , P (ej) =
Nj
N and P (ei, ej) =
Ni,j
N . Lift is estimated as l =
P (e1,e2)
P (e1)·P (e2) . This
indicator has been already used in the area of log-based failure analysis, e.g., [69], [87].
Lift can assume any value greater than 0. The greater the lift, the higher the probability
for the entries of being correlated. A sensitivity analysis is performed to understand how the
values of the lift vary with respect to the available datasets. In particular, it is estimated
the lift for each pair of subsequent entries in the log produced by different entities. Section
4.4.3 will show that, since the log is parsed sequentially when applying the heuristic, these
values of the lift are used to group the entries. Figure 5.17 provides a concept example
plot (adapted from the real data log discussed later in the presentation) showing how the
number of pairs of entries (y-axis) exhibiting a specific value of the lift (x-axis) is likely
to vary. The plot reported in Figure 5.17 shows that most of the pairs exhibit low values
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of the lift, i.e., the values in the left part of each plot. These finding indicates how to
select a lift value representing a suitable correlation threshold, i.e., L in the following, to
discriminate between related and unrelated entries; given a pair of entries, if the value of
the lift is greater than L, the entries are assumed to be correlated. As discussed, the left
part of the plot reporting the sensitivity analysis consists of pairs of unrelated entries. The
correlation threshold represents a border value between this part of the plot (where
most of the pairs converge), and the one containing the pairs exhibiting increasing values
of the lift. According to the distribution reported in Figure 5.17, L=30 would be a suitable
threshold value.
4.4.3 Lift-based Grouping Heuristic
The adoption of the lift indicator is integrated into the basic tuple heuristic. Figure 4.17
presents the proposed algorithm in a C-like pseudocode. In addition to the notation intro-
duced in Section 4.4.2, “←” indicates the introduction of an entry in a tuple, and last(t),
with t denoting a tuple, returns the last entry of the tuple t. Inputs to the algorithm (lines
2-4 in Figure 4.17) consist of: (i) the set of the entries to be grouped, (ii) the coalescence
window W estimated via the curve “knee” rule, (iii) the correlation threshold L determined
via the sensitivity analysis conducted as described in Section 4.4.2. The grouping of the
entries established with the basic tuple heuristic is available during the execution of the
proposed algorithm; as discussed, it is used to estimate the lift between a pair of entries
in the log (line 15). The set of the entries to be grouped, E, is parsed sequentially as
in the basic heuristic (line 9). Each time an entry ei is processed, it is identied the set of
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1 input:
2 1.) E = {e1, e2, ..., eN} − entries to be grouped
3 2.) W − coalescence window
4 3.) L − association threshold
5
6 id = 1, grouped = false;
7 tupleid ← e1;
8
9 for i = 2...|E| {
10 grouped = false;
11 X = {set of tuples x : t(ei)− t(last(x)) < W}
12
13 if( |X|! = 0 ){
14 for j = 1...|X| {
15 l = lift(ei, last(xj));
16
17 if(h(ei) == h(last(xj))){
18 xj ← ei; grouped = true;
19 }
20 if(h(ei)! = h(last(xj)) && l ≥ L){
21 xj ← ei; grouped = true;
22 }
23 }
24 }
25
26 if(grouped == false){
27 id = id+ 1; tupleid ← ei;
28 }
29 }
Figure 4.17: Lift-based grouping heuristic
tuples, X, created until that instant of the execution, which satisfy the temporal criteria
based on the use of the coalescence window (line 11). Each tuple in X (line 14) is analyzed
and ei is added to the first tuple in X that satisfies one of the criteria shown in line 17 and
20. More specifically, if (i) the same entity generates the entries, the ei is assigned to the
tuple by relying solely on the timing information (recall that, as stated in Section 4.4.1, it is
assumed that the tuple heuristic is enough in case of a single entity), (ii) two distinct entities
generate the entries the lift is compared with L. If no criteria is matched for any tuple in X,
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Figure 4.18: Example of grouping of the entries
a new tuple is created (line 26). An example in Figure 4.18 is used to illustrate the need for
creating a set X, rather than just trying to add an entry to the last created tuple. Let A
and B be entries in the log generated by two different entities. A and B have a low degree of
correlation, i.e., lower than L, but are close in time (their time difference is lower than that
of the coalescence window W reported in the figure). Figure 4.18 (1) represents the initial
state of the algorithm. When the event B, occurring at t2, is processed (Figure 4.18 (2)),
since the lift with A is low, the new tuple T2 is created. Let A occur again at t3 (Figure
4.18 (3)). The set X (which includes all the tuples to which A could be potentially added
solely relying on W) contains T1 and T2. Since A and B are not related, and both the events
A are generated by the same entity, A is assigned to T1.
The proposed algorithm to group entries in the log allows differentiating mul-
tiple interleaving failure dynamics, and to infer a more realistic knowledge about the
failures. This significantly improves the failure analysis leading to more accurate measure-
ments and allowing a precise diagnosis and identification of failing system components.
Tutto il nostro sapere ha origine dalle
nostre percezioni.
Overall our knowledge comes from our
perceptions.
Leonardo da Vinci
Chapter 5
Experimental Results
Techniques proposed in the thesis have been designed to make event logs effective to infer failure data:
the benefits that can be achieved by adopting the techniques are shown here by means of experiments
conducted in the context of real-world, complex distributed systems. First of all, it is demonstrated
that rule-based logging is a strongly accurate at detecting failures. Software faults injected into the
Apache Web Server and TAO Open DDS show that, as opposite to traditional logging mechanisms,
the proposed approach logs around 92% of failures at almost no false positives. Improvement is
significant, because rule-based logs detect around 60% more failures when compared to traditional
ones. The proposed logging approach is combined with the Logbus framework to characterize de-
pendability attributes of a distributed system in a long-running experiment. The framework allows
gaining in-depth visibility of the dependability behavior of the system and its individual components:
this information would have been hard to be inferred solely from traditional event logs. Further-
more, experiments demonstrate that inferring the failure data by taking into account the correlation
among the entries in the log, allows achieving better measurement. The use of the lift-based grouping
heuristic to pinpoint the occurrence of failures in the log of a supercomputing system, reveals that
traditional approaches underestimate the actual number of failures and distort measurements, such
as the MTBF, by more that 11.5%.
5.1 Accuracy of the Rule-Based Logging Mechanism
Accuracy of rule-based logs at reporting failures, e.g., in terms of coverage, or precision
parameter (as discussed in Section 3.2), is assessed by means of software fault injection ex-
periments. The evaluation framework has been described in Section 3.1: software faults aim
to introduce a failure behavior in the platform under-test in order to exercise the logging
mechanism. The objective of the analysis is (i) to evaluate the detection ability that can
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be achieved by means of the proposed rule-based logging approach and (ii) to compare ob-
tained results with the ones observed for the traditional logging mechanism, which has been
extensively discussed in Chapter 3. Comparison between traditional and rule-based logging
mechanism is performed in the context of two software platforms: Apache Web Server and
TAO Open DDS. These systems differ in terms of (i) mission, i.e., a standalone server and
a distributed middleware platform enabling the development of message-based distributed
applications, (ii) programming language/styles, i.e., procedural C code and object-oriented
C++ code, (iii) OS-level architecture, i.e., a standalone server application and a shared mid-
dleware library that is linked to the developer-provided code. The different features of the
software allow achieving a more comprehensive picture of the logging mechanism.
The original source code of each software platform has been augmented with the logging
rules described in Section 4.2.3. Then, the same set of faults that has been used to evaluate
the traditional logging mechanism implemented by each platform (the breakup of the exper-
iments by fault operator is reported in Table 3.2 and 3.4, for Apache Web Server and TAO
Open DDS, respectively) is injected in the rules-enhanced code. The Logbus infrastructure
processes the rule-based log events produced during each fault injection experiment: the
error detection parameters have been set to nS = nI = nH = 3, which are large enough to
take into account the event transmission delay caused by the network, and α is set to 0.2,
to spread out the averaging of the expected duration parameter (∆ in Equation 4.1) over
the eight most recent observations [99]. Experiments have been conducted by running the
software under the Linux OS. The machines of the testbed are Intel Pentium 4 3.2 GHz,
4GB RAM, 1,000 Mb/s Network Interface equipped. An Ethernet LAN connects the nodes.
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Table 5.1: Apache Web Sever: system representation and breakup of the fault injection (f.i.)
experiments.
entity SER INT CMP #f.i.
id file(s) exp.
E0 http_protocol, rfc1413 20 48 57 1,164
E1 http_main 9 52 3 1,450
E2 http_config 15 28 9 710
E3 http_request 5 47 12 488
E4 http_core 14 66 18 950
E5 http_vhost 4 16 3 273
files not included in the representation
alloc, buff, http_log, ... 3,165
total 67 247 102 8,200
5.1.1 Case Study 1: Apache Web Server
Apache Web Server has been instrumented with the logging rules beforehand. To this aim,
it has been adopted the system representation model shown in Figure 4.6. The representa-
tion encompasses the configuration and http-request handling code of the Web Server that
represent critical portions of the system. Table 5.1 (column 1) summarizes the entities of
the representation, and indicates the files of the software distribution implementing them.
For each entity, the number of services, interactions and complaints (i.e., dirty service exit
points) is reported. The campaign encompasses total 8,200 fault injection experiments. The
rightmost column of Table 5.1 reports an alternative view of the faults injected in the Web
Server when compared to Table 3.2: in this case the total number of faults is broken down
by entity and code that has not been included in the representation. It can be noted that
a fine-grain model has been adopted in the case study, i.e., each entity has been related to
almost one source file. Furthermore, faults have been injected in all the code of the Web
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Figure 5.1: Apache Web Server: testbed and Logbus infrastructure.
Server, despite the representation model (and, thus, the extent of the logging rules) does
not cover all the files of the distribution. Experiments show that the rule-based mechanism
provides entries in the log even if the fault that caused the failure is located in a piece of a
code that does not belong to the representation.
The components that have been deployed to evaluate the rule-based logging mechanism
are shown in Figure 5.1. Again, the workload generator, i.e., httperf tool, and Apache Web
Server are deployed on node 1 and 2, respectively. Furthermore, the testbed encompasses
the components of the Logbus framework: events produced by Apache Web Server during
the experiments of the campaign are forwarded to the on-agent tool (producing the final
rule-based log) via the Logbus transport layer. For each fault injection experiment the Test
Manager (1) initializes a faulty Web Server version (2) starts the workload generator (3)
once the workload terminates, stops all the components of the testbed and collects experi-
ments data: the rule-based log and the experiment outcome.
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(a) Rule-based. (b) Comparison.
Figure 5.2: Apache Web Server: coverage of the logging mechanism (T=Traditional;
R=Rule-Based).
Coverage and Verbosity
As already mentioned in Section 3.3.1, 1,101 out of 8,200 injected faults caused a failure
outcome during the campaign, i.e., 616 halt, 104 silent, and 381 content. The coverage of
the rule-based logging mechanism is 94.2% (1,037 logged failures out of 1,101 failures). The
coverage obtained with the rule-based mechanism is thus significantly higher
than the traditional one, which was around 34.2%: 60% more failures are detected by
introducing the rule-based strategy.
Figure 5.2a reports the coverage by failure type. It can be observed that 97.2% and
98.1% of halt and silent failures are detected and logged. Again, the rule-based approach
increases the detection capability of timing failures when compared to traditional logs, which
were able to cover only 35.4% and 10.6% of halt and silent failures, respectively. As
opposite to traditional logs (where halt and silent failures distort the control flow of the
program in a way that no information can be logged at all) the introduction of start/end
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Table 5.2: Apache Web Server: verbosity of the rule-based logging mechanism.
failure logged number of entries in the log
type failures average ±std-dev; (min-MAX)
halt (599) 4 ±3; (1-18)
silent (102) 31 ±51; (1-128)
content (336) 14 ±12; (1-42)
average 16
pairs in the source code of the program enhances the detection of timing errors. The rule-
based approach detects 88.2% content failures via complaint events logged at dirty exit
points. Nevertheless, a small number of these failures, i.e., 11.8%, go undetected: in such
cases bad values propagate within the system without causing any perceivable effect. Bad
values can be detected with application-dependent checks and logged as complaints; however,
the use of such checks cannot be formalized in terms of general rules.
Figure 5.2b provides a more detailed comparison between rule-based (RB) and traditional
(T) logging mechanism. All the failures observed during the campaign are divided into 4
classes: those (i) logged by T and RB, (ii) not logged by T but logged by RB, (iii) logged by
T but not logged by RB, (iv) not logged by any of the mechanisms. Let T ∧R, !T ∧R, T∧!R,
and !T∧!R (reported in Figure 5.2b) be such categories. Many of the observed failures (384
halt, 92 silent, and 189 content) can be logged only with the introduction of the rule-
based mechanism. Surprisingly, only total 5 failures are detected solely by the traditional
logging approach (Figure 5.2b, T∧!R class).
In the average (last row of Table 5.2), each failure detected with the rule-based logging
mechanism leads to 16 entries in the log. Again, halt failures results in the smaller number
of entries, i.e., 4. The occurrence of a silent failure causes more entries in the log, i.e.,
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Figure 5.3: Apache Web Server: recall/precision of the rule-based logging mechanism.
(T=Traditional; R=Rule-Based)
31, in the average. The traditional logging mechanism implemented by Apache logged each
failure with average 316 entries in the log (as indicated in Table 3.3): the log generated
with the proposed rules is around 19.7 times smaller.
Recall and Precision
Recall conflicts with the precision parameter in case of the traditional log. For example,
the series lines (T), bytes (T), and words (T) (representing recall and precision in case
of traditional logs, as discussed in Section 3.3.2) indicated that, in order to achieve high
precision, it should be concluded that a failure occurred only when strong error evidence is
observed in the log; however, this lead to many false negatives, i.e., small recall. The event
log produced by the rule-based mechanism overcomes this limitation, as it can be observed
in Figure 5.3 (recall and precision of the words index have been not estimated because rule-
based entries do not come with text messages). The maximum observed value of both the
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Table 5.3: TAO Open DDS: system representation and breakup of the fault injection (f.i.)
experiments.
entity SER INT CMP #f.i.
id example class(es) exp.
E0 Service_Participant, 3 27 3 674
DomainParticipantImpl, ...
E1 PublisherImpl, DataWriterImpl 11 16 3 505
E2 SubscriberImpl, DataReaderImpl 10 29 9 522
E3 TransportImpl, 2 20 0 412
TransportImplFactory, ...
E4 DataLink, DataLinkSet, 6 24 5 210
DataLinkSetMap
E5 SimpleTCPDataLink, 10 10 5 99
SimpleTCPTransport
files not included in the representation
Qos_Helper, TopicImpl, Serializer, TypeSupportImpl, ... 1,721
total 42 126 25 4,123
recall and precision parameter is 0.94 when the threshold K is minimum: differently from
the traditional logging mechanism, the presence of minor evidence in the event log, e.g., just
1 anomalous entry line, is enough to conclude that a failure actually occurred in the system
(high recall). Furthermore, there are only few cases when, despite the presence of an error
entry in the log, no failure had actually occurred in the system (high precision). This result
highlights that the rule-based approach is close to the perfect detector of software failures,
i.e., no false positives and negatives - (1,1) point in Figure 5.3.
5.1.2 Case Study 2: TAO Open DDS
Experiments conducted in the context of TAO Open DDS confirm the findings observed
for Apache Web Server. TAO Open DDS has been instrumented with the logging rules.
Instrumentation is based on the representation shown in Figure 4.5, which focuses on the
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Figure 5.4: TAO Open DDS: testbed and Logbus infrastructure.
architectural components of the DDS implementing the publisher, subscriber, and transport-
layer. Table 5.3 (column 1) shows the entities composing the representation model and, for
each entity, the number of services, interactions and complaints. Differently from Apache
Web Server, entities are composed by a set of classes in this case study: entities are logical
units that represent pieces of the system irrespectively of the implementation details, such
as programming language and/or paradigm. The rightmost column of Table 5.3 reports the
breakup of the 4,123 fault injection experiments by entity and classes that do not belong
to the representation. This is an alternate view of the same set of experiments reported in
Table 3.4. Again, rule-based logs involve a fraction of the source code (around 20 out of
total 80 source files); nevertheless, faults have been injected in all the code.
The testbed shown in Figure 5.4 has been deployed to perform the campaign. Again,
it includes the test DDS application composed by a publisher (PUB) and subscriber (SUB)
process, deployed on node 1 and 2, respectively. Furthermore, the testbed integrates the
components of the Logbus infrastructure. Both the processes of the DDS-based application
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produce rule-based events that are centralized at the node 1 of the testbed by means of
the Logbus. Events are processed on-the-fly by the on-agent tool that implements the
timeout-based error detection. The error entries produced by on-agent are stored in a single
rule-based event log for the entire DDS application. For each experiment the Test Manager,
that runs on node 2, (1) initializes the test application (2) starts the publisher process, i.e.,
the workload generator, and (3) once the workload terminates, stops the testbed components
and collects experiments data: the rule-based event log and the outcome.
Coverage and Verbosity
During the campaign 1,023 out of total 4,123 fault injection experiments caused a failure
outcome (i.e., 356 halt, 597 silent, and 70 content, as discussed in Section 3.4.1). The
rule-based approach logs 911 out of 1,023, failures: the coverage of the logging mechanisms
is thus around 89%. The coverage of the traditional logging mechanism observed for TAO
Open DDS was significantly smaller. As a matter of fact, experiments conducted in Sec-
tion 3.4.1 revealed that the traditional logging approach logs around 33.8% and 29% of
total failures at the publisher and subscriber side, respectively. As a result, the rule-base
approach increases the coverage at the PUB and SUB sides of the DDS appli-
cation by 55.2% and 60%. Furthermore, the coverage of the rule-based mechanism is
higher than the coverage of all the DDS (i.e., the failures logged by either the publisher or
the subscriber), which was around 48.1% (shown in Figure 3.8c): even with a log centraliza-
tion support, the traditional approach would not be able to improve over the rule-based one.
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(a) Rule-based.
(b) Comparison (PUB). (c) Comparison (SUB).
Figure 5.5: Open DDS: coverage of the logging mechanisms (Tp(Ts) = Traditional at
PUB(SUB); R=Rule-Based).
Figure 5.5a reports the breakup of the coverage by failure mode. Most of halt and
silent failures, i.e., 93.8% and 86.9%, respectively, are logged with the proposed rule-based
mechanism: again, the introduction of start/end pairs in the source code of the program
increases the chance to detect timing errors. The coverage of content failures is 82.9%:
in some cases it is not possible to detect the failures that corrupt the messages delivered
to the subscriber. Again, this type of failure might be detected only by introducing very
application-specific checks, that can not be generalized in terms of platform independent
rules. These result confirms the trend observed for the Apache Web Server.
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Table 5.4: TAO Open DDS: verbosity of the rule-based logging mechanism.
failure logged number of entries in the log
type failures average ±std-dev; (min-MAX)
halt (334) 3 ±2; (1-8)
silent (519) 1 ±1; (1-12)
content (58) 1 ±0.4; (1-2)
average 1.6
The comparison between traditional (T) and rule-based (RB) logs is performed by di-
viding all the failures observed for TAO Open DDS into four classes, i.e., the failures (i)
logged by T and RB, (ii) not logged by T but logged by RB, (iii) logged by T but not
logged by RB, (iv) not logged by any of the mechanisms. Figure 5.5b and 5.5c report the
number of failures belonging to each of the mentioned classes, observed at the publisher
and subscriber side of the DDS, respectively. For example, it can be noted that 243 halt,
308 silent, and 36 content failures, can be logged at the publisher side only by means of
the rule-based mechanism (Figure 5.5b, !Tp ∧R ). Only total 22 experiments (Figure 5.5b,
Tp∧!R) are logged exclusively by the traditional logging mechanism. As for the subscriber
side, it can be noted that (i) 195 halt, 394 silent, and 46 content failures (i.e., Figure
5.5c, !Ts∧R) have ben logged only by means of the rule-based approach, and (ii) only total
21 experiments (Figure 5.5c, Ts∧!R) are logged exclusively by the traditional approach.
Table 5.4 reports the average number of entries in the rule-based log notifying the occur-
rence of a failure. In the average (last row of Table 5.4), the rule-based log notifies a failure
with 1.6 entries. Verbosity of the traditional logging mechanism was significantly higher in
TAO Open DDS (Section 3.4.1): a logged failure, in the average, caused the generation of
496 entries, thus, the rule-based log is around 310 times smaller.
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(a) Publisher. (b) Subscriber
Figure 5.6: TAO Open DDS: recall/precision of the rule-based logging mechanisms
(T=Traditional; R=Rule-Based).
Recall and Precision
As observed for Apache Web Server, recall conflicts with the precision parameter in case
of the traditional log. For example, the series lines (T), bytes (T), and words (T) (dis-
cussed in Section 3.4.2, and representing recall and precision in case of traditional logs)
indicate that, in order to achieve high precision, it should be concluded that a failure has
actually occurred only when strong evidence is observed in the log (Figure 5.6).
The rule-based mechanism overcomes this limitation, as shown by the bytes/lines
(R) series in Figure 5.6. Recall and precision are both around 0.9: these values have been
observed when the classification threshold K is minimum, thus confirming the finding that
even a minor evidence in the event log is enough to conclude that a failure has occurred;
nevertheless, this approach does not cause many false positives. Again, the result highlights
that the rule-based logging mechanism is close to the perfect detector in case of failures due
to software faults (Figure 5.6, (1,1) point).
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Figure 5.7: Apache Web Server: performance impact.
5.1.3 Performance Impact of the Logging Rules
As with any technique adding further instructions to the source code of a program, perfor-
mance impact might be experienced because of the introduction of the logging rules. To
assess such impact, the performance of the original version of the software is compared to
the performance of the software adopting the rules. Experiments have been conducted for
Apache Web Server and TAO Open DDS. The focus of the evaluation is the response time
of the software, which is recognized as an effective metrics for performance analysis [104].
Key findings are summarized in the following.
The adopted performance indicator for Apache Web Server is the reply time for a
HTTP request. The reply time has been measured by means of the httperf tool, which is
the workload generator. The reply time has been measured under different load conditions,
i.e., number of HTTP requests / second server by the Web Server. A preliminary test has
been conducted to determine the maximum load it can be applied to the Web Server, i.e.,
the capacity of the server. To this aim the Web Server, when no logging rules are introduced,
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has been exercised with increasing values of the load. Figure 5.7 (No Rules (NR) series)
shows how the reply time varies when the load increases. It can be observed that the reply
time increases sharply when the load reaches 5,000 HttpReq / sec, with the server running
on the testbed machines: this load condition is the upper bound of the experiments.
The reply time of the original and instrumented version of the Web Server is thus assessed
with the load varying in the interval [10; 5,000] HttpReq / sec. As shown in Figure 5.7 (With
Rules (WR) series), the software adopting the logging rules does not show a significant
performance decay with low/medium loads, i.e., ≤500 r/s. A higher impact is observed when
the load is >500 r/s; however, as above discussed, such values of the load approach the server
capacity. Nevertheless, the impact observed with a high load condition is still acceptable. As
a matter of fact, studies on multi-layer workflows (e.g., web searches, content composition,
advertisement selection), state that the target delay of the components implementing the
workflow, such as web servers, should be in the order of 10-100ms [105]. This delay range
is indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 5.7: the software adopting the logging rules meets
the target delay even in the worst case scenario.
The performance impact caused by the logging rules in case of TAO Open DDS has
been assessed by taking into account the load specification of a real Air Traffic Control
application1, where the DDS is used as support middleware. In this application, the DDS
has to transmit an average of 100 messages / sec. In order to achieve a more comprehensive
evaluation of the performance impact introduced by the logging rules in case of TAO Open
DDS, the transmission time of a DDS message (i.e., the time the message takes to be
1Coflight project: http://www.coflight-efdp.com.
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Figure 5.8: TAO Open DDS: performance impact.
transferred from the publisher to the subscriber process) is assessed when the load varies
in the interval [1; 1,000] messages / sec. Figure 5.8 summarizes obtained results: No Rules
(NR) reports the transmission time measured for the original version of the DDS middleware,
while With Rules (WR) indicates the transmission time observed with the version of the
DDS adopting the rules. As shown in Figure 5.8 rules do not affect performance significantly,
because, when compared to Apache, the representation model adopted for DDS leads to the
introduction of a smaller number of logging instructions.
The analysis of the performance impact revealed that in some cases, e.g., Apache Web
Server, the logging rules might impact performance when the load is particularly high. This
is especially true when the software is instrumented at a fine grain of detail. However, it
is possible to reduce the performance impact by introducing a smaller number of logging
statements in the system, as in the case of TAO DDS, without impacting the detection
ability of the logging mechanism. In other terms, there is a trade-off between the
instrumentation grain and the coverage of the logging mechanism, as expected.
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The right compromise has to be found case-by-case, taking into account the non-functional
and performance requirements of the target system.
5.1.4 Extent of the Improvement
Case studies revealed that the rule-based logging mechanism significantly improves the ac-
curacy of event logs: this is a key factor to increase the level of trust on log-based failure
analysis. Main findings of the analysis are summarized in the following:
• Rule-based logging improves the detection of software failures: in the average
(estimated across the case studies) around 92% of failures are reported in the log by
the proposed mechanism: the proposed strategy logs around 60% more failures when
compared to the traditional logging mechanism.
• The rule-based mechanism achieves a high compression rate: in the average,
the rule-based log is around 160 times smaller than the traditional one, as indicated
by the verbosity parameter. Failures are notified with few lines, thus easing the inter-
pretation of the log and tasks, such as diagnosis and maintenance.
• Rule-based logs cause a small number of false positives, i.e., 8%, estimated
across the case studies. The proposed strategy leads to around 32% less false failure
indications when compared to the traditional logging mechanism.
It is worth noting that the applicability of the rule-based approach is restricted by
the availability of design artifacts. Nevertheless, it is possible to use reverse engineering
techniques or to apply post-release patches, to introduce the logging code.
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5.2 Logbus-Based Dependability Characterization
Experimental evaluation demonstrates that the rule-based logging mechanism is an accurate
technique to detect the occurrence of failures. For this reason, the rules and the components
of the Logbus infrastructure have been deployed into a real-world critical software system,
i.e., a Flight Data Plan (FPL) Processor, developed in the framework of the mentioned COS-
MIC project (Section 1.3). Differently from the fault injection-based experiments, which aim
to validate the detection capability of the rule-based logging mechanism by means of star-
and-stop experiments, the experimentation that has been conducted here, allows to compare
the effectiveness of traditional and rule-based event logs to characterize dependability at-
tributes of a system. For this reason, a known failure behavior is emulated in the FPL
Processor application over 32 days: logs collected with both the mechanisms over this period
are analyzed to assess some dependability measures.
The case study exemplifies the use of the Logbus infrastructure in a real system that
adopts replication techniques to increase long-term availability. Furthermore, experiments
demonstrate that the use of an accurate detection and monitoring infrastructure
significantly improves final results, while reducing analysis efforts. The proposed
framework makes it possible to gain in-depth visibility of the dependability behavior of
the system and its individual components. Such information has been made available to
engineers by means of the entity-grain level representation of the system, and it is hard to
be inferred from traditional event logs.
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Figure 5.9: Case study: FPL Processor.
5.2.1 Air Traffic Control Application
The reference application consists of a real-world software system in the field of the Air
Traffic Control domain. A Flight Data Plan (FPL) Processor has been considered
in the context of this study. FPLs provide information such as a flight expected route, its
current trajectory, vehicle-related information, and meteorological data. The FPL Processor
is developed on the top of an open-source middleware platform named CARDAMOM, which
provides services intended to ease the development of critical software systems. For example,
these include Load Balancer (LB), Replication (R), and Trace Logging (TL) services, used
by the application in hand. The FPL Processor uses a DDS implementation to disseminate
FPLs among the system components.
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Figure 5.9 shows the FPL Processor. It is a CORBA-based distributed object system.
It is composed by a replicated Facade object and a set of processing Servers managed by
the LB. Facade accepts FPL processing requests (i.e., insert, delete, update) supplied by an
external Tester and guarantees data consistency by means of mutual exclusion among re-
quests accessing the same FPL instance. Facade subsequently redirects each allowed request
to 1 out of the 3 processing Server, according to the round robin service policy. The se-
lected server (i) retrieves the specified FPL instance from the DDS middleware (ii) executes
request-related computation, and (iii) returns the updated FPL instance to the Facade ob-
ject. Facade publishes the updated FPL instance and finalizes the request by acknowledging
the Tester component.
Tester object invokes Facade services with a frequency of 1 request per second. Under
this workload condition a request takes about 10 ms to be completed. The Tester object
has been instrumented in order to detect request failures. A timeout-based approach is
adopted to this aim. A time of 15 ms is assumed to be an upper bound for a request to
be completed. Consequently, if a request is not acknowledged within a 50 ms timeout, it
is considered as failed. Due to the replicated nature of both Facade and Server objects,
one request failure does not imply that the mission of the FPL Processor is definitively
compromised. The system may be in a degraded state, but still able to satisfy further
requests. For this reason the mission of the system is assumed to have been definitively
compromised only if 3 consequent requests fail. In this case the Tester object triggers the
FPL Processor reboot via the start.sh bash script. The application reboot time varies
between 300 s and 400 s.
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Machines composing the application testbed (Intel Pentium 4 3.2 GHz, 4 GB RAM,
1,000 Mb/s Network Interface equipped) run a RedHat Linux Enterprise 4. A dedicated
Ethernet LAN interconnects these machines. About 4,000 FPLs instances, each of them of
77,812 bytes, are shared with the DDS. FPL Processor uses the Trace Logging (TL) service
to collect log messages produced by applicative components (Figure 5.9). TL provides a
hierarchical mechanism to collect data. A trace collector daemon is responsible to store
messages coming form processes deployed on the same node. A trace admin process collects
per-node log entries and store these data in a file. Each log entry contains information such
as a timestamp, 1 out of 5 severity levels (i.e., DEBUG, INFO, WARN, ERROR, FATAL), source-
related data (e.g., process/thread id), and a free text message. Data collected via the TL
service are assumed to be an example of traditional logs.
The application code has been instrumented to produce rule-based events and to in-
tegrate the Logbus infrastructure (Figure 5.9). The representation model that has been
adopted in the study consists of entities associated to each FPL object (i.e., Facade and
Serves). Interactions consist of both CORBA-based remote methods invocations and DDS
read/write facilities.
5.2.2 Experimental Setup
The FPL Processor run for about 32 days. During this period a known failure is emulated
into the system. The aim of the experiments is to evaluate if/how traditional and rule-based
logs allow to reconstruct this known dependability behavior. More in details, availability
and failure analyses by using both logs have been performed.
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Table 5.5: Time To Failure (TTF) distributions
Object Distribution
Facade F (t) = 1− e−(0.000001t)0.92
Server S(t) = 1− e−(0.000005t)0.92
FPL Processor objects (i.e., Facade and Servers) have been instrumented to trigger
failures according to the Time To Failure (TTF) distributions shown in Table 5.5 (time
measured in centiseconds). The Weibull distribution is a proper choice because it has shown
to be one of the most used distributions in failure analysis [62]. However, any other reliability
function clearly fits the aim of the experiment. Different scale parameters ensure that Facade
and Servers fail with different rates. When an object failure has to be triggered according
to the current TTF estimate either a crash or a hang has been injected with the same
probability. A faulty piece of code, i.e., a bad pointer manipulation and an infinite wait on
a locked semaphore, is executed to emulate, crashes and hangs failures, respectively. Jointly
with the execution of the faulty code it is recorded the type of the emulated failure, i.e., crash
or hang, as well as the component executing it. An object failure always results in a system
failure in our case study, as the current FPL request does not correctly succeed. Furthermore
an object is not immediately resumed after a crash failure. This is the reason why subsequent
crashes lead progressively to the reboot signal. In this case the FPL Processor as a whole
is restarted. It has been observed that during the 32 days period the FPL Processor is
rebooted 400 times and 2,502 object failures are triggered. Table 5.6 reports the failures
breakup by object. Logs and/or reports produced both by the TL service and pluggable
components are collected to perform the analysis.
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Table 5.6: Failures breakup by object
Object Failures
Facade 260
Server 1 732
Server 2 772
Server 3 738
Total 2,502
5.2.3 Analysis of the Traditional Log
TL log collected during the long-running experiment is about 2.2 MB. The availability of the
FPL Processor is conducted by estimating uptimes and downtimes intervals, as described
in previous works in the area of log-based failure analysis (e.g., [7, 96]). To this aim, for
each reboot occurred during the experiment, are identified the timestamp of (i) the event
notifying the end of the reboot, and (ii) the event immediately preceding the reboot. A
downtime estimate is the difference between the timestamps of the two events. An uptime
estimate is the time interval between two successive downtimes. Uptime and downtime
estimates are used to evaluate system availability by means of Equation 5.1.
A =
∑
i uptimei∑
i uptimei +
∑
i downtimei
· 100% (5.1)
The described approach requires the identification of application reboots from logs. To
this aim TL log is directly inspected in order to identify sequences of log events triggered
by application reboots. Figure 5.10 depicts a simplified version of such a reboot sequence.
The “Startup complete” event identifies the end of the reboot. The event preceding the
“CDMW Finalize” event is assumed to be the one preceding the reboot. An ad-hoc algorithm
automatically extracts (i) reboot events, and (ii) uptime and downtime estimates from TL
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1 2010/26/09 14 : 41 : 05 INFO CDMW Finalize
2 2010/26/09 14 : 41 : 20 INFO Parsing XML Finalize FDPSystem
3 2010/26/09 14 : 41 : 47 INFO FDP Server
4 2010/26/09 14 : 43 : 54 INFO Finalize APP1/Server process
5 . . .
6 [omissis]
7 . . .
8 2010/26/09 14 : 43 : 13 INFO CDMW Init
9 2010/26/09 14 : 43 : 23 INFO Parsing XML Init file FDPSystem
10 2010/26/09 14 : 43 : 27 INFO FDP Server
11 2010/26/09 14 : 43 : 30 INFO Initialize APP1/Server process
12 with XML File
13 2010/26/09 14 : 43 : 40 INFO CDMW init ongoing for APP1/Server
14 2010/26/09 14 : 44 : 10 INFO Acknowledge creation of process
15 APPL1/Server
16 . . .
17 [omissis]
18 . . .
19 2010/26/09 14 : 46 : 44 INFO Acknowledge creation of process
20 APPL4/Facade
21 2010/26/09 14 : 46 : 48 INFO Startup complete
Figure 5.10: FPL Processor reboot sequence (TL log).
Table 5.7: Downtime and uptime estimates: statistics (TL log)
Downtime Uptime
Value 350.2 (±23.6) s 6,740.6 (±4,399.6) s
Minimum 300.1 s 843.4 s
Maximum 400.2 s 32,518.6 s
log. Table 5.7 provides statistics characterizing the estimates. Downtime estimates are close
to the expected reboot time. FPL Processor availability has been estimated according to
Equation 5.1. Equation 5.2 provides AT , i.e., availability based on TL log.
AT =
2, 689, 487.9 s
2, 689, 487.9 s+ 143, 736.5 s
· 100 ≈ 94.9% (5.2)
AT is about 94.9%. Overall downtime is 143,736.5 s. Since a reboot of the FPL Processor
takes about 350.2 s (Table 5.7) and considering that 400 reboots occurred, an overall down-
time estimate is 400 · 350.2s = 140, 080s, which is close to the measured one.
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Figure 5.11: FPL Processor estimated TTF (TL log).
TL log is investigated to characterize failure related data. The analysis reveals that
error conditions and propagations phenomena usually result in the higher severity levels, i.e.,
WARN, ERROR, and FATAL, provided by the TL logging mechanism. An algorithm to extract
failure-related entries from TL log by means of the severity information has been developed:
around 14% of the amount of the collected information, is used to perform failure analysis.
Furthermore, since a component failure might lead to multiple log entries over short time
interval, the entries that are close in time (i.e., less than 5s in the case study) are treated
as the same failure manifestation. The time window have been selected by performing a
sensitivity analysis on the tuple count, and is accurate enough for this system; it is worth
noting that the same assumption might heavily impact results in case of systems composed
by hundreds or thousands computing entities. By using this approach, 1,289 failure data
points have been identified in the log. It should be noted that only 1,289 out of the 2,502
actually emulated failures result from the analysis. An in depth analysis reveals that only
crashes are logged while hangs do not leave any trace in TL log.
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1 2010/27/08 18 : 21 : 15 SDW [ Facade ]
2 2010/27/08 18 : 22 : 35 SUP [ Server1 ]
3 2010/27/08 18 : 23 : 10 SUP [ Server2 ]
4 2010/27/08 18 : 25 : 05 SUP [ Server3 ]
5 2010/27/08 18 : 26 : 30 SUP [ Facade ]
Figure 5.12: FPL Processor reboot sequence (RB log).
The TTF distribution for the FPL Processor, named s_TL(t) is estimated by using the
timestamp information of both the tuples and the events notifying the end of a reboot.
Figure 5.11 depicts the analysis finding. Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is approximately
34 minutes. This is greater than the expected since only 1,289 out of the 2,502 actual
emulated failures result from the analysis. Regardless of the quality of the achieved finding,
s_TL(t) is a characterization of the failure behavior of the system under study. Anyway, it
is not clear how this finding could be actually exploited by developers, e.g., to drive specific
dependability improvements where needed. In the proposed case study, among multiple
notifications reported by the TL log, it has not been possible to pinpoint the object that
firstly signaled a problem, thus preventing and in-depth system characterization.
5.2.4 Analysis of the Rule-Based Log
During the 32 days long-running experiment about 30 millions of rule-based events are
sent over the Logbus. Resulting RB log, provided by the logger pluggable component, is
about 128 KB and contains 4,500 lines. It should be noted that the size of RB log is
about 5.7% when compared to TL log. The amount of information actually needed for the
analysis phase has been significantly reduced with the proposed strategy. The availability
of the FPL processor is estimated by means of the approach adopted in Section 5.2.3.
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Table 5.8: Downtime and uptime estimates: statistics (RB log)
Downtime Uptime
Value 350.2 (±23.6) s 6,740.6 (±4,399.6) s
Minimum 300.1 s 843.4 s
Maximum 400.2 s 32,518.6 s
In this case, application reboots are identified by SDWs-SUPs sequences. Figure 5.12 is
provided as an example. Facade SUP identifies the end of a reboot. The event preceding
the first SDW of a reboot sequence is assumed to be the one preceding the reboot itself.
Table 5.8 provides statistics characterizing uptime and downtime estimates. FPL Processor
availability is estimated according to Equation 5.1. Equation 5.3 provides ARB, i.e., the
availability estimate resulting from RB log. ARB is close to AT . The proposed framework
allows to estimate system availability as well as a traditional logging approach, however the
introduction of SUP and SDW events significantly reduces analysis efforts. Furthermore, as
discussed later in this Section, it is possible to perform a detailed availability analysis for
each system entity.
ARB =
2, 689, 488.1 s
2, 689, 488.1 s+ 143, 736.3 s
· 100 ≈ 94.9% = AT (5.3)
Rule-based log is used to gain insights of the FPL Processor failure behavior. As for the
traditional log, the entries that are close than 5s are clustered. RB log allows identifying
2,502 failure. It should be noted that this is the amount of the actually emulated failures,
as shown in Table 5.6. It is preliminary conducted a TTF analysis for the FPL Processor
as a whole, i.e., by jointly considering the failures from all system entities. Figure 5.13a
shows both s_TL(t) and s_RB(t), i.e., the application TTF estimated by analyzing RB
log. Resulting MTTF is approximately 17 minutes, thus shorter if compared to s_TL(t).
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(a) FPL Processor estimated TTF.
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(b) Server 2 estimated TTF.
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(c) Facade estimated TTF.
Figure 5.13: Estimated TTF distributions (RB log).
This finding highlights deficiency of TL log at providing evidence of all the failures occurred
during the experimentation time. Information provided by the rule-based log makes it
possible to achieve further insights about the dependability behavior of the proposed case
study. As a matter of fact, the information about the originating entity provided by the
logger component is used to figure out TTF distributions for each entity of the system.
Figure 5.13b depicts the estimated TTF, named s(t), when compared to S(t), for Server
2 (a similar finding comes out for the two remaining Servers). The experienced distribution
is close to the one emulated during the long running experiment. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test is performed to evaluate if s(t) is a statistically good S(t) estimate. Let (i) D be
the maximum distance between the analytical and the estimated distributions and (ii) L be
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Table 5.9: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
Process Samples D L
Server 1 732 0.0410 0.80<L<0.90
Server 2 772 0.0325 L<0.80
Server 3 738 0.0253 L<0.80
the resulting significance level of the test. Table 5.9 reports results obtained for the all the
Servers. The low value of L assures that the collected samples are consistent with the actual
failure distributions. The same distribution analysis has been conducted for the Facade
object. Figure 5.13c shows f(t), i.e., the TTF estimate. It is trivial to figure out that f(t)
is different form the emulated F(t), but lower than S(t). This is a realistic finding, which
depends on the recovery strategy adopted in the case study. In our long-running experiment
Servers exhibit a failure rate higher than the Facade (Table 5.5). This makes it very likely
that all Servers have crashed while the Facade is still properly working. In this case the
Tester object triggers the FPL Processor reboot, thus preventing the Facade object from
exhibiting its actual behavior. The proposed strategy enables an in-depth characterization
of the FPL Processor dependability behavior. The comparison between the estimated TTF
distributions, i.e., f(t) and s(t), makes it possible to identify the actual most failure-prone
entity within the system. This information can be used, for example, to reduce the Mean
Time To Repair [97] or to apply proper recovery actions only when needed [106].
The statistics component discussed in Section 4.3.3, provides a snapshot of the current
states of the system entities during the operational phase. This information is not available
with the TL logging subsystem and it is the result of the proposed strategy. Table 5.10
shows the snapshot observed at the end of the long running experiment. In the following,
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Table 5.10: RB report at the end of the long-running experiment
Uptime Downtime Failtime SUP SDW SER IER Avail.
Fac. 2,700,740 s 129,111 s 4,863 s 400 385 260 2,242 95.0%
Ser. 1 1,479,900 s 770 s 1,354,250 s 400 7 732 0 52.2%
Ser. 2 1,591,580 s 1,470 s 1,240,200 s 400 7 772 0 56.1%
Ser. 3 1,522,890 s 1,860 s 1,308,500 s 400 6 738 0 53.8%
the resulting findings are discussed to figure out if they are consistent with respect to the
emulated failure behavior. Facade availability is 95%, thus close to the one estimated for the
system as a whole (Equation 5.3). As a matter of fact when the Facade is unavailable, the
FPL Processor is rebooted, since FPL requests cannot be satisfied anymore. Consequently,
the Facade object is not allowed to remain in a failed state for a long time (i.e., a low
failtime). On the other hand, Servers availability is around 54%. Due to the adoption of
the LB policy, even if a Server crashes, the two remaining ones make it possible to execute
subsequent FPL request. It may take a long time before the application is rebooted and a
crashed Server is resumed.
Facade SDWs are mainly clear, i.e. the SUP count is close the SDW one. This is
a realistic finding, since the Facade object has a failure rate lower than the Servers. As
discussed, it is very likely that it is still able to correctly handle FPL requests when the
reboot signal is triggered. Not the same for the Server objects. In this case most of the
reboots are dirty. Adopted logging rules, make it possible to understand if a problem with
an entity is caused by a propagating error and thus to prevent erroneous findings. Table
5.10 reports service errors (SER) and interaction errors (IER) counts, which allow to break
the total amount of outages for each system entity by local, i.e. SER, and interaction, i.e.,
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IER. Servers exhibit only SERs, as they do not start interactions with any other entity
within the system. It should be noted that the SER count is equal to the actual emulated
failure count for each Server (Table 5.6). This finding demonstrates the effectiveness of the
proposed error identification strategy with respect to the case study. On the other hand,
errors shown by the Facade object are mainly due to interactions.
5.3 Correlation-Aware Failure Data Identification
Inferring failure data from the log produced by a system composed by hundreds or thousands
of computing entities is challenging, because of the presence of collisions and propagation
phenomena (discussed in Section 4.4.1). The tuple heuristic might fail to group the entries
in the log related to the same problem: incorrect grouping impacts the actual number
of failures inferred from the log and distorts analysis results. The tuple and the
proposed lift-based heuristic (denoted as T and T+, in the following) are used to group
the error entries produced by a large-scale system. Analysis quantifies the extent of the
distortion caused by incorrect grouping, and highlights the improvement of the measure
that can be obtained with the lift-based heuristic. The event log used in this study is
produced by the Mercury cluster at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications
(NCSA)2: the entities of the system are represented by the nodes of the cluster.
5.3.1 Event Log of the Mercury Cluster
The analysis encompasses the log of the Mercury cluster at the NCSA. The log has been
collected during a period of about 6 months (from Jan-1-2007 to Jul-2-2007). Mercury is
2www.ncsa.uiuc.edu - University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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composed by 987 IBM nodes (256 dual 1.3 GHz Intel Itanium2 processors and 731 dual 1.5
GHz Intel Itanium2 processors). Myricom’s Myrinet interconnects the nodes. Each node
runs a Red Hat 9.0 operating system. Mercury has a three-layer architecture consisting of
login, computation, and storage nodes. These nodes are indicated as tg-loginN, tg-cN,
and tg-sN, respectively, with N denoting an integer number. A dedicated node, named
tg-master, provides supervision and managing capabilities, such as running the daemon
responsible for the IBM General Parallel File System (GPFS). Entries in the log are collected
via the syslog daemon. Each entry reports, among the others, a timestamp (resolution
of 1 second), the name of the node that generated it, and a text-free message providing
specific descriptive content. Entries account for a large number of operational conditions
resulting from both normal and abnormal activities. The operating system kernel and
components, application processes, and daemons generate the events. During the above-
mentioned period, about 200 million entries were collected; the size of the log is about
10GB. Not all the entries are actually useful for performing the failure analysis, as many of
them just report informational statements. For this reason, the text-free message of each
entry is de-parameterized (similarly to [30]) in order to identify the relevant content. In
other words, variable fields, such as user names, IP or memory addresses, folders, and so on,
are replaced with the * wildcard. As a result, 1,124 distinct messages are identified. Next
a manual analysis is conducted to identify those messages reporting severe error conditions,
e.g., the messages reporting the events that caused the corruption of one or more jobs run in
the cluster. To this aim, available manuals and, when needed, direct support of the system
management team at the NCSA have been used to establish the meaning of the messages.
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Figure 5.14: Generation rate of the error entries: (A) # entries per minute, and (B) # nodes
per minute
A total of 76 unique error messages (out of 1,124) are found, which generated 377,197
entries in the log. The number of failures occurred in the system is inferred by grouping these
377,197 entries both with the tuple and the proposed lift-based heuristic.
Figure 5.14A shows how the generation rate of the error entries, i.e., entries per minute,
varies during the period the log has been collected. Figure 5.14B reports the number of
distinct nodes producing the entries each minute. It can be noted that usually only a single
node is responsible for the entries in the log; however, in some cases, up to 6 different
nodes generating the entries within the time window of 1 minute are observed. In these
cases, it is possible to experience collisions. The overall dataset is split into 2 subsets of
3 months. In the following Sections, they will be indicated as dataset #1 and dataset
#2. The same set of analyses has been repeated for both the datasets and, when needed,
obtained results are compared. The two datasets have different features in terms of total
Chapter 5. Experimental Results 151
Table 5.11: Error categories and occurrence of the entries.
Category Description dataset dataset
(acronym) #1 #2
Device errors related to peripherals 57,248 244,301
(DEV) and PCI cards
Memory memory-related non 12,819 49,491
(MEM) correctable errors
Network communication issue raised 3,702 973
(NET) by a machine
Input/Output problems, such as SCSI disk 5,547 1,091
(I/O) errors, damaged sectors
Processor processor exceptions, 1,504 326
(PRO) machine check issues
Other other errors (not attributed 34 161
(OTH) to a specific category)
total 377,197 80,854 296,343
number of entries, and distribution of the entries among different error categories: repeating
the analyses over the datasets helped at achieving a better understanding of the collision
phenomena. Error messages are classified into 6 categories, as described in the two leftmost
columns of Table 5.11 along with the acronyms used in the rest of the dissertation. The two
rightmost columns of Table 5.11 report the breakup of the entries in the log by category
and dataset. Figure 5.15 reports, for each dataset, the breakup of the entries by node and
category. Only the 10 nodes with largest number of generated entries are reported in each
plot. Nodes belonging to the same architectural layer of the cluster exhibit a similar failure
behavior. For example, computation nodes are mostly prone to DEV and MEM errors. Storage
nodes exhibit a significant number of I/O errors. The tg-master node exhibits many NET
errors, mainly due to communication issues with other nodes. As noted by other studies in
the area, e.g., [38], there is a correlation between a node and its workload.
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(a) Dataset #1.
(b) Dataset #2.
Figure 5.15: Breakup of the entries by node and category.
5.3.2 Estimation of the Parameters of the Lift-Based Heuristic
The tuple heuristic is applied to each dataset to provide evidence of the collision phenomena
in case of multi-node systems. To this aim, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to assess
a suitable value for the coalescence window W. Figure 5.16 shows the tuple count as a
function of the size of the coalescence window3. According to [22], a reasonable choice for the
coalescence window is the value after the “knee” of the curve, where the tuple count sharply
flattens. A coalescence window of 240s is thus suitable for both the datasets. For the selected
window 476 and 1,206 tuples have been observed for dataset #1 and #2, respectively. These
values represent an approximation of the actual number of failures that have occurred in the
system. A similar coalescence window has also been adopted in other works in the area of
3For reasons of readability, Figure 5.16 does not report the tuple count for W=1s. In this case are observed
11,792 and 31,503 tuples for each dataset, respectively.
Chapter 5. Experimental Results 153
Figure 5.16: Tuple count as a function of the size of the coalescence window.
log analysis of supercomputing systems, e.g., [10]. This value of W has been used to conduct
a preliminary analysis, which is reported in this section. A detailed study is discussed
later in Section 5.3.3. As discussed, even when the coalescence window is carefully chosen,
the chance of experiencing distinct faults triggered coincidentally is not negligible in case
of multi-node systems: log entries reporting distinct problems can be erroneously grouped
together thus distorting the actual number of failures inferred from the log. The problem
stated in Section 4.4.1 is illustrated via examples encountered in the analyzed datasets.
Example 1. When applying the tuple heuristic to the dataset #1, it can be observed that
the following two entries are placed in the same tuple:
1 ( A ) 1174245458 tg−master NET
2 stream_eof connection to ∗ is bad remote service may be down message may be
3 corrupt or connection may have been dropped remotely . Node state to down
4 ( B ) 1174245678 tg−c324 PRO
5 +BEGIN HARDWARE ERROR STATE AT CMC
The temporal distance between (A) and (B) is 220s, i.e., smaller than the chosen window of
240s. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, this might be the result of a propagation phenomenon
or just an accidental collision. It should be noted that there is no discernible relationship
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between the two entries: they belong to different error categories and are logged by different
nodes. Nevertheless, due to the lack of ground truth, i.e., the knowledge of the actual failure
behavior, it is not possible to determine directly which is the correct option. As a matter of
fact, the event log is the only available data source to achieve insights regarding the failure
behavior of the system: no additional information is available to supplement the content of
existing logs. As described in Section 4.4.3, it has been observed that entry (A), i.e., the
NET event raised by tg-master, appears in 46 tuples. Entry (B), i.e., the PRO event raised
by tg-c324, appears in 30 tuple, but just one tuple contains both the entries. This finding
allows stating that it is reasonable to assume that the tuple likely represents a collision.
Another example, reported for the sake of illustration, is obtained by applying the tuple
heuristic to the dataset #2.
Example 2. Two DEV errors, raised by tg-s176 and tg-c407, respectively, are grouped
in the same tuple because their time difference is 125s, thus shorter than 240s. Individual
and joint counts have been assessed. (A) and (B) occur in 680 and 91 tuples, respectively;
however, only 6 tuples contain both the events. It is reasonable to assume that these entries
were triggered coincidentally rather than because of a propagating error. This example also
shows that it is possible to experience collisions between entries in the log belonging to the
same error category.
1 ( A ) 1181258107 tg−s176 DEV
2 + PCI Component Error Detail : Component Info : Vendor Id =∗ Device Id =∗ Class
3 Code =∗ Seg/Bus/Dev/Func =∗
4 ( B ) 1181258232 tg−c407 DEV
5 +BEGIN HARDWARE ERROR STATE AT CPE
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Figure 5.17: Lift: sensitivity analysis.
Figure 5.17 shows the plots summarizing the sensitivity analysis that has been conducted
to estimate the correlation threshold of the lift-based grouping heuristic, as described in
Section 4.4.2. Plots show that most of the pairs exhibit low values of the lift, thus represent-
ing uncorrelated entries. The analysis has been repeated for the values of the coalescence
window in the interval [120, 360]s, i.e., a set of reasonable values for W as shown in Figure
5.16. Results show that the values of the lift are rather insensitive to the underlying group-
ing. Plots for the values of W={120, 240, 360}s are reported. According to the distribution
reported in Figure 5.17, L is assumed to be 30 when analyzing the system log.
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5.3.3 Analysis of the system log
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and reliability have been adopted as reference metrics
to assess how T+ is able to infer a more realistic number of failures from the event log, and
to improve measurements. MTBF and reliability have been widely used in log-based failure
analysis studies, e.g., [38, 37], to characterize the behavior of an operational system. Such
measurements, estimated by considering both the overall system log and individual error
categories, provided further insights into the collision phenomenon. To this end, analysis
results produced by both T and T+ are compared when a proper coalescence window W
is selected. As discussed, 240s is a reasonable choice for W. Nevertheless, in order to drive
more general considerations, besides 240s, the analysis is repeated for a subset of values of
W in the interval [120,360]s (with a step of 30s), which are in the stable part of the curve
reporting the tuple count (Figure 5.16).
Results are summarized in Table 5.12. Column 1 shows the values of the coalescence
window. According to Figure 5.17, L, i.e, the correlation threshold, is assumed to be 30 for
all the values of W in the considered interval of coalescence windows. Recall that the value
of L is relatively insensitive to the underlying grouping of the entries. Column 5 reports the
number of collisions c, i.e., the difference between the tuple counts, namely, the number of
failures inferred from the system log, obtained with both the heuristics (reported in columns
4 and 2, respectively). It can be observed that the number of collisions increases as W in-
creases. In other words, the longer W the higher the chance, when using T , to include in the
same tuple entries related to independent faults triggered near the same time.
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Table 5.12: Sensitivity analysis of the tuple count and the MTBF obtained with T and T+
with respect to W.
W T MTBF T+ MTBF ∆C ∆M
(L=30) count (h) count c (h) % %
dataset #1
120 725 2.80 773 48 2.63 6.62 6.63
150 613 3.32 663 50 3.07 8.16 8.17
180 556 3.66 609 53 3.34 9.53 9.55
210 497 4.09 551 54 3.69 10.87 10.89
240 476 4.27 531 55 3.83 11.55 11.58
270 462 4.40 518 56 3.93 12.12 12.15
300 453 4.49 509 56 3.99 12.36 12.39
330 444 4.58 501 57 4.06 12.84 12.87
360 440 4.62 497 57 4.09 12.95 12.98
dataset #2
120 1,374 1.52 1,396 22 1.49 1.60 1.60
150 1,338 1.56 1,365 27 1.53 2.02 2.02
180 1,297 1.61 1,328 31 1.57 2.39 2.39
210 1,266 1.65 1,303 37 1.60 2.92 2.92
240 1,206 1.73 1,244 38 1.68 3.15 3.15
270 1,161 1.80 1,200 39 1.74 3.36 3.36
300 1,124 1.85 1,163 39 1.79 3.47 3.47
330 1,098 1.90 1,138 40 1.83 3.64 3.65
360 1,068 1.95 1,108 40 1.88 3.75 3.75
The distortion of the produced measurements is assessed as follows. Let vT and vT+ be
the values of a specific measure, e.g., the tuple count or the MTBF, obtained with T and T+,
respectively. The percentage difference of the values, i.e., ∆v =
|vT−vT+|
min(vT ,vT+)
·100%, quantifies
the distortion introduced on the value of the measure due to unaccounted collisions. As
shown in column 5 of Table 5.12, the number of collisions is almost in the same order for
both the datasets. Nevertheless, the distortion of produced measurements is different, since
the final number of tuples is around 530 and 1,200, for each dataset, respectively. For
instance, in the case of the reference coalescence window of 240s, the number of collisions
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is 55 and 38, respectively; however, the distortion introduced on the MTBF, i.e., ∆M , is
around 11.5% and 3.15%, respectively (similar percentages can be observed for the distortion
of the tuple count ∆C). In other words, in the first dataset, for a value of the MTBF of
about 4h and 15min, the difference of the measure due to unaccounted collisions is about
30min. Difference is small in the second dataset. It has to be noted that the MTBF is the
average value of the time intervals between the starting points of two subsequent tuples. As
described in Section 4.4.3, T+ introduces additional tuples in case of collisions. This results
in a greater number of tuples with respect to T within the same observation period of 3
months, thus, the obtained MTBF is shorter with respect to T .
The groupings obtained with T and T+ differ in terms of length and interarrival times
of the tuples. This difference alters reliability, i.e., the probability that the system provides
continuity of correct service over a certain amount of time. Figure 5.18A and 5.18B report
the distribution of the interarrival times of the tuples, obtained with T in case of the reference
coalescence window W=240s, for each dataset, respectively. The x-axis reports the duration
of the interarrival times (min), and the y-axis the probability of experiencing interarrivals
of that specific duration. The two datasets exhibit similar distributions. For example, the
probability of the interarrivals to be ≥10min is 0.86 and 0.76 for the dataset #1 and #2,
respectively. It should be noted that, when using T , it is not possible to obtain interarrivals
shorter than the coalescence window. In other words, the first four bins of the plots 5.18A
and 5.18B, i.e., 0, 1, 2, and 3min, do not have any samples: T+ overcomes this limitation
because it introduce tuples even if the time difference of the entries in the log is shorter than
W. Figure 5.18C, 5.18D, 5.18E, and 5.18F will be discussed later in the dissertation.
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Figure 5.18: Analysis of the system log: distribution of the interarrival times (A,B) and
length (C,D) of the tuples obtained with T . Number of collisions with respect to the length
of the tuples (E,F).
The different distribution of the interarrivals obtained with T and T+ alters reliability
measurements. This can be observed in Figure 5.19. More in details, Figure 5.19a and 5.19b
provide the reliability plots obtained with the two heuristics for each dataset, respectively.
Furthermore, it is shown the difference between them (d series). The x-axis reports time in
hours. The y-axis reports the probability that system does not exhibit any failure, i.e., of
any type, such as, DEV, I/O, etc., and from any node, during that interval of time. It can
be observed that the probability that the system does not experience any failure, after an
operational time of 24 hours, is very low. As for the MTBF, distortion is more significant in
the dataset #1. For example, after 2 hours of operations, reliability in dataset #1 is around
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(a) Dataset #1. (b) Dataset #2.
Figure 5.19: System reliability obtained with T and T+.
0.457 and 0.413, when applying T and T+, respectively. The distortion ∆r, is around 10%.
Again, distortion is smaller in dataset #2; the higher number of tuples experienced in this
dataset keeps down distortion even if the number of collisions is almost the same.
5.3.4 Analysis of the individual error categories
The content of both datasets is analyzed by considering each category of error individually.
This type of analysis is useful for pointing out the most failure-prone subsystems, and it
shows that T+ can improve the process of inferring the failures from the log. In the following,
the main findings of the analysis are presented. Results show that even when resorting
to fine-grain analysis, dependability measurements can be distorted by collisions between
failures belonging to the same category. Results are summarized in Table 5.13. Because of
space limitations, the tuple count and the MTBF, achieved with both the heuristics and
for each dataset is reported for a single value of the coalescence window. In particular,
for each category, performing the sensitivity analyses described in the previous sections has
identified a suitable combination (W-L); this combination is used to coalesce the entries of
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Table 5.13: Analysis of the tuple count and the MTBF obtained with T and T+ for each
category of error.
CTG T MTBF T+ MTBF ∆C ∆M
W-L count (h) count c (h) % %
DEV 312 6.50 333 21 6.09 6.73 6.75
240-30 958 2.11 976 18 2.07 1.88 1.88
I/O 93 21.43 102 9 19.52 9.68 9.78
240-40 60 32.04 64 4 30.00 6.66 6.78
MEM 68 29.12 70 2 28.28 2.94 2.99
360-20 87 17.95 90 3 17.35 3.45 3.49
NET 66 31.13 68 2 30.20 3.03 3.08
240-20 87 23.53 87 0 23.53 0 0
PRO 71 27.90 71 0 27.90 0 0
120-20 62 32.32 62 0 32.32 0 0
OTH 13 163.97 13 0 163.97 0 0
360-30 66 29.10 67 1 28.66 1.52 1.54
that category in both the datasets. Column 1 reports these values. Each category has its
own pair (W,L). Given the row related to a category of error (Table 5.13), the upper row
reports results obtained for the dataset #1; for the lower one, the results obtained are for
the dataset #2.
The number of collisions varies with respect to the specific category of error (Table 5.13,
column 5). The DEV and I/O ones exhibit a relevant number of collisions. On the other
hand, this phenomenon is almost negligible for NET or PRO errors. Given a specific category,
the number of collisions is similar for each dataset, e.g., 21 and 18 for DEV, 9 and 4 for I/O,
and so on; however, the distortion introduced on the value of the produced measure, i.e.,
∆C and ∆M , is significantly different. For example, 21 and 18 collisions are observed for the
DEV category. Nevertheless, the distortion of the MTBF is about 6.75% and 1.88%, for each
dataset, respectively, thus negligible in dataset #2. On the contrary, collisions significantly
distort measurements achieved for both the dataset in case of the I/O category.
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Figure 5.20: Analysis of the individual error categories: distribution of the interarrival times
(A,B,C,D) and length (E,F,G,H) of the tuples obtained with T . Number of collisions with
respect to the length of the tuples (I,L,M,N).
Figure 5.20A, 5.20B, 5.20C, and 5.20D report the distributions of the interarrival times
of the tuples obtained when applying T to each category of error. Due to space limitations,
for the same category of error samples coming from both the datasets are aggregated in the
same plot. Again, it can be noted that interarrivals shorter than the coalescence window are
not allowed with T ; this, in turn, alters reliability measurements. For example, Figure 5.21a
reports the reliability plots obtained for the DEV category, in the dataset #1, and obtained
with T and T+, respectively. Reliability after 1 hour is about 0.56 and 0.53 according to
T and T+, respectively; as a result ∆r is around 5.6%. Similar considerations hold for the
I/O category (Figure 5.21b). In this case, the distortion is around 9.5%.
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(a) DEV - dataset #1. (b) I/O - dataset #1.
Figure 5.21: Reliability of DEV and I/O categories obtained with T and T+.
5.3.5 Discussion
The analysis of the log of the Mercury cluster, reveals that the grouping technique
impacts the ability at inferring the failure-related data from the system log.
As a result of this deficiency, measurements obtained by means of log-based
failure analysis are overestimated. The overestimation occurs both for the system log
(Section 5.3.3) and individual error categories (Section 5.3.4). The distortion introduced on
dependability figures of the system is not negligible: for example, the MTBF is altered by
11.5% with the basic tuple heuristic. Furthermore, reducing the granularity of the analysis,
i.e., by considering individual categories of error separately, leads to a smaller distortion, e.g.,
9.78% in the worst case (I/O failures, dataset #1); however, it does not seem to improve
the quality of obtained results.
Analyzed data do not highlight the existence of a particular relationship between colli-
sions and characteristics of the produced tuples, such as the distribution of the interarrivals
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or their length. or example, similar interarrival distributions result in a different vulnera-
bility to the collision phenomenon. As reported in Figure 5.20A and 5.20B, DEV and MEM
exhibit a similar trend, e.g., in both the cases the percentage of interarrivals ≤60min is
around 61% and 62%, respectively; however the number of collisions is almost negligible for
the MEM category. A similar finding has been observed for the I/O and NET categories (Figure
5.20C and 5.20D).
The length of the tuples does not seem to affect the chance of experiencing a collision,
despite one might think that the longer the tuple the higher the probability of having
a collision. Figure 5.18C, 5.18D and 5.20E, 5.20F, 5.20G, 5.20H report the distribution
of length of the tuples for the system log and individual categories of error, respectively.
More specifically, the x-axis reports the length of the tuples in min, and the y-axis the
probability of experiencing a tuple of that specific length. Similarly, Figure 5.18E, 5.18F
and 5.20I, 5.20L, 5.20M, 5.20N show the number of collision tuples (y-axis), i.e., the tuples
that according to T+ contain a collision, as a function of the length. In other words, given
all the tuples that exhibit a specific length, the y-axis reports how many of them resulted in
collisions. The plots indicate a higher number of collisions for short durations of the tuples;
however, this is due to the fact that the probability of experiencing short tuples is higher.
In practice, collisions can be observed also for a longer duration of the tuples.
Conclusion
The thesis faced issues and challenges concerning the use of event logs for the analysis of
system failures. Event logs, which report events of interest occurring during operations,
are valuable to achieve insights into dependability characteristics of computer systems and
to improve their subsequent releases. The thesis discussed a substantial body of literature
using event logs: discussion highlighted that, the analysis of failure data in the log, is
extremely useful in a variety of application domains. For example, it makes it possible
to classify errors and failures, evaluating dependability properties, validating assumptions
made in system models, or predicting failures. Nevertheless, novel industry trends, that
have been impacting dependability-related research over the past decades, are threatening
the effectiveness of logs.
Among the first contributions on this topic, the thesis demonstrated that, the shifting of
the failure causes from hardware to software, has made logs strongly inaccurate. Software
fault injection campaigns allowed estimating that around 67% of software failures go unde-
tected by the logging mechanism: in other words, around 7 out of every 10 actual failures
are unreported in the log. Furthermore, experiments demonstrated that event logs (i) re-
port many false positives, i.e., failure notifications that do not correspond to actual failures,
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and (ii) are highly verbose. These results show that the level of trust on log-based failure
analysis is strongly biased by inaccuracy of logs. The research prompted the investigation
of implementation pitfalls of current logging mechanisms. The analysis of the source code of
eight successful open-source and industrial projects, accounting for total around 3.5 million
lines of code, revealed that the scarce detection ability of current logging mechanisms is
caused by the assumption of a too simplistic error model.
Based on the lessons learnt from the analysis, novel techniques, which aim to make logs
effective to infer failure data, are proposed. Techniques involve production, collection, and
correlation of the failure data in the log to support accurate dependability characterization.
Engineers can adopt a subset if not, all, the proposed techniques depending on different
parameters, such as the type of analysis they aim to perform, the accuracy of the results
they want to achieve, the degree of intervention they can operate on the system. The rule-
based logging mechanism exploits design artifacts and proposes a set of precise rules to
drive the effective placement of logging instructions within the source code of systems. For
example, the approach improves the detection of timing failures by means of the introduction
of multiple logging points to monitor the progression of the control flow of the program.
Logbus provides not only a mere a log-centralization support, but integrates integrates on-
line monitoring features that allow supplementing the content of existing event logs when
failures occur. Finally, the lift-based grouping heuristic allows pinpointing failure data in the
log that are related to the manifestation of the same problem. Experimentation described
in the thesis highlights the benefits of the techniques. Among the others, they
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• Reduce, if not eliminate, preprocessing effort to analyze the data log. Tra-
ditional logs require significant manual efforts and ad-hoc procedures to identify and
extract events of interest from the log (e.g., occurrences of system reboots and failures).
The Logbus infrastructure and tools, such as on-agent, produce a system architecture-
aware log, which is based on a precise error model: the log can be used to directly
derive dependability measurements.
• Preserve the findings of traditional event logs. The evidence provided by tra-
ditional event logs is only a subset of the one achievable by means of proposed tech-
niques. For example, most of the failures detected by means of rule-based logging
can not detected via traditional approaches; Logbus infrastructure can generate fur-
ther knowledge about the behavior of the system by means of monitoring artifacts
integrated in the logging framework.
• Significantly improve accuracy of traditional techniques to infer the failure
data from the log. Rule-based logging improves detection of software failures by
more than 60% when compared to the traditional logging mechanism. The proposed
lift-based grouping heuristic allows discriminating multiple failure dynamics in com-
plex distributed systems, and demonstrates that, neglecting correlation among failure
entries in the log, distort measurement by more that 11.5%.
• Reduce the amount of information actually needed to perform the failure
analysis. Rule-based log is around 160 times smaller than the traditional one, as
indicated by the verbosity parameter; furthermore, it has been observed that the size
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of the log produced by the Logbus infrastructure over a long running experiment, is
less that 5.7% when compared to traditional ones. Improvement does not introduce
information loss to failure analysis.
Techniques proposed in the thesis contributed to improve the evaluation of real, complex
distributed systems. As a matter of fact, experimentation has ranged from commodity
software, such as web servers and middleware supports, to supercomputing systems and
critical application domains as the Air Traffic Control. Some of the algorithms and artifacts
described in thesis have been the basis to develop tool suites that are currently available on
the web.
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